fore, could not be law, even supposing it to be correctly reported, which might well be doubted. That case states that if the devise had been, "that if he died without issue in the life of the other, or before such an age, that then it should remain to the other, then, peradventure, it should be a contingent devise in tail, if it should happen, and not otherwise." No lawyer would pretend, at this day, that a devise to one and his heirs, and in case he die without issue in the life of another, or if he died before the age of 21, then over, is an estate tail, either vested or contingent. It is, like the present case, an estate in fee-simple, defeasible on the event happening, with a valid executory devise over. The other cases cited by Mr. Chancellor Kent' would all be found to range themselves under one of the following classes: (1) Where there are no words to control the indefinite failure of issue. (2) Where the first estate is only for life, and enlarged by implication to an estate tail by the limitation over, or failure of issue. (3) Where the first taker left issue, and the executory devise, in consequence, could not take effect." (4) Several cases cited against the construction insisted on by the defendant in the present case, which are manifestly in favor of that 160*] construction. In Massie v. Hudson, the master of the rolls considers the words "executors, administrators, and assigns," as showing the intent of the testator to vest the interest, and make it transmissible. But, in the present case, there are no words of limitation annexed; and if it be said they are implied, the same might be said of every legatee, who, if no words of restriction are added, takes an absolute interest transmissible to his executors, etc. But here the interest neither vested nor transmissible. Barlow v Salter' cannot be reconciled with the general course of English adjudications in cases of personal property, and is entirely inconsistent with the American authorities. As to the notion of the word "survivor" being used to indicate the surviving branch or stock, in the recent case of Wollen v. Andrews, it is expressly laid down, that "survivor or survivors," mean not the surviving stocks, but the surviving children. And Mr. Fearne observes, that was 1.-Anderson v. Jackson, 16 Johns. Rep. 897 424. 2. Tenny v. Agar, 12 East, 213; Romilly v. James, 6 Taunt. 263; Brice v. Smith, 1 Willes, 1; Doe v. Tennereau, Dougl. 477; Denn v. Slater, 5 Term Rep. 335; Doe v. Ellis, 9 East, 382; Hunter v. Haines, 1 Wash. 171; Ide v. Ide, 5 Mass. Rep. 500; Royal v. Eppes, 2 Munf. 479. 3.-Webb v. Herring, Cro. Jac. 415; King v. Rumball, Cro. Jac. 448; Sutton v. Wood, Camer. & Norw. 202. 4.-Roe v. Scott, 2 Fearne, 259; Hope v. Taylor, 1 Burr. 268; Doe v. Rivers, 7 Term Rep. 276; Denn. v. Slater, 5 Term Rep. 335. 5.-Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick 13 Ves. 476; Richardson v. Noyes, 2 Mass. Rep. 56; Porter v. Bradley, 3 Term Rep. 143; Roe v. Jeffray, 7 Term Rep. 585; Haver v. Shitz, 3 Yates, 205; Ray v. Enslin, 2 Mass. Rep. 554; Keating v. Reynolds, 1 Bay, 80; Jones v. Rice, 8 Dessaus 165. 6-2 Meriv. 130. 7.-17 Ves. 479. 6 though the authorities have established on solid ground the power of testamentary dis positions of contingent and executory estates, and possibilities coupled with an interest, and such as would be descendible to the heir of the object of them dying before the contingency or event on which the vesting or acquisition of the estate depended; yet the decisions do not appear to reach those cases, where the contingent interest is not transmissible from any person, until the contingency decides him to be the object of the limitation. Now, it has been decided, that a testamentary disposition of an estate, devised to the survivor of two persons, while both are alive, is not valid, although the person making the disposition becomes the survivor; because, till by the death of the other he so becomes the survivor, he has no interest whatever in the land." So, also, Mr. Preston observes, that mere possibilities to persons not ascertained, as to the survivor of several persons, are not coupled with an *interest, [* i 6 r and are not devisable, nor, he apprehends, transferable to assignees under a commission of bankrupt." So, again: "titles under possibilities or expectancies are of two descriptions. (1) Possibilities coupled with an interest. (2) Possibilities without any interest. Those possibilities which are not coupled with an interest