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We will proceed, then, briefly to notice the cases that have been supposed to have a bearing upon this question favorable to the underwriters.

for hire. For Lord Hardwicke said, "no man | by the total destruction of the subject, or was could say that the master, by taking in goods transferred by the abandonment to the under of his own head, could make the owners liable." writers, the misconduct of the master could It is a little difficult to perceive how in any not prejudice the rights of the owner. legal sense the relation of principal and agent connection of principal and agent was dissolved, could exist, at the time when the misconduct of and they stood towards each other as mere the master is alleged to have taken place. So strangers, so far as any legal responsibility far as he was agent for navigating the vessel, it could be involved in the conduct of the master. had terminated by the absolute destruction of Such we apprehend to be the result of the apthe subject. The agency would seem to have plication of well-settled principles of law to the ceased from necessity. There was nothing facts and circumstances presented by the bill of upon which it could act. Had there not been exceptions, in the absence of any au- [*415 a total loss of the vessel, there would have re- thority to govern the case. mained a duty and legal obligation, on the part of the master, to use his best exertions to save what he could from the wreck. But when the subject-master of the agency becomes extinct, it is not easy to understand how, in any just sense, the agency can be said to survive. There might be a moral duty resting on the master to communicate information of the loss to his owner. But how could there have been any legal obligation binding upon him to do it. The information could neither benefit nor prejudice the owner. It is a general rule of law, that if an injury arises to a principal, in consequence of the misconduct of his agent, an action may be sustained against him for the damage. Could an action in this case be sustained by the owner against the master for not giving him information of the loss? and if not, it would seem to follow as a necessary consequence, that the owner could not be prejudiced by his acts. 414] But suppose the agency of the master not to have terminated, but that, in judgment of law, he was the agent of some one. The question recurs, whose agent was he? The answer cannot admit of a doubt. If agent at all, he was, by operation of law, the agent of the underwriters.

In Fitzherbert v. Mather, 1 Term Rep. 12, the fraud or concealment relied upon to avoid the policy was, that one Thomas, who, on the 16th of September, and before the loss happened, had written a letter to the agent of the assured, and put it in the post-office, but the mail did not leave the place until the afternoon of the next day, before which time, and on the morning of the 17th, he knew of the loss, but did not withdraw his letter from the post-office, or write another giving information of the loss. Here was, then, a palpable case of gross negli gence, if Thomas was to be considered the agent of the assured; and, that he was, appears not only to have been assumed by the whole court, but the conclusion is fully warranted by the facts in the case. The assured, in his letter to Fisher, who procured the insurance, directed him to procure it on receiving the bills of lading; which bills, it appears from the case, were to be sent to him by Thomas. The letter and information from Thomas was therefore made the foundation of the insurance, and the assured adopted Thomas as his agent, by directing Fuller to procure insurance on receiving the bills of lading from him. It was, therefore, a case of concealment, or misrepresentation, by one who stood in the relation of agent of the assured, in the subject-matter of the contract, and whose information lay at the foundation of it.

The case of Stewart v. Dunlop, 4 Brown. Parl. Cas. and Park, 320, decided in the House of Lords, is very imperfectly reported, the reasons of the judgment, and the ground on which the decision rested, not appearing in any report of the case. Enough, however, is shown, from the statement of facts, to put the decision upon the plain ground that the policy was procured by an agent of the assured expressly in

The policy, taking the risk on the vessel and cargo, lost or not lost, although effected after the loss happened, related back; and by the abandonment, the underwriters were substituted in the place of the assured; and the master, although the agent of the owner until the loss occurred, became, upon the abandonment, the agent of the underwriters. The law upon this subject is well settled, where there is only a technical total loss, and any part of the subject insured remains. The interest in the salvage, whatever it may be, becomes transferred to the underwriters, and the agency is, of course, transferred with the subject; and the agent, thereafter, becomes responsible to the underwriters for the faithful discharge of his trust. No action could be sustained against him by the assured for the proceeds, or any misconstructed by him to obtain the insurance; he, duct in the management thereof. This is not only the settled rule of law, but a contrary doc trine would involve the greatest absurdity. It would be placing the absolute interest in the property in one party, and making the agent accountable for its management to another. No action could be sustained by the assured, for the plain reason that he would have no interest in the subject of the agency.

