working for the receiver, was insufficient to bind the company. Compare Proctor v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (1890) 42 Mo. App. 124, an action against a railroad company and the receivers thereof jointly, wherein the court "conceded" that the process served was good as against the corporation, though the point was not in issue, the controversy being as to whether process served, after receivership, on a station agent in the employ of the receivers, was sufficient to bind the receivers.

However, since a receiver has no authority outside of his own jurisdiction, it has been held that the appointment of a receiver by a foreign court for a foreign corporation, which has a resident agent in the state of suit, and has property and is doing business therein, does not affect the service of process on such agent, and service on him will give the court juristion over the foreign corporation. Thus, in Georgia Southern R. Co. v. Bigelow (1881) 68 Ga. 219, the plaintiff brought an action against a domestic railroad to recover for his

forcible ejection from a train. The court held that process served on an agent of the defendant was sufficient to bind it, though it appeared that the agent was in the employ of the receivers of a foreign railroad, and made remittances to them as a result of a contract made between the receivers and the local road, whereby the receivers agreed to operate the road, and to share and divide the expenses or profits, incurred or earned respectively. So, in Howard v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (1897) 11 App. D. C. 300, where the plaintiff sued for injuries received in a wreck on the defendant's line in Kentucky, the court held that the appointment of receivers for the road in Virginia and West Virginia did not operate to transfer to them property situated in the District of Columbia, and hence that process served on the resident agent of the company in the District of Columbia was sufficient to bind the company, where the agency remained unchanged after the appointment of the receivers. M. J. McC.

basis.

- contingent fee

skill.

2. Where, in an action to recover attorneys' fees under an oral contract of employment stipulating that the amount of such fee should be contingent upon the success of the litigation, one ground of defense was based upon the contention that there was no consideration for such contract, inasHeadrotes 2-4 by GALBRAITH, C.

much as the services claimed to have been rendered did not require skill, diligence, or legal knowledge, held, that the skill, diligence, and legal knowledge of counsel, exercised in a lawsuit, should be measured in a large degree by the result of the litigation, and not by the number of pleadings filed, or their length, or the number of

Mr. J. T. Smith, in propria persona: Where the verdict of the jury is based upon the testimony of four reputable men, and there is not a line of testimony to contradict them, such a verdict is clearly sustained by weight of the evidence, and should not be disturbed on appeal.

Mullen v. Robison, 30 Okla. 527, 120 Pac. 1099; Brown v. Baird, 5 Okla. 133, 48 Pac. 180; Weller v. Western State Bank, 18 Okla. 478, 90 Pac. 877; Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Burgess, 21 Okla. 653, 97 Pac. 271; Independent Cotton Oil Co. v. Beacham, 31 Okla. 384, 120 Pac. 969; Fitch v. Green, 39 Okla. 18, 134 Pac. 34; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hart, 45 Okla. 659, 146 Pac. 436; Missouri, O. & G. R. Co. v. Parker, 50 Okla. 491, 151 Pac. 325; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hodge, 53 Okla. 427, 157 Pac. 60; Ft. Smith & W. R. Co. v. Chandler Cotton Oil Co. 25 Okla. 82, 106 Pac. 10; Ellison v. Bank of Meeker, 27 Okla. 782, 117 Pac. 199; Weller v. Western State Bank, 18 Okla. 478, 90 Pac. 877; Rison v. Harris, 50 Okla. 764, 151 Pac. 584.

Galbraith, C., filed the following opinion:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered

upon the verdict of a jury returned in an action to recover an attorney's fee based on an oral contract of employment. Smith, as plaintiff in the lower court, alleged that in September, 1913, the plaintiff in error, Cornelius, was made defendant in a suit pending in the district court of Creek county, involving the title and oil and gas lease covering the allotment of Susie Crow, a deceased Creek Indian, whose allotment was located in the north end of the Cushing oil fields. This allotment embraced two tracts of 80 acres each. Cornelius held an oil and gas lease on the allotment that had been executed to him by Molly Tiger and Baby Cumsey, who claimed to be the sole heirs of the deceased allotee. The legality of this lease was one of the issues involved in that suit.

