gant and the dissolute generally live beyond their means, and therefore have the strongest desire, as well as the strongest necessity, for borrowing. In proportion as their wants rise, they are more ready to contract for high interest; and as they are unable to pay when the proper time for payment arrives, they are compelled to submit to further exactions; and the creditors, as they perceive an increasing hazard of losing the principal, are disposed to indemnify themselves against the risk by additional premiums. From these combined operations, always going on, in such cases, with accelerated force, there is almost a certainty of ultimate ruin to such borrowers. The creditors are thus compelled to more vigilance, and to more effort to obtain or secure payment, until, at last, the borrowers seem to be the victims of misfortunes which they are unable to resist, and the creditors to be the instruments of harsh and vindictive oppression. Thus public sympathy becomes enlisted on the side of the sufferers, without adverting to the rights or the indulgences of the creditors, simply because the latter can bear the loss without as much suffering. But a more extensive ground of prejudice has been derived from religious sources. Those who are enemies to the allowance of interest in general, often make no distinction between that and usury, and hold each to be equally reprehensible. Christians, in an especial manner, have drawn arguments from the prohibition of usury by the law of Moses, among the Jews; and the school divines, partly on this account, and partly on the authority of Aristotle, who has fancifully said that money is naturally barren, and to make it breed money is preposterous, have not hesitated to pronounce it contrary to the divine law, both natural and revealed. The canon law, too, has proscribed the taking of any, even the least, interest for the loan of money, as a mortal sin. It is not surprising, under such circumstances, that men, in the dark ages, should have looked with horror upon the taking of interest, and that the military and feudal lords of those days, who were always needy, and always borrowing, full of the pride of birth and rank, and full of disdain for the humbler avocations of life, and especially of those connected with the accumulation of money, should have looked with contempt upon the usurer, and have augmented the popular delusion. But that, in enlightened times, the religious scruples to which we have alluded should still have

prevailed, is one more illustration of the difficulty of correcting error when it has once fastened itself on the community. Nothing can be clearer, than that the Mosaic precept was merely a political, and not a moral precept. It did not prohibit the Jews from all taking of usury It only prohibited them from taking it from their own brethren, the Jews. But the Mosaic law, in express words, permitted them to take it of a stranger. The Jews have, accordingly, been great money-lenders upon interest in all ages; and this has, probably, in Christian countries, still more augmented the prejudice against this venerable, but unfortunate people. Indeed, so strongly is this prejudice fixed, that a man of a sordid and avaricious character is, even now, proverbially called a Jew. There is however, not the slightest foundation, either in natural or revealed religion, for any prohibition against the taking of interest upon money, any more than against the taking of a profit for the use of any other thing loaned. But the policy of most nations has not suffered the right or rate of interest to rest upon the mere moral law, or the doctrines of religion. In almost all nations, in modern times, the legislature have regulated the subject, and prohibited, under severe penalties, all contracts and bargains, by which any excess of interest, beyond the rate prescribed by the law, is secured. In many countries, they have declared all such contracts utterly void, so that even the principal loan cannot be recovered; thus making the supposed want of conscience, on one side, a full justification of the grossest want of conscience on the other. In some countries, they have allowed the interest, if paid, to be recovered back. In other countries, they have refused this, and adopted an intermediate course, allowing a recovery of the principal, sometimes with a small interest, and sometimes with no interest, Among statesmen and political economists, it has been for a long time a vexed question, how far the regulation of interest upon money is founded in sound policy, or public convenience. That it should be regulated by the legislature to the extent of declaring, by a general rule, what interest shall be allowed when the parties have been silent, and what shall be allowed where there has been a wilful delay of payment beyond the stipulated period, would seem to be a proposition suscepti ble of little question or debate. It is far better to have some certain rule, in suck