And if such would be the effect of an abandonment in case of a technical total loss, there can be no good reason assigned why the rule should not be applied to a loss really total, so far as to transfer whatever agency could remain. So that, whether the agency terminated

the agent, having grounds to suspect a loss of the ship, which grounds were not communicated to the underwriter; and, besides this, there was enough to afford strong suspicion that the assured himself knew of the [*416 loss. The men who arrived at Greenock, knowing of the loss, communicated the information to the friend and intimate acquaintance of the assured, who desired it might be concealed. The same day this friend held a conversation with the clerk of the assured, and asked him if he knew whether there was any insurance upon the vessel, and if there was any account of her; and, after this, the assured directed this clerk to write to. get insurance. The case

was open to strong suspicion, that the friend of the assured had communicated to him the information he had received of the loss, which would have been a plain ground for declaring the policy void. But if such a conclusion is not fairly warranted, there was enough communicated to the clerk to lead him to suspect a loss had happened; and he being the agent employed to procure the insurance, his principal was properly chargeable with all the information he had in relation to the loss.

The case of Andrews & Boerum v. The Marine Insurance Company, 9 Johns. Rep. 32, does not seem to have much bearing upon this point. The decision turned upon a question of fact, whether there was such gross negligence, or constructive fraud, as to vacate the policy. There was no question of agency involved in the decision The master of the vessel was part owner, and one of the insured, and there was no point raised as to his legal obligation to use ordinary diligence in giving information of the loss to his co-owners; but the court considered that, under the circumstances of the case, he was not chargeable with such negligence as to vacate the policy. But what would have been the result if the doctrine now contended for had been applied to that case? If what is known to the agent is considered as impliedly known to the principal, with much more propriety should the knowledge of one part owner be imputable to all. And the poliey must have been held void, because procured with implied knowledge of the loss.

The case of Gladstone v. King, 1 Maule & Selw. 35, did not turn upon the question now before the court. The claim was for an average loss upon the ship, in consequence of an injury received before the policy was effected. The defense set up was a concealment of this 417*] fact, or negligence in the master in not mentioning it in a letter written to his owners, after the injury had been received, and before the policy was underwritten. The policy, however, took up the vessel from the commencement of the voyage, and would, of course, cover the injury. The court considered the concealment material, and that the underwriter ought not to be charged with the loss. They did not, however, decide the policy to be void, which would seem to have been the necessary consequence of a material concealment, according to the principles of insurance law. But they exonerated the underwriter by the application of what was avowed to be a new principle; that this antecedent damage should be considered an applied exception out of the policy; and this principle, say the court, although new, is adopted as being consistent with justice and convenience.

It is unnecessary to say whether, to such a case arising here, we should think proper to adopt and apply this new principle. It is enough for the present to say, the principle does not apply to the case now before us. It may, however, be observed, that the decision in that case, so far, at least, as it went to exonerate the insurer from the payment of the average loss, may be supported upon well-settled rules. Information of the injury was withheld by the captain whilst he was acting in his ap propriate character of the master, and, as such |

was the exclusive agent of the owner, ard for whose negligence he alone was responsible. And from what fell from Lord Ellenborough upon the trial, it may be presumed this letter was shown to the underwriter, and, if so, it amounted to a representation that the vessel had sustained no injury at the date of the letter. But unless the case is imperfectly reported, it would be difficult to sustain it upon principles heretofore understood to govern analogous cases.

These are all the cases cited on the argument on the part of the underwriters, which are supposed to have a bearing upon the present question. We think, however, they are distinguishable in many material circumstances, and particularly in this, that the fraud or concealment, which was held to vitiate the policies, was traced to some agent, having connection in some way with procuring the insurance; and the agency was, therefore, concerning the [*418 subject-matter of the contract.

It is, no doubt, true, with respect to policies of insurance, as well as to all other contracts, that the principal is responsible for the acts of his agent; and that any misrepresentation, or material concealment by the agent, is equally fatal to the contract, as if it had been the act of the principal himself. But such responsi bility must, of necessity, be limited to cases where the agent acts within the scope of his authority. In the present case, the master was clothed with no authority or agency, in any manner connected with procuring insurance. The misconduct charged against him occurred, not whilst he was acting as master, but at time when the relation of master and owner may well be considered as dissolved from necessity, by reason of a total destruction of the whole subject matter of the agency; and if not, the master, by the legal operation of the abandonment, became the agent of the underwrit ers, and was their agent at the time of his alleged misconduct.

