ADVANCE OF JACKSON AND LEE.

649

him across the stream, but the bridge was burned by the enemy, immediately after crossing it, and as the stream was not then fordable, it was necessary to rebuild it, which consumed some time. The cavalry explored the country as far as Waterloo bridge over the Rappahannock, but found no other force of the enemy.

On the 24th, a considerable detachment of the enemy, numbering not less than twenty-five thousand, infantry, artil-. lery, and cavalry, under command of "Stonewall" Jackson, crossed higher up, and moved northward toward Rectortown, Salem and White Plains, in the Blue Ridge valley, with the evident intention of passing through Thoroughfare Gap, and thus threatening Washington.

Pope's re-enforcements, meanwhile, did not come up. On the 24th, he had been notified that over thirty thousand troops were at Alexandria, demanding transportation; they were said to be Cox's and Sturgis' divisions, and Heintzelman's and Franklin's corps, in all about thirty-seven thousand men. He immediately sent orders for the distribution of these troops in such a way as to protect his lines, and to be ready to re-enforce him promptly at any points where they might be needed; but so dilatory were the movements of most of them, that they had made no considerable progress as late as the 26th, and those who did come up, were very scantily supplied with ammunition or provisions.

On the 25th, it had become apparent, that if he held his connection with the lower Rappahannock later, Jackson, who was making forced marches on Thoroughfare Gap, would flank him; and finding the main body of Lee's army moving northwestward toward the upper fords, he abandoned it, having, however, at the very last moment, a short but severe struggle with a portion of the rebel force which attempted to force a passage in the face of the retiring troops, but were repulsed. During the night of the 26th, and the morning of the 27th,

650

DESPERATE POSITION OF GEN. POPE.

the main body of Lee's army commenced moving over the same route which Jackson had taken, toward Salem and White Plains, with the intent of crossing the Bull Run mountains at Thoroughfare and Hopeville Gaps. Jackson's advance had already passed through Thoroughfare Gap, and on the night of the 26th, cut the Orange and Alexandria rail-road, at Kettle Run, about six miles east of Warrenton Junction, thus breaking Pope's line of communication.

This disaster convinced Gen. Pope that the re-enforcements on which he had depended, were not as yet available, and made it impossible for him to know when they would come up. There was nothing left for him but to use what force he had, wearied and broken down as it was, in the endeavor to cut off the force of Stonewall Jackson, which had already passed through the Gaps in the Bull Run mountains, from the remainder of Lee's force which were approaching those Gaps, and thus dividing the enemy, and holding the passes of the mountains, to defeat, first, the one section, and then the other.

For such an undertaking he had Sigel's corps, now reduced to nine thousand; Banks' corps, not exceeding five thousand; McDowell's corps, fifteen thousand five hundred; Reno's corps, seven thousand; and Heintzelman's and Porter's corps, about eighteen thousand men ; in all, fifty-four thousand five hundred. Of these, all except the two last named corps,-Heintzelman's and Porter's-had been marching and fighting continuously, night and day, for nine days, with little food or sleep, and were greatly fatigued. Heintzelman's corps had reached Warrenton Junction without wagons, artillery, or horses, and with only four rounds of ammunition per man, and Porter's corps had come in to the same point the night before, with a very small supply of provisions, and only forty rounds of ammunition for, each man. The entire force of Gen. Lee was not less than one hundred and ten thousand, of whom about twenty-five thousand were in Jackson's command. The

odds was entirely without a parallel in any great battle or series of battles, except, perhaps that of Fitz John Porter, at Gaines' Mill, yet Gen. Pope was resolved to do the best in his power, though not without some forebodings of disaster.

The indications were that the first great battle would occur at or near Gainesville, a village on the Manassas Gap rail-road, about five miles south-east of Thoroughfare Gap, and he accordingly set about concentrating his forces on that point. Gen. Mc Dowell was ordered to move forward upon Gainesville, by the Warrenton turnpike, with his own corps and Sigel's, and Reynolds' division, which was temporarily attached to his corps; Gen. Reno, with his corps, followed by Kearney's division of Heintzelman's corps, was directed to move from Warrenton Junction on Greenwich, so as to reach them by the evening of the 27th, and be ready to support Gen. Mc Dowell; Gen. Porter was to remain at Warrenton, till relieved by Gen. Banks, who was marching to that place from Fayetteville, and then push forward as rapidly as possible, to Gainesville. Gen. Pope himself, with Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps, moved along the rail-road to Manassas Junction.

