port them effectually and safely in our own vessels, our navy would be starved on the seas for want of Coal, and our population starved at home for want of Bread. Whatever commerce of whatever other Power the Declaration might protect, it would not protect the most vital commerce of this country.

THE DECLARATION OFFERS NO SECURITY FOR THE ABOLITION OF PRIVATEERING.

Others there are who, while they admit that Great Britain has been placed under a grave disadvantage by accepting the doctrine that the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, declare that she at the same time gained a compensating and equivalent advantage in the abolition, so-called, of privateering. The Declaration of Paris, they say, was of the nature of a bargain in which a valuable right was given for a valuable immunity. But unfortunately for those who so argue, the terms of the bargain are such that while every security is afforded that the right shall not be exercised, no security whatever is given that the immunity shall be enjoyed. The obligation to allow the neutral flag to cover enemy's goods, is an obligation towards all the States which shall remain neutral during the war. They profit by it, they have every interest in enforcing it, and every right to resist its infraction. It is an obligation towards all the world, less the other belligerent; and one which all the world has a clear right to enforce and a paramount interest in enforcing. Not so the obligation to desist from privateering. In that the belligerent is bound towards the other belligerent alone; and if he chooses to break his obligation, there is none to enforce it except that other belligerent, who, being already engaged in levy

ing war upon him, is already doing his worst, and can do no more. The result is that while there is every security against the infraction of the one obligation, there is every inducement to the infraction of the other, should its infraction promise advantage; and that, whenever Great Britain shall be at war with any naval Power, she will be exposed at once to suffer all the disadvantage inflicted by the Declaration, and to reap none of the advantage said to be afforded by it; at once to be harassed by the enemy's privateers, and to be prohibited from touching the enemy's commerce. That this is no idle fear is proved by the language of the Russian press and merchants, who, recently forecasting the chances of a war with Great Britain, openly advised their Government to repudiate the first rule of the Declaration of Paris and to fit out privateers against British commerce.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE EFFECT OF THE DECLARATION OF PARIS ON CARRYING TRADE.

ONE of the first effects of war would undoubtedly be the subjecting of all capturable property on the seas to "War Risk" premiums of insurance. Mr. Dawson, a recent writer on the subject, tells us that during the great wars with Napoleon the war risk premium rose on voyages from Russia, Norway, Sweden and the Baltic, in 1811, to 22 per cent. This, however, was unusually high, the average rate of premium during 1812 being 6.5 per cent., as compared with 0.339 per cent. during 1892. Mr. Dawson adds:

"An average all-round premium for our present trade would "be about 148. taking steam and sail together, and for steam only about 10s. per cent."

And he proceeds to say:

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"In one respect we shall probably feel our war premiums, when they do come, more keenly than we did before. If they reach "only the actual level they reached in the latter years of the "last war, they will increase eight or tenfold the ordinary "marine rate before the war. It is true this might not make "the total premium so heavy as it was eighty years ago. But "it would handicap us in our competition for the carrying-trade "of the world, where we have now hardly a rival, to a very

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Our Next War in its Commercial Aspect. J. T. Dawson. London, 1894, pp. 91-92, 94, 96.

“serious extent. For five per cent. on the value carried, added "to our freight and insurance (percentages being counted as they are in these days) would be very serious in its effect."

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Before the Declaration of Paris, enemy's property was capturable under any flag, and therefore paid the war risk premium, whether shipped in a neutral or in a belligerent bottom. But under the Declaration of Paris, enemy's property is capturable only when in a belligerent, and not when in a neutral, bottom. The war risk premium, therefore, whether of 5 or of 22 per cent. would attach, in case Great Britain were at war, only to British property carried in British merchant vessels; and not to British property carried in neutral vessels the same being, of course, equally true as regards the other belligerent. Under the old rule a British merchant vessel was as safe as any other for British property; under the new rule it would be less safe, and the difference of risk would be represented by what the war risk premium settled down to, whether 5 or 20 per cent-which would be an additional charge to that extent, on British commerce carried in British merchant vessels.

It seems impossible to doubt, neither has any competent person who has looked into the matter ever doubted, that the effect of this must be at once largely, if not wholly, to divert British trade into neutral bottoms. The British merchant vessel would be deserted for the neutral by the British merchant; it would, in addition, be unable to continue the carrying it formerly did in time of peace for the present enemy; and, not all indeed, but a large proportion of our tonnage must be laid up for want of employment. Meantime a new and great demand has sprung up for neutral carriage. The neutral has had laid open to him, first the whole carrying-trade of the other

belligerent, which can no longer use either its own ships, or the British ships which formerly carried for it; and, secondly, a considerable portion of the carrying-trade of Great Britain herself. The neutral, it is true, does not possess the necessary tonnage for carrying on this new trade. But the laid-up ships of Great Britain, as well as those of the other belligerent, will be for sale, and for sale cheap; and a proportion of these, added to those that can be built by the neutral at home, will drive a roaring trade, and pay for themselves over and over again. Meantime, the result is that a large part-or as some think the whole-of the British carrying trade is lost, possibly never to be recovered.

This effect of war under the Declaration of Paris is ably set forth by the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Merchant Shipping, which sat in 1860, and which, appalled by the prospect it had itself set forth, hastily suggested as its own remedy the exemption of all private property from capture at sea-a suggestion dealt with elsewhere. The Committee, on page xiii of its Report, says:

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America was invited to be a party to this general international "agreement, but demurred, and coupled at first her assent to "the abolition of privateering with the condition that private "property at sea should no longer be subject to capture. Finally "she refused to be a party to a convention whereby she would "be precluded from resorting to her merchant marine for privateering purposes in case she became a belligerent. But this "is not surprising, for the United States has obtained a recog"nition of the rights of neutrals for which she contended "throughout a former period of hostilities, and Great Britain "has surrendered her rights without any equivalent from the "United States. Our shipowners will thereby be placed at an "immense disadvantage in the event of a war breaking out with any important European power. In fact, should the Declaration of Paris remain in force during a period of hostilities, the

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