cases, to furnish a universal guide, than to leave the amount to be ascertained by a judicial decision in every case of difference between the parties. And where the parties have been silent, if such a rule exists, it may fairly be presumed to be acquiesced in or adopted by them. The question, then, is not, whether the law ought, in cases unprovided for by the parties, to adopt some uniform measure of interest, but whether the parties should be prohibited from stipulating for any rate of interest which they may choose. In former ages, it was quite a common practice for legislatures to regulate the rate of buying and selling many commodities, so as to restrain the ratio of profits within certain limits. Such regulations would now be generally deemed unphilosophical and impolitic, as well as oppressive. All that the law would now attempt to accomplish, would be to prevent imposition, fraud and circumvention in such contracts. Why should not the same principles apply to bargains about money? Why should a man,dealing fairly and openly, be prevented by the laws from making as high a profit upon the sale or loan of money as upon the sale or loan of merchandise? The general grounds upon which legislation upon the subject of the interest of money has been justified, as contradistinguished from other profitable contracts, are, the prevention of excessive interest; the prevention of prodigality; the protection of the poor and needy against extortion; the suppression of rash enterprise, and the security of the weak and credulous against imposition. Now, it will be found, upon a careful examnination, that some of these grounds are quite unsatisfactory and delusive; and some of them are equally applicable to all other contracts and bargains as well as to loans of money. So far as the object of laws is to prevent oppression and imposition, and undue advantage of the strong over the weak and credulous, the principle should apply to all contracts, not by regulating the terms of every contract a priori, and settling what, under all the circumstances, should be just and reasonable, but by providing, by general principles of law, that unconscionable and oppressive contracts, where undue advantage is taken of the weakness, or credulity, or necessity, of the other party, shall be either wholly set aside, or reduced to moderation, upon a full trial of each particular cause, and an examination of all the facts, so as to make the decision just in itself, er æquo et bono. There is nothing in the nature of

contracts for loans of money which, in this respect, makes it either necessary or proper to distinguish them from others. Nor is it easy to see how prodigality would be encouraged by the facility of borrowing any more than of buying. Interest will always bear a steady proportion to the means of repayment, and the punctuality of the performance of the contract. If persons are prodigal and extravagant, they will not be less inclined to borrow because the laws have protected them against paying an undue interest; and if they do borrow under such circumstances, they must either give an extravagant interest, in order to indemnify the lender against the additional risk from its illegality, or else they will borrow upon the usual terms; and in neither case does the prohibition answer its purpose. The interest of money must ordinarily be regulated in practice by the value of the use to the borrower as well as the lender, by the general demand for it, and by the hazard of repayment. If the demand be small, and the security be good, the interest will be low. If the demand be great, the interest will be high, although the security be good. And if the demand be great, and the security doubtful, it is obvious that the price will be proportionally enhanced, since it includes the risk of loss as well as the value of the use. Now, it is certain that these three ingredients admit of very various combinations, and that there are perpetual changes going on in relation to each. Nothing is more uncertain or variable than the demand for money, and the facility of obtaining it. It depends upon a thousand circumstances, political, commercial, and even local. No man can foresee them; and no legislation can suitably provide for them. The very elements upon which to found a rule admit of no arrangement and no certainty. Is it not, therefore, unwise, as well as unjust, to establish a general rule to govern all cases, when the rule itself cannot work the same way any two days in succession throughout the year? On the other hand, there are positive mischiefs attendant upon all absolute regulations of this subject. In the first place, no laws can practically reduce the rate of intetest below the lowest ordinary market rate at the time when the money is wanted. It will be borrowed, at all events, if there is a necessity; and in proportion as the demand grows more urgent, there will be a correspondent disposition to evade and break down the restriction. Thus a tendency is cre