Smith, in his petition, alleged that he was a regularly admitted attorney at law, practising at Sapulpa, engaged in the active practice of his profession, and that after Cornelius was made a party to said suit he came and employed Smith to represent him therein, and agreed orally to pay him a nominal fee in the event that the litigation, or other litiga

tions involving the lease which might be brought, was lost, or in the event that the premises were condemned in the meantime for oil and gas mining purposes, and in the event that his interest in the premises was established, or, if the matter was compromised, he was to pay Smith a liberal fee, based on the amount Cornelius should obtain thereby; that under said agreement of employment he appeared in said case as Cornelius's attorney, and filed an answer for him, and appeared for him, and looked after his interest in the litigation for a period extending over something like a year; that in September, 1914. Cornelius disposed of his lease on 80 acres of said land for the sum of $20,000; that later he disposed of his interest in the other 80 acres for the sum of $37,500; that a reasonable fee for the services rendered in said litigation under the terms of said contract would be $10,000, for which amount judgment was prayed.

Cornelius answered, denying specifically that he entered into the contract as set out in the petition, but admitted that he employed Smith to file an answer for him, but alleged that he had other attorneys regularly employed to represent him, but that these attorneys were personally interested in this suit, and for that reason did not care to appear for him, but agreed to prepare the pleadings and advise as to his interests, but suggested that Smith be employed to appear in court for him; that his regular counsel prepared the answer, and he delivered it to Smith, and asked him how much he was going to charge to appear for him and represent him under the directions of his general counsel, and that Smith said he would only charge a small fee, and in no event to exceed $250; that with this understanding he delivered the answer to Smith and directed him to file it; that Smith rendered very little service in the case, and that $100 would be ample compensation for the services rendered, and tendered

that amount in the court in satisfaction of his claim.

The case was tried to the court and a jury, and a verdict returned against Cornelius and in favor of Smith for $2,145. On the hearing of the motion for a new trial the court found the verdict to be excessive in the sum of $145, and required the plaintiff to remit that amount, and on his doing so a new trial was denied, and the verdict approved for $2,000, and judgment entered for that sum. To review this judgment, Cornelius has appealed to this court.

It is contended (1) that the judgment for $2,000 is excessive, and is so excessive that it is apparent that the same was the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury, and therefore should be set aside. This proposition is argued at length in the brief. The character of the services rendered by Smith in the action is belittled, and it is contended that, viewed in any light, with calm deliberation, they could not possibly be found to be worth the amount of the judgment; that the trial court, who saw the

witnesses and heard them testify,

found that the verdict was excessive in the sum of $145, and that such finding necessarily involved the finding that the same was the result of prejudice and passion on the part of the jury, and that, if it was, the vice extended to the entire verdict, and could not be cured by a remittitur, but the verdict should have been vacated and a new trial ordered. It is not clear on what ground the court found the verdict to be excessive, and just how he determined the amount that should be remitted. This court has adopted the rule relative to excessive verdicts that they should be vacated on Appealthis ground "only excessive verdict when it appears

-vacating.

that the verdict is so excessive as per se to indicate passion or prejudice." St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hodge, 53 Okla. 427, 157 Pac. 60. In the instant case the employment was admitted. What were the terms

of the contract of employment was the leading issue in the case. If the terms were as Smith contended, then the value of the services rendered was another issue to be determined by the jury. These were issues of fact that were submitted to the jury fully and fairly by the court in a series of instructions which were not excepted to by either party. The jury by its verdict found that the terms of the contract of employment were as alleged by Smith, and the verdict also fixed the reasonable value of the services rendered. There is nothing upon the face of the verdict or upon the record to justify the conclusion that the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. On the contrary, the evidence abundantly supported the verdict and judgment.

Again, it is argued that the court erred in the admission of certain evidence. (1) In admitting an order of revivor made in the case upon the death of Wallace Jack, one of the parties to the suit. It appears that this order was prepared by Smith, and was entered upon his request to the court, and that in doing this he was acting in the interest of his client, Cornelius, although Smith did not appear for Wallace Jack, he being represented by another attorney in the case. This evidence was competent upon the value of services issue as to the character of the service rendered by Smith, which was one of the material issues in the case. (2) It is complained that testimony was admitted showing the interest of McDougal & Lytle in the suit, and that they received a portion of the $20,000 paid to Cornelius for the lease on the land. This testimony was admitted for the purpose of showing how much Cornelius realized out of the lease, and for that purpose it was competent.

Evidence

of attorney.

-value of lease.

Again, it is complained that the court erred in admittng testimony that Mr. Ransom, another attorney,

received $10,000 of the $37,500 paid Cornelius for the lease on the second 80 acres. This testimony, it seems, was competent for the same reason as the other testimony set out above.

