634

CORRESPONDENCE WITH MCCLELLAN.

to enable the two armies to co-operate, or to enable Gen. Pope to render any assistance in his power to the army of the Potomac. He promised that every suggestion that Gen. McClellan might make, should meet all respect and consideration at his hands, and that so far as it was in his power to do so, he would carry out his wishes with all energy, and with all the means at his command.

This frank and manly communication only elicited from Gen. McClellan, a reply in very general terms, and making no suggestions for co-operative action. It did not suit his purposes to co-operate with a General who was his equal in power, nor to have a force in the vicinity of the Rappahannock or covering Washington at all. Afterward, on the 4th of August, knowing, or having the opportunity to know, that Jackson's and Longstreet's corps were and had been for more than two weeks moving northward to attack Pope, Gen. Mc Clellan demanded of Gen. Halleck that Pope's and Burnside's armies be sent to re-enforce him on the Peninsula.

Finding that there was no prospect of cordial and harmonious action between Gen. McClellan and himself, Gen. Pope suggested to the President, the appointment of a military Commander-in-chief, who should have power to direct in general the movements of both armies, and Major General Halleck was accordingly appointed General-in-chief, on the 11th of July. Soon after his appointment, Gen. Pope, fully aware of the thankless duties before him, and fore-seeing probable disaster, expressed to him and to the President, his earnest desire to be relieved from the command, and to return to the west. Both, however, considered his services necessary in the projected campaign, and accordingly declined to comply with his request. Under these circumstances, he entered upon his duties, not without grave forebodings, but with a determination to carry out the plans of the Government, with all the energy and ability of which he was master.

HIS ADDRESS TO THE ARMY.

635 On the 14th of July, he issued an address to the officers and soldiers of the army of Virginia, a little vainglorious, perhaps, in its boastings of western successes, but well adapted to cheer and inspirit his forces. It was a misfortune that it was interpreted by some of the leading commanders of the army of the Potomac, as implying a censure upon them, and was the foundation of a hostility toward him, which, on the part of some of them, was unremitting throughout the campaign. On the 18th of July, he issued from Washington,— where he was still detained making arrangements for the effective organization of his command-three general orders, two of which (No. 5 and 7,) though perfectly justified by military precedent, and approved by the Government, were construed by his enemies, and those of the Government, as authorizing indiscriminate robbery, plunder, and violence. The rebel President, Jefferson Davis, issued an order declaring Gen. Pope and his officers, in consequence of these orders, felons, and directing that they should not be regarded as prisoners of war if captured, until the orders were revoked. ders were as follows:

The or

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HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, WASHINGTON, July 18, 1862. GENERAL ORDERS, No. 5.-Hereafter, as far as practicable, the troops of this command will subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on. In all cases, supplies for this purpose will be taken by the officers to whose department they properly belong, under the orders of the commanding officer of the troops for whose use they are intended. Vouchers will be given to the owners, stating on their face that they will be payable at the conclusion of the war, upon sufficient testimony being furnished that such owners have been loyal citizens of the United States, since the date of the vouchers. Whenever it is known that supplies can be furnished in any district of the country where the troops are to operate, the use of trains for carrying subsistence will be dispensed with as far as possible.

By command of Major General POPE. GEO. D. RUGGLES, Col. A. A. G. and Chief of Staff.

General Order, No. 6, directed that in the operations of cavalry forces, no supply or baggage trains should be used,

unless so stated specially. The men were to carry two days' cooked rations, and all villages or neighborhoods through which they passed, were to be laid under contribution, in accordance with General Order No. 5, for the subsistence of men and horses. No. 7, was as follows:

HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1862.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 7.-The people of the valley of the Shenandoah, and throughout the region of operations of this army, living along the lines of rail-road and telegraph, and along the routes of travel in rear of the United States forces, are notified that they will be held responsible for any injury done to the track, line, or road, or for any attacks upon trains or straggling soldiers, by bands of guerrillas in their neighborhood. No privileges and immunities of warfare apply to lawless bands of individuals, not forming part of the organized forces of the enemy, nor wearing the garb of soldiers, who, seeking and obtaining safety on pretext of being peaceful citizens, steal out in rear of the army, attack and murder straggling soldiers, molest trains of supplies, destroy rail-roads, telegraph lines, and bridges, and commit outrages disgraceful to civilized people and revolting to humanity. Evil disposed persons in rear of our armies, who do not themselves engage directly in these lawless acts, encourage them by refusing to interfere or to give any information by which such acts can be prevented, or the perpetrators punished. Safety of life and property of all persons living in the rear of our advancing armies depends upon the maintenance of peace and quiet among themselves, and upon the unmolested movements through their midst, of all pertaining to the military service. They are to understand distinctly that this security of travel is their only warrant of personal safety.