are not devisable, but all titles under them may be barred, excluded, or bound by estoppel. Such are the expectancies of an heir apparent or presumptive, or of persons where the gift is to the survivor, and both are living." So, a power given to the survivor of two persons cannot be well executed by both of them while alive." In addition to the argument upon the case, as a question of general law, the counsel referred to the decisions of the state courts of New York, as conclusively establishing the construction contended for on the part of the defendant in error, as a settled rule of property in that state; and to the decisions of this court showing that the law thus established by a long series of adjudications in the local tribunals, would be respected here.1 Mr. Justice Thompson delivered the opinion of the court, and after stating the case, pro ceeded as follows: Questions growing out of devises of this description, are among the most difficult and intricate doctrines of the law; and from the numerous cases that have arisen, as found reported in the books, it will be seen that nice and almost imperceptible distinctions have been resorted to, with the avowed object of carrying into effect the intention of the testator. To review the cases that have arisen in the English courts on these questions, [*162 would be an arduous, and to reconcile them. a difficult, if not a fruitless undertaking. Nor 11.-Doe v. Tompkinson, 2 Maule v. Selw. 165. 12.-1 Preston on Estates, 76. 13.-Preston's Abstr. tit. 204. 14.-Sugd. Powers, 162; 3 Bro. Ch. 310. 15.-Fosdick v. Cornell, 1 Johns. Rep. 440: Jackson v. Blanshaw, 3 Johns. Rep. 292: Moffat v. Strong, 10 Johns. Rep. 12; Jackson v. Staats, 11 Johns. Rep. 337; Jackson v. Anderson, 16 Johns 8.-Fearne 481, note; 1 Serg. & Rawle, 144-159; Rep. 382; Wilkes v. Lion, 2 Cowen's Rep. 333. 8 Serg. & Rawle, 470. 9.-2 Bingh. 126. 10.-Ex. Dev. (6th Lond. ed.) 545. 16.-5 Cranch, 32; 9 Cranch, 98; 6 Wheat. Rep. 127 7 Wheat. Rep. 550; 8 Wheat. Rep. 535-542: 10 Wheat. Rep. 159; 11 Wheat. Rep. 367-8. are the decisions of the state courts in our own | members, was applied to the purpose of en- This is a principle so obviously just, and so indispensably necessary under our system of government, that it cannot be lost sight of. The inquiry, then, is, whether the question arising in this case has been so settled in the state courts of New York as to be considered at rest there. Numerous cases have come before those courts upon this question; some on the very clause in the will now under consideration; others on wills containing clauses very analogous, and which, in those courts at least, have been considered identical with the present. I shall proceed to notice some of the leading cases there decided, to see how the law on this question is held to have been settled in that state. In the case of Anderson v. Jackson, 16 Johns. Rep. 382, decided in the court for the trial of impeachments and correction of errors, in the year 1819, the decision turned solely upon the construction of this very clause in the will of Medcef Eden, the elder, affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court, which had been given without argument, the court considering the question raised to have been settled by former cases; and the Court of Errors, in affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court, put it principally upon the same ground, and considered the question at rest by the repeated and uniform decisions of the Supreme Court for the last twelve or fourteen years. It may be useful to recur to the progress of these 163*] *decisions, to see the steady and uninterrupted course of the courts upon the ques | tion, and how firmly the principle has become ingrafted in the law of that state as a rule of landed property. The first case that arose was that of Fosdick v. Cornell, 1 Johns. Rep. 440, in the year 1806. By the will there in question, the devise over was, "My mind and will is, that if any of my said sons, William, Jacob, Thomas and John, or my daughter Mary, shall happen to die without heirs male of their own bodies, then that the lands shall return to the survivors, to be equally divided between them." And it was held by the court unanimously, that this clause did not create an estate tail, but was to take effect as an executory devise. In the case of Anderson v. Jackson, the doctrine of that was considered applicable to the Eden will, and to govern its construction. And it was not pretended by the dissenting