This division was the first to encounter the enemy, about four miles south-west of Bristow Station, under Gen. Ewell, who commanded one of the three divisions of "Stonewall" Jackson's corps. The engagement took place on the afternoon of the 27th, and was, for a time, quite severe, about three hundred killed and wounded, being lost on each side. Ewell was driven back along the rail-road, but, at dark, he still confronted Hooker along the banks of the Broad Run, and immediately in front of Bristow Station. In this engagement, Gen. Hooker's division nearly exhausted their ammunition, and could not be supplied with more in season for the battle, which was apparently destined to come off on the morrow Mc Dowell, Reno, and Kearney, had reached their destination on the night of the 27th, and were evidently between Jack

652

DISPOSITION OF FORCES.

son and the main body of the rebel army, which was still west of the Bull Run range.

In consequence of Hooker's lack of ammunition, Gen. Pope, early in the evening of the 27th, sent back orders to Gen. F. J. Porter, to move forward at one o'clock the next morning, and report to him at Bristow Station at daylight the next morning, and to leave instructions for Gen. Banks. The officer who bore the order was instructed to inform him of the necessity of the case, and to conduct him to the field. Gen. Porter made no attempt to comply with this order, giving as excuses, that his men were tired, that they would straggle in the night, and that there was a wagon train somewhere on the road, which would obstruct his march. It was not till sometime after daylight, that he moved his men at all, and he reached Bristow Station at half-past ten A. M. Gen. Pope, believing that Stonewall Jackson would renew his attack the next day—since he could not retreat toward the Gap without an encounter with Mc Dowell, whose force was larger than his own, and to fall back on Centreville, would take him farther still from the main body of Lee's army,-determined to bring up re-enforcements in sufficient numbers to destroy the enemy.

Accordingly, in addition to his orders to Gen. Porter, to report to him at Bristow Station at daylight, he sent directions to Gen. Mc Dowell to push forward at dawn to Manassas Junction, with his own and Sigel's corps; to Gen. Reno, to march from Greenwich, direct upon Manassas Junction, at the same hour, and to Gen. Kearney, to move at the same time upon Bristow. "Stonewall" Jackson was not, however, the man to fall into such a trap. By three o'clock A. M., of the 28th, his troops were on the march for Centreville, as he had evidently conjectured the purpose of the Union commander, and preferred to take his chance of effecting a union with the main body of the rebel army, rather than to fight a superior force at Manassas Junction.

FIGHT WITH JACKSON.

653

Gen. Sigel, who was in the advance of Gen. Mc Dowell's force, for some reason, delayed his departure from Gainesville, till 7:30 A. M., and this delay proved fatal to the success of the Union arms; for had he moved at dawn, as ordered, he must have intercepted Jackson, and compelled him to fight on unfavorable ground. As it was, the rebel General retreated with his troops through Centreville, and thence toward Thoroughfare Gap, part of them by the Sudley Springs road, and part by the Warrenton turnpike, toward Gainesville, destroying the bridges behind them as they retreated.

About six o'clock in the evening of the 28th, Gen. Mc Dowell, with his whole force except Ricketts' division, which had been sent to guard Thoroughfare Gap, marching toward Centreville, re-encountered Jackson's advance, on this retreat, and a severe action ensued, of which Gibbons' and Doubleday's brigade of King's division bore the brunt. Both parties maintained their positions.

In spite of all previous mishaps, it now seemed certain that Jackson must be entirely defeated and crushed before Lee's main army could come to his help. To insure this result, and at the same time to prevent his retreat toward the north, in the direction of Leesburg, Gen. Pope directed Gen. Kearney to push forward cautiously during the night, keeping his right well to the north, and his force in contact with Jackson's, and sent orders to Gen. Mc Dowell and to Gen. King, to hold their ground at all hazards, and prevent Jackson from retreating westward, while he would bring up the entire remainder of the force from Manassas Junction, and attack him at daylight on the east.

He also sent orders to Gen. Porter, whom he supposed to be at Manassas Junction, to move upon Centreville at the earliest dawn, stating to him the position of the forces, and that a severe battle would undoubtedly be fought the next morning. By this disposition of his forces, he would have had a force