ated to a habitual disobedience to the laws-a tendency which, in every view, moral as well as political, is deeply to be deprecated. In the next place, it operates greatly to the discouragement of trade and commerce. Nothing more favors the interests of commerce than a general liberty to buy and sell without restraint or obstruction. If the party can always obtain money, while he possesses good credit, without any restraint as to the interest he shall give for it, from the rise or fall of markets, he will naturally be induced to extend his business, and may extend it with comparative security and advantage. But, if he is obliged to calculate all possible chances of relieving his necessities beforehand, with the knowledge that, if money rises in the market, he must borrow upon disadvantageous terms, he will not embark at all in enterprises which go beyond his own present means; or he will take the risk, and, if the exigency arises, he must pay proportionally higher, because the law gives no validity to the contract. He must pay the lender for trusting to his honor and honesty, and not to the authority of the laws. In short, the moment it is admitted (what can hardly be disputed) that commerce cannot well subsist, to a great degree, in any country, without mutual and extensive credits, it is obvious that every measure that facilitates and gives security to such credits must be beneficial. Another evil attendant upon restrictive laws is, that, in any scarcity or extraordinary emergency, they unavoidably enhance the market price of money. They make the pressure heavier, and compel the parties to heavier sacrifices. Many men will not, in such times, lend their money at all upon common interest; and yet they have great scruples about letting it upon any contract for usury, lest they should lose both principal and interest. Others, if they do lend without regard to the laws, demand a higher and perhaps extravagant compensation for the hazard which they run. And conscientious borrowers, rather than incur the imputation of being violators of the laws, make other sacrifices of their property, which sometimes are ruinous, and generally are deeply injurious to their estates. If, under such circumstances, they were free to make their own bargains, they could borrow at lower rates, and could give legal security. In short, the prohibitory system, in many cases, aggravates the very evils which it is intended to mitigate It makes the prodigal more extravagant, the rash more undistinguishing, the poor more servile and dependent, the rich

more irresolute or avaricious, the weak a more easy prey to the crafty, the busy and enterprising more timid or more speculative, and thus introduces into social life many perturbations which cannot be calculated, and many immoral practices which silently impair, or openly sap, the foundations of virtue.

ÚT, RE, MI. (See page 493.)

UTAWAS, or OUTAWAS; a river which forms the boundary between Upper and Lower Canada, and flows south-east into the St. Lawrence, just above Montreal. It is sometimes called Montreal river. Its course is considerably interrupted by falls and rapids; yet the fur traders contrive to pass these without damage in their loaded canoes. Its navigation will doubtless be greatly improved by canals.

UTERINE (from uterus, womb) is used to denote the relation of children who have the same mother, but different fathers.

UTERUS (the womb); the organ in which the embryo is received from the ovary, to which it becomes adherent, so as to receive the materials of its growth, and in which it is retained for a longer or shorter time in various species until its expulsion in the process of parturition. A proper uterus belongs only to the mammalia; oviparous generation under various modifications is found in the other classes; and the female organ is therefore reduced to a mere canal (oviduct) for the transmission of the ova. In the human female, the uterus is a spongy receptacle, resembling a compressed pear, situ ated in the cavity of the pelvis, above the vagina, and between the urinary bladder and rectum. Its form resembles that of an oblong pear flattened, with the depressed sides placed towards the ossa pubis and sacrum; but, in the impregnated state, it becomes more oval, according to the degree of its distention. For the convenience of description, and for some practical purposes, the uterus is distinguished into three parts-the upper part. called the fundus; the lower, the cervir; the space between them, the body. The uterus is about three inches in length, about two in breadth at the fundus, and one at the cervix. Its thickness is different at the fundus and cervix, being at the former usually rather less than half an inch, and at the latter somewhat more; and this thickness is preserved throughout pregnancy, chiefly by the enlargement of the veins and lymphatics, there being a smaller change in the size of the arteries. But there is so great a variety in size and dimensions of the uterus in different women, independent of the states

of virginity, marriage or pregnancy, as to prevent any very accurate mensuration. The internal surface of the uterus is corrugated in a beautiful manner, but the ruge, or wrinkles, which are longitudinal, lessen as they advance into the uterus, the fundus of which is smooth. In the intervals between the rugæ are small orifices, like those in the vagina, which discharge a mucus, serving, besides other purposes, that of closing the os uteri very curiously and perfectly during pregnancy. The substance of the uterus, which is very firm, is composed of arteries, veins, lymphatics, nerves, and muscular fibres, curiously interwoven and connected together by cellular membrane. The use of the womb is for menstruation, conception, nutrition of the foetus, and parturition. It is liable to many diseases, the principal of which are retroversion and falling down, hydatids, dropsy of the uterus, moles, polypes, ulceration, cancer, &c. (See Labor.)

