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The Bill for raising an additional Military Force being under consideration; on motion of the Hon. Mr. Anderson to strike out the word "ten,” for the purpose of inserting a smaller number of regiments, Mr. GILES rose, and submitted, in substance, the following observations.

MR. GILES faid he found himself in a very unprepared ftate, called upon to oppofe a very unexpected motion. The object of the mover had not been very precifely expreffed, but he had mentioned the number of 12,000 infantry as preferable to twenty thousand, about the number provided for by the bill. Mr. Giles faid it was alfo understood, that a force of ten thousand men of every description would more correfpond with the executive views, and fully answer the executive requifition. This, he believed, was the fact. Notwithstanding this circumstance, however, confidering the late occurrences on our western frontiers, and the feelings of the western people fo juftly excited thereby, &c. he acknowledged that the motion had come from the most unexpeced quarter of the union, and from a gentleman the most unexpected to him of all those who reprefent the western portion of the United States; becaufe, from the long courfe of military services honorably rendered by that gentleman during the revolutionary war, he muft have become well acquainted with the abfolute neceffity of a due degree of momentum in military affairs.

Mr. Giles faid he did not propofe to go into a full expofition of our foreign relations at this time, yet the motion furnished a moft extenfive fcope for obfervation, because if it fhould unfortunately fucceed, it would effentially derange, as he conceived, the whole views of the committee, who had reported the bill. He would therefore prefent to the Senate, the most prominent and important confiderations, which he prefumed had operated on the committee,and had certainly on himself, to induce the recommendation of twenty-five thousand men, as the fmalleft poffible quantum of force demanded by the crifis, and to demonftrate the advan. tages of a force at least to that extent, over that which feemed to be contemplated by the honorable mover, and ftill more over that which is faid to confift with the executive project.

In the confideration of this fubject, it is important to turn our attention to the objects for which a military force is demanded, to enable us the better to apportion the means to the objects inten

ded to be effected. For this purpose he begged the moft ferious attention of the Senate to the President's Message at the commencement of the feffion.

"I muft now add, (obferves the Prefident,) that the period has arrived, which claims from the legiflative guardians of the national rights a system of more ample provifions for maintaining them. -Notwithstanding the fcrupulous juftice, the protracted moderation, and the multiplied efforts on the part of the United States to fubftitute for the accumulating dangers to the peace of the two countries, all the mutual advantages of re-cftablished friendship and confidence; we have feen that the Britith cabinet perfeveres, not only in withholding a remedy for other wrongs fo long and fo loudly calling for it: but in the execution, brought home to the threshold of our territory, of meafures which, under exifting circumstances, have the character as well as the effect, of WAR on our lawful commerce.

"With this evidence of hoftile inflexibility, in trampling on rights which no independent nation can relinquish, Congrefs will feel the duty of putting the United States into an armour and attitude demanded by the crisis, and correfponding with the national spirit and expectations.

"I recommend, accordingly, that adequate provision be made for filling the ranks and prolonging the enliftments of the regular troops; for an auxiliary force to be engaged for a more limited term; for the acceptance of volunteer corps, whofe patriotic ardor may court a participation in urgent fervices; for detachments, as they may be wanted, of other portions of the militia, and for fuch. a preparation of the great body as will proportion its usefulness to its intrinfic capacity.'

Here we find, in the first place, the moft folemn and imperious call upon Congrefs in the character of the "legislative guardians of the national rights for a fystem of more ample provifions for maintaining them." The Prefident then very properly and emphatically proceeds to tell us why he makes, this folemn call upon the legiflative guardians at this time. He tells us in fubftance, that notwithstanding the fcrupulous juftice, the protracted moderation, and the multiplied efforts on the part of the United States," to induce Great Britain to recede from her hoftile aggreffions upon their effential fovereign rights, fo far from yielding to thefe polite and pathetic invitations, fhe had increafed her aggreffions, and had adopted "measures which under exifting circumftances, have the character as well as the effect, of war on our neutral commerce;" and that these measures are, in their execution, "brought home to the threshold of our territory." Could the Prefident have chofen language more emphatic to fhew the imperious character of the call made upon Congrefs to furnish him with adequate phyfical means to retreive the honor and redrefs the wrongs of the nation? Left there might be fome poffible miftake on the part of Congrefs, he tells us explicitly, that the aggreflions

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of Great Britain have the character, as well as the effect,of war upon our lawful commerce, and that this war is brought home to the threshold of our territory.

But the Prefident does not ftop here. He tells us that notwithstanding our protracted moderation, &c. &c. Great Britain, with hoftile inflexibility, perfeveres in trampling on effential fove. reign rights; rights, at least," which no independent nation can relinquith." Here then, it is evident that the Prefident conceives, that our independence, as a nation, is brought into queftion, and put at hazard. Can any object prefent a more awful and imperious call upon Congress to exert and apply the whole energies of the nation, than a queftion of INDEPENDENCE? The plain English of all this communication, he understood to be, that all the inefficient meafures, which have been adopted in relation to the belligerents for three years past had not answered the expectations of their projectors; but instead of the expected receffion, had produced, on the part of Great Britain at least, inflexible hoftility. This was a very natural result, and one which he had always anticipated, as was well known to this honorable body. But the administration, having learnt wisdom by these feeble experiments, had now determined to change its courfe, and for the purpose of rendering this hoftility more flexible, had at length refolved, inftead of commercial reftrictions, to try the effect of phyfical force. An adequate force is therefore demanded by the executive; and the adequacy of that force is very properly referred to Congress where the refponsibility is placed by the conftitution; where it ought to reft; and, for one he was willing to take his full fhare of it. But the Prefident goes further. After defignating the objects, he points out the ftandard for afcertaining the adequacy of the force demanded for their effectuation. In his official refponfible meffage, he tells us that "Congrefs will feel the duty of putting the U. States into an armor, and an attitude demanded by the crifis, and correfponding with the national spirit and expectations." The standard here pointed out for calculating the quantum of force to be fupplied is "The Crifis," (which had been previously described in the moft folemn and impofing terms) and "the national spirit and expectations." Whether the committee had reported too great a force for fubdu. ing the crifis, he was willing to fubmit to the verdict of the national spirit and expectations.