It is therefore ordered, that wherever a rail-road, wagon-road, or telegraph is injured by parties of guerrillas, the citizens living within five miles of the spot, shall be turned out in mass to repair the damage, and shall, besides, pay to the United States, in money or in property, to be levied by military force, the full amount of the pay and subsistence of the whole force necessary to coerce the performance of the work, during the time occupied in completing it.

If a soldier or legitimate follower of the army be fired upon from any house, the house shall be razed to the ground, and the inhabitants sent prisoners to the head-quarters of this army. If such an outrage occur at any place distant from settlements, the people within five miles around shall be held accountable, and made to pay an indemnity sufficient for the case.

Any persons detected in such outrages, either during the act,

or at any time afterward, shall be shot without waiting civil process. No such acts can influence the result of this war, and they can only lead to heavy afflictions to the population to no purpose.

It is therefore enjoined upon all persons, both for the security of their property and the safety of their own persons, that they act vigorously and cordially together, to prevent the perpetration of such outrages. While it is the wish of the General commanding this army, that all peaceably disposed persons who remain at their homes, and pursue their accustomed avocations, shall be subjected to no improper burden of war, yet their own safety must, of necessity, depend upon the strict preservation of peace and order among themselves, and they are to understand that nothing will deter him from enforcing promptly, and to the full extent, every provision of this order.

By command of Major Gen. POPE. GEO. D. RUGGLES, Col. A. A. G. and Chief of Staff.

By General Orders No. 11, issued July 23, 1862, commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, &c., were ordered to proceed immediately to arrest all disloyal male citizens within their lines, or within their reach in rear of their respective stations. Such of these as were willing to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and give sufficient security for its observance, were to be allowed to return to their homes. and pursue their accustomed avocations. Those who refused, were to be sent beyond our lines, and notified, that if found again anywhere within our lines, or at any point in the rear, they would be considered spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law. Any person who, after taking the oath of allegiance, should be found to have violated it, was to be shot, and his property confiscated.

All communication with any persons living within the enemy's lines, except through the military authorities, and in the manner specified by military law, was positively prohibited, and any person engaged in writing or carrying such communication was to be considered and treated as a spy.

By still another order, all straggling was prohibited, and strict military discipline enforced.

These orders were stringent, and in particular cases undoubtedly occasioned hardships to individuals; but they were justified

638

ARMIES OF VIRGINIA AND THE POTOMAC.

by all military usage, and were particularly necessary in Eastern Virginia, where, for months, a large class of the resident population, who were most clamorous for the protection of their property, by our troops, under the pretence that they were peaceful farmers and citizens, had been in the habit of going out at night to murder and plunder the soldiers, and the army trains. No license was given to the soldiers to rob or destroy; on the contrary, every precaution was taken to prevent any of the demoralizing practices of which some of the regiments in that army had previously been guilty. The abuse showered upon Gen. Pope for these orders was evidently undeserved.

Before Gen. Pope left Washington to take the field in Virginia,―July 29th,-it had been unanimously determined by the Government, Gen. Halleck, and other military advisers, that the union of the armies of Virginia and the Potomac, was absolutely essential, both to the safety of the national Capital and to the further successful prosecution of the operations against Richmond. For this purpose, Gen. Pope's army was directed to cover, as far as possible, the front of Washington, and to make secure the valley of the Shenandoah, and so operate upon the enemy's lines of communication to the west and northwest of Richmond, as to force him to make such heavy detachments from his main force, as would enable the army of the Potomac to withdraw from its position at Harrison's Landing, and embark for Acquia creek or Alexandria.

It was feared that the rebel commander would throw his whole force in the direction of Washington, on finding that Gen. McClellan was in no position to prevent such a movement. In that event, Gen. Pope was to resist his advance at all hazards, and so to delay and embarrass his movements as to gain all the time possible for the arrival of the army of the Potomac behind the Rappahannock. The union of the two armies, it was believed, would enable their commanders to drive back the rebel forces to and through Richmond.