UTICA; in antiquity, a celebrated city established very early by the Phoenicians, on the northern coast of Africa. It was independent of Carthage, yet in alliance with that city. It was celebrated for the suicide of the younger Cato (q. v.), who is called, on that account, Uticensis. After the destruction of Carthage, it became the capital of the province. According to Strabo, it was situated on the same gulf with Carthage. Augustus granted the title of Roman citizens to its inhabitants. On its site are found old walls, a very large aqueduct, cisterns, and vestiges of other edifices, which announce a large and magnificent city. The name of the modern town is Booshatter. This, by the accumulation of mud brought down by the river Bagada, is now about seven miles from

the sea.

UTICA. The city of Utica, in New York, stands on the south side of the river Mohawk, in lat. 43° 6' N., and lon. 74° 13′ W. It is situated in the north-eastern part of the charming valley which is made by the river Mohawk, the Ouskany and the Sadaghqueda or Saquoit (saw-qua) creeks. These creeks furnish canal basins and water for many useful branches of manufactures and machinery. The Erie canal passes through the city, running parallel to the river, at the distance of sixty-five rods, and is crossed by twelve bridges. The canal level is 425 feet above the tide water at Albany. The central street of the city is distant from Albany, by the post-road, 196 miles; by the canal, 110 miles: from Buffalo, on lake Erie, by the post-road, 202 miles; by

the canal, 253 miles: from Oswego, the southern port of lake Ontario, with which it communicates by the Erie and Oswego canals, 84 miles. The city is nearly the geographical centre of the state. In 1794, the place contained nineteen families: in 1830, the return from the census was 8500. Its present population is estimated at 10,000. The city charter was granted by the legislature of the state February, 1832. The charter is remarkable for being the first ever granted in the state in which the licensing of shops for retailing ardent spirit is expressly prohibited. The institutions chartered by the legislature are fifteen, namely, two banks, with an aggregate capital of $850,000 actually paid in; a branch of the United States bank, with no definite amount of capital assigned; two insurance companies (capital $750,000), aqueduct company (capital $25,000), horticultural society (capital $10,000), Oneida medical society, Utica academy, city library (with 3000 volumes), Utica lyceum, public school, orphan asylum, Oneida institute of science and industry, ancient Briton's society, mechanic's association. There are also thirtythree charitable and benevolent societies or associations not chartered, besides four temperance societies; religious congregations, organized under the statute, fourteen, having thirteen churches and houses of worship. There are thirty-six private schools, nine weekly newspapers, twentyseven physicians and surgeons, thirty-three lawyers, and twenty-three clergymen, a post-office, 116 regular stage-coaches; and 28 packet-boats depart every week. Value of real estate, taken from the assessors' books, $1,619,050; personal, $1,053,525; total, $2,672,575: value of the most important articles of manufacture, exclusive of cotton and woollen goods, yearly,$585,000; sales of merchandise from New York and other places abroad, $1,100,000; sales of cotton and woollen goods manufactured in the immediate vicinity, $500,000; amount of salt, glass and lumber not estimated. The canal commerce, belonging to the city, as appears from the collector's books for 1831, yielded the following sums: tolls received at Utica, $41,014:44; tolls paid on clearances received and passing Utica, $897,352:31; total, $938,366:75. The manufacturing district, or the beautiful valley of the Sadaghqueda above mentioned, includes a territory of ten miles square, having Utica in the north-east corner, and the river Mohawk for its northerly line. Here, on the stream from which the valley takes its name, are eleven cotton factories, with