It is said, that if this is a new question, the court should adopt such rule as is best calculated to preserve good faith in effecting policies of insurance. But it is by no means clear that this end would be best promoted by adopting the rule contended for on the part of the underwriters. Cases may very easily be supposed, where negligence or misconduct in agents of underwriters, as to matters not immediately connected with effecting a policy, will still have a remote influence, which may have a tendency to prejudice the interest of the assured. Such cases, however, as well as those of the description now under consideration, will most likely be of rare occurrence, and nice and minute distinctions practically operate unfavorably on the business of insurance."

If underwriters feel themselves exposed to fraudulent practices in such cases, the protection is in their own hands, by not assuming any losses that may have happened prior to the date of the policy. It is considered a hazardous undertaking to insure, lost or not lost, and a proportionate premium is demanded, according to the circumstances stated, to show the probability or improbability of the safety of the subject insured.

Although no adjudged cases directly [*419 applicable to the one before us have been

found, we do not consider this decision as es-
tablishing any new principle in the law of in-
surance, but as grounded on the application of
principles already settled, to a new combina-
tion of circumstances.
Judgment affirmed.

[Constitutional Law.]

BROWN et al., Plaintiffs in Error,

V.

wares, or merchandises, by bale or package, or of wine, rum, brandy, whiskey, and other distilled spirituous liquors, etc., and other persons selling the same by wholesale, *bale, or [*420 package, hogshead, barrel, or tierce, shall, before they are authorized to sell, take out a license as by the original act is directed, for which they shall pay fifty dollars; and in case of neglect or refusal to take out such license, shall be subject to the same penalties and forfei tures as are prescribed by the original act, to which this is a supprement." The penalties and forfeitures prescribed by the original act which was passed in 1819, were, a forfeit ure of the amount of the license tax, and a fine

THE STATE OF MARYLAND, Defendant in of $100, to be recovered by indictment.

Error.

An act of a state legislature, requiring all importers of foreign goods by the bale or package, etc., and other persons selling the same by wholesale, bale, or package, etc., to take out a license, for which they shall pay $50, and in case of neglect or refusal to take out such license, subjecting them to certain forfeitures and penalties is repugnant to that provision of the constitution of the United States which declares, that "no state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any impost, or duty on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws;" and to that which declares that Congress shall have power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states and with the Indian tribes."

The defendants having demurred to the indictment, a judgment was rendered upon the demurrer against them, in the City Court, which was affirmed in the Court of Appeals, and the case was brought, by writ of error, to this court.

Mr. Meredith, for the plaintiffs in error, contended, that the law in question was an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power of Maryland. He did not deny the existence of such a power. As a necessary incident to sovereignty, it belonged to the several states_before the adoption of the constitution, and it still belongs to them, subject, however, to the restrictions imposed upon its exercise by the paramount authority of that instrument. With to contend that the general grant contained in This was an indictment in the City Court of the eighth section of the first article of the conBaltimore, against the plaintiffs in error, upon stitution vested in the national government the second section of an act of the legislature anything more than a concurrent power of tax. of the state of Maryland, passed in 1821, en-ation. He admitted the rule of construction, titled, "An act supplementary to the act laying that a grant of power to Congress does not, of duties on licenses to retailers of dry goods, and itself, imply a prohibition of its exercise by the for other purposes." The second section of states. The powers granted to the general the act provides, "That all importers of for-government are never to be considered as exclueign articles, or commodities, of dry goods, sive, unless they are made so in express terms,

ERROR to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. regard to these restrictions, he did not mean

NOTE. Power of Congress to regulate Commerce. Power of State to tax.

A state law which requires the masters of vessels engaged in foreign commerce to pay a certain sum to a state officer, on account of every passenger brought from a foreign country into the state, or before landing any alien passenger in the state, is Inoperative, by reason of its conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States. The 1 nsportation of passengers is a branch of commerce, and a tax upon it is a tax upon a commercial operation. Smith v. Turner, 7 How. 283.

A city ordinance exacting a license fee from a company keeping an office in the city for a carrying or express business extending beyond the limits of the state, is not repugnant to the provisions of the constitution vesting in Congress the power "to regulate commerce among the several states." Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479.