Lastly, it is contended that the judgment is erroneous, and that a new trial should have been granted, for the reason that there was no consideration necessary to entitle the plaintiff to recover, on the basis of a contingent-fee contract, for the reason that the nature of the services which he claims to have rendered in the case were minor acts, and required on the part of the counsel rendering them no skill or diligence or legal knowledge. In answer to this contention we are constrained to say that whatever skill or legal knowledge Smith may or may not have possessed, or whatever diligence he may or may not have exercised in this case, should be deter

mined by the re- Attorney and sults obtained by client-conthe lawsuit. Meas- tingent feeured by this stand

skill.

ard, Cornelius's attorney must have been possessed of a fine degree of skill, and exercised considerable diligence, and displayed a high degree of legal knowledge in this litigation, since the evidence shows that Cornelius invested $100 in the lease, and as a result of a compromise and settlement of the action realized the sum of $47,500 in money. From this result we are forced to the conclusion that he had competent and skilful legal advice and was well served by his counsel in the litigation. Smith was his only attorney of record, and from the evidence we cannot say that

did not show contingent fee skill, diligence, and legal knowledge of a high character. On the whole rec

Damages

we conclude attorney's ord, that the judgment contractappealed from should be affirmed.

Per Curiam:
Adopted in whole.

contingent fee.

I. Introductory, 237.

II. Reasonable fees, 239.

III. Unreasonable fees, 246.

1. Introductory.

This annotation is intended as a compilation of the cases wherein the courts have declared certain specific amounts to be reasonable or unreasonable as compensation for legal services in the absence of a contract or statutory provision expressly fixing the amount. Cases involving the inadequacy of a definite amount awarded by court or jury are not included.

In all of the cases dealing with the question what is a reasonable attorneys' fee, whether that question has been presented to the court or to the jury, the inquiry has been turned to the circumstances of the particular rase, and the fee has been fixed ac、 cording to those circumstances. Thus it has been said: "There is no standard by which the compensation of counsel can be properly and definitely determined as to amount.

The ques

tion, when presented at this time, must be decided upon considerations as vague and indefinite as when it was said in the Mirror (chap. 2, § 5) that 'four things are to be regarded: (1) The greatness of the cause; (2) the pains of the sergeant; (3) his worth, as his learning, eloquence, and gift; (4) the usage of the court.'" Frink v. McComb (1894) 60 Fed. 486.

"The learning and ability of the counsel, the means of the client, the magnitude of the interests involved, the hazards of the litigation, and the final result, whether successful or otherwise, as well as the actual time and labor expended for the client, all are or may be elements to be considered in determining what is reasonable compensation in a given case." Halaska v. Cotzhausen (1881) 52 Wis. 624, 9 N. W. 401.

So, in Leitensdorfer v. King (1884) 7 Colo. 436, 4 Pac. 37, it was said: "In estimating the value of an attor

ney's services, where no special contract exists fixing the same, they are to consider a variety of facts and circumstances, such as the character of the litigation in which the services were rendered; the novelty, difficulty, and importance of the questions involved; the value of the rights or property in controversy; the attorney's position in the case, as leading cr assistant counsel, and the degree of responsibility resting upon him; the length of time necessarily consumed by the trial and other court proceedings; the fact, if it be a fact, that compensation is wholly contingent upon success; the manner in which his duties are performed, etc."

In Randall v. Packard (1894) 142 N. Y. 47, 36 N. E. 823, the court said: "The general rule is that an attorney, in the absence of an agreement, deserves compensation according to the reasonable worth of his services. Of that the jury are the sole judges; and, to arrive at their value, they may consider the nature of the services rendered, the standing of the attorney in his profession for learning, skill, and proficiency, the amount involved, and the importance to his client of the result. The reason why the result is one of the important factors in the consideration must be obvious. It not only is some evidence of the usefulness of the services, but, for its effects upon the situation of the client, rela-tively to what it had been, it must be conceded a degree of influence in fixing the amount of the attorney's compensation, proportioned to the nature and incidents of the result, in connection with the other considerations adverted to."

In Kirchoff v. Bernstein (1919) 92 Or. 378, 181 Pac. 746, it was said: "It must be remembered, however, that the value of services performed by an attorney cannot always be meas ured with the same degree of exactitude as can a bushel of wheat or a ton of coal. Education, experience,