at

a capital stock of $686,000. In eight of these are manufactured cotton cloths of different qualities, and in three, cotton yarn. They have in operation 29,608 spindles, 745 power-looms, and produce annually 5,110,700 yards of cloth, valued at upwards of $500,000. They employ directly more than 1100 persons, and give support to as many more, not immediately engaged in the establishments. The quantity of cotton annually wrought is 1,515,290 pounds, costing about $160,000. In addition to the common cloths, are made 534,560 yards of 6-4 bed-ticking, woven in families in the neighborhood of the factories. In the yarn factories, 100,000 pounds of yarn are annually spun, which is not made into cloth. Connected with these factories are twelve saw-mills, eight grain-mills, one furnace, one triphammer, two clothiers' shops, two oilmills, two paper-mills, two machine shops, one calico-printing shop, one woollen factory, one bleaching establishment, and two plaster-mills, the investments and products of which have not been estimated. In the woollen factory on the Oriskany, the amount of capital invested is $160,000; number of persons directly employed, 147; number in families, exclusive of the above, maintained by wages from the factory, 360; aggregate amount of wages, $18,500; quantity of wool used, 125,000 pounds; average amount of goods annually made, $135,000. This small territory has a population of more than 28,000, inhabiting six or seven villages, supporting one college, four chartered academies, six select seminaries of education, and upwards of one hundred common schools, with a proportionate number of churches, religious congregations and charitable societies. The climate is considered remarkably salubrious. From a meteorological journal kept at the academy in Utica, it appears that, for five years past, the mean annual temperature, indicated by the thermometer, has been 47° Fahr.; the average number of clear days in the year, 205; cloudy, 160; prevailing wind, west. The average quantity of water annually falling measured, by the rain-gauge, forty inches and ninety-five hundredths.

UTILITARIANS; a name given particularly to the school of Jeremy Bentham (q. v.), the advocates of "the greatest happiness principle," who test the value of all institutions and pursuits by the principle of utility, that is, the promotion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The estimation to be formed of this doc

trine must obviously depend upon the idea which is attached to happiness. If by this be understood physical enjoyment chiefly, the principle is certainly low and narrow; for, although the physical comforts of a people are intimately connected with their moral and intellectual well-being, and their progress in religion and virtue, in the sciences and the arts, will depend greatly on the fact of the mass of the people having a full supply of nutritive food, or being pinched for the necessaries of life; yet we must reflect that, if man's true welfare consists in the highest improvement of his nature, the greatest good is often found, not in physical gratification, nor in any form of what is usually called pleasure, but in the hard trials of adversity. This subject requires a much fuller consideration than we can give to it here. We would only remark that, at a time when the word "utility" has become so general a favorite, it should not be forgotten that utility has reference only to means, and necessarily supposes an object of a higher character to which they are to be applied. However far we may carry the idea of utility, we must stop somewhere, and admit that there is something beyond, of which utility cannot be predicated. The idea of utility has even encroached upon the province of morality, as if our age could not love and do good for its own sake. We are told that we should be virtuous. In what way is virtue useful? our age replies. The answer is, Because it makes men happy. But every one knows that virtue does not make us happy in the lower sense of the word, in which it is almost synonymous with "comfortable." It is, then, inental and moral happiness, serenity of mind, for which virtue is useful. But a thorough utilitarian might ask, For what is this state of mind-namely, the happiness of a good conscience-useful; and, if told, Because it gives the assurance of the favor of God, might go on to inquire, For what is it useful to please God? The reader sees how pitiful is the application of utility to the highest objects of existence. Utility, then, cannot be considered as the ultimate principle of morality. It is equally defective when considered as the main-spring of the highest intellectual activity. Had not men of an elevated caste delighted in the pursuit of truth for its own sake, and pressed on through labor and difficulty, unconcerned as to the practical application of their discoveries, the world would never have witnessed those noble examples of intellectual effort which raise our