A condition in a charter granted by a state to a railroad company, that the company shall pay to the state from time to time a bonus, or a portion of its earnings, is not invalid as amounting to a tax upon the transportation of passengers, or as infringing the exclusive power of Congress to regulate commerce among the states. A state has power to impose conditions upon its own grants to corporations. Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456. The California statute regulating the arrival of passengers from a foreign port is palpably unconstitutional and void. Its purpose is to extort money from a large class of passengers, or prevent their immigration. It operates directly on the passenger; for, unless the master or owner of a vessel gives an onerous bond for the future protection of the state against the support of the passenger, or pays such sum as the Commissioner of Emigration

| chooses to exact, he is not permitted to land from the vessel. It extends far beyond the necessity in which the right, if it exists, is founded, of protecting the state from the diseased, poor and criminal classes, and invades the right of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Chy Lung 1. Freeman, 2 Otto, 275; Matter of Ah Fong, 13 Am. L Reg. 761; 3 Sawy. 144.

A statute of Missouri which requires the pay. ment of a license tax from persons who deal in the sale of goods, wares and merchandise, which are not the growth, produce or manufacture of the state, by going from place to place to sell the same in the state, and requires no such license tax from persons selling, in a similar way goods which are the growth, produce or manufacture of the state, is in conflict with the power vested in Congress to regulate commerce with foreign_states and among the several states. Welton v. State, 1 Otto, 275. That power was vested in Congress to insure uniformity of commercial regulations against discrimi nating state legislation. It covers property which is transported as an article of commerce from for eign countries, or among the states, from hostile or interfering state legislation until it has mingled with and become a part of the general property of the country, and protects it even after it has en tered a state from any burdens imposed by reason of its foreign origin. Ib.

That the tax is imposed in the form of requiring a license fee makes no difference. Where the business or occupation consists in the sale of goods, the license tax required for its pursuit is in effect a tax upon the goods themselves, and it is not, any the less invalid because enforced through the form of a license.

Ib.

A statute which imposes a burdensome and almost impossible condition on the shipmaster as

or unless, from the nature of the power itself, Its concurrent exercise must necessarily produce direct repugnancy or incompatibility. But be argued, that this was by no means the inevitable result from a concurrent exercise of the taxing power, because its peculiar nature rendered it often capable of being exercised by different authorities at the same time, and even upon the same subject, without actual collision or interference.

to a different power, whether exclusive or con current, express or implied, residing in the general government.

Having stated and illustrated these as the constitutional limits of the taxing power of the states, he insisted that they had been transgressed by the legislative act under consideration. The second section comprises all the provisions of the law which are material to the question. The true construction of this secThe restrictions which he had alluded to, tion is somewhat doubtful; upon any interpre421*] were to be found in other provisions tation, however, it prohibits the importer from of the constitution; and they were both ex-selling the imported merchandise without havpress and implied. The former were all coming first taken out a license to do so, for which prised in the tenth section of the first article, he is required to pay a stipulated tax. by which the states are prohibited, unless with The question, then, is, whether this is such a the consent of Congress, from laying any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws, and are, also, without such consent, forbidden to impose any duty upon tonnage. The effect of this prohibition, coupled with the general grant of the taxing power before referred to, is to vest in the national government an exclusive right to the commercial imposts of the country. With the exception of these, however, the power to lay and collect taxes is a concurrent power.

But, like all the other concurrent powers of the states, this power of taxation is subject, in its exercise, to that general implied restriction which necessarily results from the supreme and paramount authority of the Union. This is a vital principle of the political system, and its direct operation is to restrain the states from the exercise of any power repugnant to, or incompatible with, the constitution, or the constitutional laws of the national government. By which is to be understood, not merely a repugnancy growing out of a concurrent exercise of the same power by Congress and a state legislature, but that which may arise from the exercise of one power by a state, with reference

prerequisite to his landing his passengers, with an
alternative payment of a small sum of money for
each one of them, is a tax on the ship-owner for
the right to land such passengers, and, in effect, on
the passenger himself, since the ship-master makes
him pay it in advance as a part of his fare. Such
a statute of a state is a regulation of commerce,
and when applied to passengers from foreign coun-
tries, is a regulation of commerce with foreign na-
tions. Legislation on the subject which it covers is
confided exclusively to Congress by that clause of
the constitution which gives to that body the
"right to regulate commerce with foreign nations.'
Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y. 2 Otto, 259.
An act of the legislature of N. Y., passed May 6,
1870, in relation to wharfage, with the provision
that "all canal-boats navigating the canals of this
state, and vessels known as North River barges,

