Kentucky in advance, were ordered forward. On reaching the rebel batteries, they were found entirely deserted, the rebels having fled across the river in the utmost confusion. A flight which can only be accounted for, by the fact that they were utterly demoralized by the unexpected result of Sunday's fight, and imagined that they were pursued by a force of twenty or thirty thousand Federals. Such was the haste in which they left the field, that they carried little with them, except the clothing upon their persons.

The rebels still held the important positions of Fort Henry on the Cumberland, Fort Donelson on the Tennessee, Bowling Green-centrally situated on the rail road, between Louisville and Nashville, and connected with Memphis by a branch rail road, and Columbus on the Mississippi. All these positions were strongly fortified, heavily garrisoned, and regarded as impregnable to any assaults which the Union force could make upon them. But the events detailed in the following chapter, will show the sore disappointment in store for them,

CHAPTER XI.

MISSISSIPPI FLOTILLA-CAPTURE OF FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON.

The Gun and Mortar Boats-Effect of the Battle of Mill Spring - Fort Henry -Plan of the Attack-The Surrender-Expedition up the Cumberland — Importance of the Tennessee River-Strength of Fort Donelson-Its Investment-Thursday's Fight― Attack of the Gun Boats — Saturday's Fight—

The Surrender-Losses.

To re-open the navigation of the Mississippi, which the rebels sought to close, by lining it with batteries from Columbia to Memphis, and to operate also on the important tributaries of that river, a fleet of gun and mortar boats was early projected, and put under contract for rapid completion. The largest of the gun-boats is about one hundred seventy-five feet long, and fifty feet wide, and when loaded, draws about four feet of water. About three feet in thickness of oak timber, firmly bolted together, form the bows and bulwarks; the sides are not so heavily timbered. The sides, from the water line, incline each way, at an angle of 45°, and can only be injured by plunging shot from high bluffs. They are sheathed with the best quality of iron plates, two and a half inches thick. The largest sized boats carry thirteen guns each. The forward or bow guns, are eighty-four pounder rifle guns, the others eight inch columbiads. The great proportionate width of the boats, gives them much steadiness in action. They are so constructed as to fire with the bows on, and in that position are more invulnerable than in any other. Each boat has five boilers, so connected that, in case of injury to one or more, the others can still be used.

The boats which were first finished and brought into use, were the St. Louis, thirteen guns, the Cincinnati, thirteen guns, the Carondolet, thirteen guns, the Essex, nine guns, the Canestoga, nine guns, and the Tyler, nine guns. The latter two were not iron-plated.

Unexpected delays occurred in finishing the river flotilla, and its movements afterward, were, of course, controlled by the general plan of the campaign, as the army and the river navy must act in concert. Excepting reconnoitering service on the river, no important movement was made until the expedition up the Tennessee river was projected.

The battle of Mill Spring had occurred on the 19th of January, and was the turning point in the fortunes of the war. It inaugurated a series of successes, scarcely paralleled in the annals of war; to which the river flotilla, commanded by Commodore Foote, contributed its full share.

It was decided early in February to make a concerted land and naval attack upon Fort Henry, situated upon the Tennessee River, near the northern boundary of the State. The fort had been built during the preceding summer, and was intended to protect the river from the passage of our boats.

The principal fortification was a common bastion fort with nine bastions, and inclosing three and a half acres within the ramparts. The trench is twelve feet wide and seven feet deep, making the top of the parapet, which is fourteen feet high, twenty-one feet above the bottom of the ditch. The slope is twelve feet thick at the top. Outside of these is a series of rifle pits or trenches, upwards of three miles in length. The armament of the fort was, one ten inch columbiad (one hundred-twenty pounder,) smooth bore; one twenty-four pounder, rifled; twelve thirty-two pounders, smooth bore; one twentyfour pounder, siege gun; two twelve pounders, upon siege carriages. The guns are mounted variously, on siege, barbette and casemate carriages.

ATTACK ON FORT HENRY.

357

Gen. Grant and Com. Foote had arranged the plan for the combined attack. The land forces under the former, were to have been so placed as to have prevented the escape of any rebel force in or near the fort, while the latter was to attack the fort with the boats named above, from the river. Gen. Grant gives the following reasons for not making a complete investment of the fort:

"Owing to dispatches received from Major-General Halleck, and corroborating information here, to the effect that the enemy were rapidly re-enforcing, I thought it imperatively necessary that the fort should be carried to-day. My forces were not up at 10 o'clock last night, when my order was written, therefore I did not deem it practicable to set an earlier hour than 11 o'clock to-day to commence the investment. The gun-boats started up at the same hour to commence the attack, and engage the enemy at not over six hundred yards. In little over one hour, all the batteries were silenced, and the fort surrendered at discretion, to Flag-Officer Foote, giving us all their guns, camp and garrison equipage, etc. The prisoners taken are General Tilghman and staff, Captain Taylor and company, and the sick. The garrison, I think, must have commenced their retreat last night, or at an early hour this morning.

"Had I not felt it an imperative necessity to attack Fort Henry to-day, I should have made the investment complete, and delayed until to-morrow, so as to secure the garrison. I do not now believe, however, the result would have been any more satisfactory."

From Com. Foote's official report, we extract the following description of the first thorough test of the ability of the ironclad river fleet to withstand the heavy batteries of the enemy:

"The fire was opened at seventeeen hundred yards distance from the flag-ship, which was followed by the other gun-boats, and responded to by the fort. As we approached the fort, slowly steaming till we reached within six hundred yards of the