But it is now faid or intimated in fubftance, that this official refponsible standard is only oftenfible, and that the true standard for eftimating the quantum of force demanded, must be derived from the decrepid ftate of the treasury, and the financial fame of the gentleman at the head of that department-This fubject will require a diftinct confideration; but in the mean time it is fufficient to say, that the committee unanimoufly refused to be influenced by any confiderations, but thofe refulting from the official responsible communication, and their own reflections upon the

ftate of the nation as difclofed thereby. They unanimoufly rejected informal inofficial communications.

It will be observed too, in the meffage, the Prefident, in his more specific recommendations, after defignating the kinds of force fuited to the occafion, leaves the quantum of each to be judged of, and decided by Congrefs, where the refponsibility did and ought to reft; and Mr. G. was unwilling, by receding from his conftitutional duty, to revert this refponfibility upon the executive.

It thus appearing, faid Mr. G. that the force demanded was for the purpose of war, if unfortunately we fhould be driven by G. Britain to that laftrefort; and that although the war would be undertaken upon principles ftrictly defenfive, yet in its operation it muft neceffarily become offenfive on our part; and that Congrefs was to determine exclufively upon the adequacy of the means for conducting it; he would now proceed to inquire more particularly, 1ft, whether the committee had recommended a force more than adequate to the purposes of the war; and 2d, whether it was within the capacity of the U. States to fupply the force thus recommended?

Mr. G. faid that in eftimating the quantum of force demanded by the exifting crifis, it appeared to him, gentlemen had not giv. en fufficient confideration to the attitude affumed by the United States, in relation to the Floridas, to the extention of our fouthern and western frontiers, to the late hoftile acts and threatenings in that quarter; nor to the importance of Orleans, its expofed pofition and defencelefs fituation. These circumftances, however, entered deeply into the confideration of the committee, and induced it to conclude that the whole military establishment now authorised by law, if completed, would not be more than fufficient, perhaps infufficient, to answer the neceffary objects of the gov ernment in the fcenes juft defcribed; it was therefore intended that the whole of that force fhould be left free to act therein according to circumstances, and that the additional force now recommended fhould act exclufively in the northern and eaftern portion of the union. This force no gentleman will pretend can be too great for our objects in that quarter, in the event of war, unaided by the exifting establishment--Hence it was matter of great furprize to him, that the western gentlemen fhould with to diminish the number of men now propofed to be raised; because he believed, that every man deducted from the proposed force, would take one from the force intended by the committee to protect our fouthern and western frontiers. Thefe gentlemen, he prefumed, must be better judges than himfelf how many of thefe men they can generously fpare from their own protection; but for his part he thought there was not one to fpare from thefe objects, and the committee were willing to give the whole of them that deftination.

With respect to the protection of Orleans, he knew it was the

expectation of the late administration, that in the event of war, Great-Britain would poffefs herself of that city; and it was not their intention to incur the expense of being constantly prepared to repel the firft incurfions of the enemy: He did not know the intention of the prefent adminiftration in that refpect, but prefumed it was acting on the fame policy. In cafe the Britifh fhould take pofseffion of Orleans, the western people muft neceffarily be called on to drive them out, and he doubted very much whether it would be a very acceptable occupation or a very eafy task. He had always difsapproved of this policy, and in the event of war, he thought it wife, not only to be prepared for defence at all points, but to give the firft blow. He believed, in the end, it would be found, not only the wifeft, but the most economical policy, both in blood and treasure.

Having prefented to the Senate the objects to which the existing military establishment ought to be affigned, according to the vews of the committee, he would proceed to inquire, whether the additional force recommended would be more than competent to the objects to which it muft necefsarily be affigned, and which ought unquestionably to be effected by it. In cafe of war, an event he deprecated as much as any gentleman prefent, the new army would have to man your fortifications on the fea board from Norfolk to the extremities of our territory north and east and to occupy Canada. Thefe are the contemplated and indispenfable objects of this army, in the eftimation of the Executive and the honorable mover, as well as of the committee. The queftion will therefore turn upon the accuracy and correctness of their refpective calculations as to the quantum of force necefsary to effect thefe objects.

Mr. G. faid he had a converfation with the Secretary for the department of War, in his character of chairman of the committee of foreign relations, in which the Secretary did endeavor to demonftrate to him, that a smaller number of men than 25.000 would answer thefe objects; but fo far from producing this conviction, it fatisfied him that the number was too fmall. He thought that every inference drawn by the honorable Secretary, ought to have been inverted. For inftance, he was asked, how many men were indifpenfably neceffary to man the fortifications at New-York. The honorable Secretary replied 2000 but he intended to make 1000 anfwer, and would rely for the reft of the complement on the local militia. Now, faid Mr. G. he inferred, if 2000 men were neceffary for that moft expofed and important pofition, that 1000 could not answer with the precarious and accidental aid of the local militia; that 2000 ought to be calculated on for that service; and if with the aid of the local militia they could protect New-York against the force Great-Britain might detach againft that city, they would perform their full fhare of the toils and perils of the war. Two thoufand men, completely furnished with all the means of annoyance, pof

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