law as the legislature of Maryland have a right to pass. Under color of a license law, he contended that this statute was a palpable *evasion of the express restriction up- [*422 on the states to "lay duties on imports;" an indirect attempt to do that which the constitution has explicity inhibited. And he said this, because he thought it might be clearly shown that a law laying a tax on the importer for the privilege of selling the merchandise he has himself imported, which is this law, and this case, is equivalent, in all substantial respects, to a duty on imports, since, with a few slight and unimportant differences, it answers all the purposes, and produces all the effects of a concurrent power in the states to impose such duty.

What are the apparent differences between this and a tax directly on imports? It may be said, in the first place, that the one is a tax for the privilege of bringing the foreign article into the country, and the other a tax for the privilege of selling it after it is so brought in. But these privileges are indissolubly connected; the right to sell is a necessary incident to the right of importing. The grant of a privilege to import would be of no value, unless it im that which solely belongs to Congress. It would be a tax upon interstate commerce. Indiana v. Am. Exp. Co. 7 Biss. 227.

The Iowa act of March 23, 1874, to establish rea. sonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of freight and passengers on the different roads of the state, is not a regulation of interstate commerce. Chicago R. Co. v. Iowa, 4 Otto, 155.

So much of the N. Y. act of May 22, 1862, amended April 17, 1865, as requires, with certain exceptions, all ships or vessels which enter the port of New York, or load, or unload, or make fast to any wharf therein, to pay a certain percentage per ton, to be computed on the tonnage expressed in the registers of enrollments of such ships or vessels, respectively, violates U. S. Const. art. 1, sec. 10, forbidding a state to levy any duty on tonnage. Co. v. Tinker, 4 Otto, 238.

shall pay the same rates as heretofore." It further Inman Steams March 6, 1869, in relation to the

provided that if any vessel should leave a wharf, etc., without paying the wharfage due, after a de mand of it, she should pay double rates. Held, that the act was not contrary to the constitution of the United States. The Ann Ryan, 7 Ben. 20.

The Ind. act of March 8, 1873, requiring every corporation, foreign or domestic, engaged in carryIng passengers or merchandize through the state to make returns of gross receipts and a one per cent. tax, cannot be enforced against a foreign corporation, except, perhaps, as to earnings received within the state. It is not competent for a state to require of a foreign corporation the pay. ment of a tax on gross receipts not received in the state, or to impose a tax on the receipts of a foreign corporation for the transportation of merchandise received out of the state and delivered out of the state, and simply carried through the state. That is an interference by the state with

The La. act of

survey of hatches of sea-going vessels arriving at New Orleans, and of damaged goods coming on board of her, etc., is in the nature of a regulation of commerce, and vold. Foster v. Master, etc., of New Orleans, 4 Otto, 246.

The statute of Missouri which prohibits driving or conveying any Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle into the state, between March 1 and Nov. 1, in each year, is void as involving an attempt to regulate commerce. Railroad Company v. Husen, 5 Otto, 465.

The Wis. act of March 11, 1874, relating to railroads, express and telegraph companies in the state, is confined to state commerce, or such interstate commerce as affects the people of Wisconsin, and is therefore valid. Peik 7. Chicago R. Co. Otto, 164.

plies a right to sell. Prohibit sale, and impor | necessarily be resorted to of a more odious and tation necessarily ceases. He maintained that, oppressive nature. Now, the consequence of on a fair and just construction of the whole the right claimed by this law on the part of revenue system, the implication was irresis- Maryland, is to place this branch of the pubtible. That the duties exacted by the gener- lic revenue completely in her power; as entire al government were paid, not for the privilege ly so as if she had constitutionally a concur to import simply, but for the privilege of im rent right to tax imports. It is to ena-[*424 porting foreign commodities, and using them ble her, at her pleasure, by means of license in the way of merchandise, might be incontesta- laws, to annihilate, as it regards her own terribly proved, by showing that no goods were tory, the commercial revenues of the country. dutiable, unless imported with the intention. What is to prevent her from prohibiting ai and for the purpose of traffic. With this view, together the importation of foreign merchandise he referred to various provisions of the act into any of her ports. It is only to increase of March, 1799, ch. 128, s. 30, 32, 45. 46. 60. the price of the license until the commodity and 107, and to the case of The Concord. This will no longer bear the burden, and the end is is the principle, also, of the English law of accomplished. Importation must in that case customs, from which our system is mainly bor- necessarily cease, and with it, revenue. It is rowed. It was likewise worthy of remark, that not pretended that these consequences are prothe legislation of Maryland, upon this sub- duced by this particular law; it is not necessary ject, before the adoption of the constitution, that this should be the case. We are not to was in strict accordance with the same princi- look at the particular exercise of power so ple, and carried it so far as to permit the mer- much as at the principle upon which the pow chant to try the market by an actual sale, and er is asserted. We are not to judge of the con428*] paying the duties only on the *portion stitutionality of this law by the amount of tax sold, to export the residue free of duty. There which it imposes; it is not the degree of taxais, then, no difference in this respect between tion, in the particular instance, that deterthese two modes of taxation. mines the right to tax. That the public revenue is, to a certain degree, affected by the operation of this law, is incontestable. But if, on principle, Maryland has a right to demand fifty dollars as the price of a license to sell imported merchandise, she has a right to demand any sum for the same privilege. If, in other words, she is within the proper sphere of her taxing power, that power is, in its nature, unlimited, and she may carry it to what extent she pleases. A power to tax, this court has emphatically said, is a power to destroy. In this case it is a power to prohibit; a power to deprive the government of the means to accomplish its great objects, and conduct all its im portant operations; a power to defeat the intention of the exclusive grant of commercial

It may be said that these taxes are payable at different times; in the one case, at the time of importation; in the other, at the time of sale. But if they are both paid substantially for the same privilege, surely this is not a material difference. It is a matter that simply concerns the safety, certainty, and convenience of collection; but it gives no distinctive character to the law. In point of fact, however, the duty imposed by the revenue system is not payable except it is less than fifty dollars, until after the importation.

A third apparent difference may be said to consist in this: that the import duty is a charge upon the goods, the license upon the person; but the one is as much a charge upon the goods as the other, if by that is meant an increase of their actual cost. The import duty is, however, a personal charge upon the importer; it is not the bond that alone makes him personally liable; without having given a bond, he is still answerable for the duties."

revenue.

If Maryland has a right to enact laws of this description, she has a right to regulate her own foreign commerce, although, by the constitution, it is exclusively vested in Congress. The imposition of import duties is often resortThese are the only differences in the opera-ed to, not for the purpose of revenue, but to tion of the two taxes, and they are apparent, regulate commercial intercourse with foreign but not substantial; they are the disguise countries. Discriminating duties, protecting thrown about the law to elude detection. The duties, prohibitory duties, are so many comtrue test, however, is, to consider the effect mercial regulations. These may all be resortof this law upon the exclusive grant to the ed to under the disguise of license laws. If general government, to raise revenue from im- Maryland has a right to pass general license posts. The reasons for such a grant are obvi- laws, she may pass partial ones; she may select ous. The objects committed by the constitu- particular commodities, and burthen their sale tion to the general government are of immense with a license duty; she may establish a tariff magnitude, and require corresponding means. of discriminating duties for herself, [*425 Of all species of taxation, that upon imports and affect, if not defeat, the commercial policy is most fruitful and least oppressive. It is of the country. In one word, she may exersound policy, therefore, to cherish and extend cise the same right to regulate commerce by this branch of the public revenue; because, means of license laws, which a concurrent whenever it fails, other modes of taxation must power to tax imports would give her, and thus evade, in this respect also, the constitutional prohibition. It may be said that this law looks to no such object; that it is simply a tax for revenue, and that there is no ground to apprehend that it will be used for any other purpose

1.-9 Cranch, 388; see also 4 Cranch 347. 2.-Hale on the Customs, Pt. 3, ch. 20, in Hargr. Law Tracts, 211.

3.-Hanson's Laws of Maryland, Act of 1783, ch. But the motives for legislative acts are not fit 86, s. 34; Act of 1784, ch. 84, s. 5.

4.-1 Mason's Rep. 482.

subjects of judicial inquiry. If the power can be exercised for one purpose, it may be for an

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