members of the Court of Errors, but that if the case of Fosdick v. Cornell was correctly decided, it would govern the case then before the court. And the whole strength of the argument in the very elaborate opinions given by the dissenting case deavoring to show that the decisions in that case, and in those which rested upon it, had proceeded upon incorrect views of the law, as decided both in the English and American courts. Chancellor Kent here took occasion to announce his change of opinion on this ques tion, and to say, that although he did not deliver the opinion of the court, he would not shelter himself under his silence, but partook of the error; but that he had discovered, years ago, that the case of Fosdick v. Cornell was decided on mistaken grounds. If this should be admitted (which I certainly do not mean to admit), it is an error which has been so repeatedly sanctioned by all the courts of that state, for the last twenty years, that it has ripened into a settled rule of law. And a reference to the cases which followed that of Fosdick v. Cornell, will show that it has become a rule so fastened upon the law of real property in that state as to make it unwise and unsafe to disturb it. In the case of Jackson v. Blanshaw, 3 Johns. Rep. 289, decided in the year 1808, the question before the court *arose upon a will, [*164 where the testator devised "all his estate, real and personal, to his six children, to be equally divided between them, share and share alike; but if any of them died before arriving at full age, or without lawful issue, that then his, her, or their part, should devolve upon and be equally divided among the surviving children, and to their heirs and assigns, forever." This was held to be a good devise over by way of executory devise; and Chief Justice Kent, in delivering the opinion of the court, refers to the case of Fosdick v. Cornell, and observes, that the court there reviewed the leading authorities, and held, that the devise over was a good executory devise, and that the true construction was, a devise over to take effect on failure of male issue during the life of the first taker. That the ancient case of Hanbury v. Cockrill, 1 Roll. Abr. 835, was quite analogous in favor of the executory devise. The devise there was to the two sons in fee, with a proviso, that if either died before they should be married, or before they should attain the age of 21 years, and without issue of their bodies, then his share should go to the survivor. That Lord Kenyon, in the two cases of Porter v. Bradley and Roe v. Jeffray, 3 Term Rep. 143; 7 Term Rep. 589, supported this established construction in a very forcible manner; and that the case before the court could not be distinguished in principle from those in which this rule of law is settled beyond controversy. Again; in the case of the Executors of Moffat v. Strong, 10 Johns. Rep. 12, decided in the year 1813, the testator, after giving certain specific parts of his real and personal estate to his sons, adds this provision: "And if any of my sons aforesaid should die without lawful issue, then let his or their part or parts be divided equally among the survivors." Although this was a case of personal property, the judg. ment of the court did not rest upon that distinction. Chief Justice Kent, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "The greatest diffi culty that arises in starting the main point for consideration, is to avoid being overwhelmed and confounded by the multitude of cases. Lord Thurlow said there were fifty-seven cases the Court of Errors (2 Owen, 333), and a preon this point, and we know they have greatly liminary question was made, whether the court increased since." And, after reviewing many of would hear an argument on the point decided 165*] the leading cases, the Chief Justice ob- in the case of Anderson v. Jackson. But as serves, if the limitation rested solely on the that question was so involved with other ques words "dying without issue," it would fail; but tions in the cause, it was found difficult entirethe will proceeds, and gives the part of the son ly to separate them, and the argument proceedso dying without issue to the survivors. The ed; the president of the court at the same time term "survivors" will be found to rescue the observing, that he should suppose counsel limitation from the operation of the general would not question any point plainly decided principle, and to bring it within the reach of in Anderson v. Jackson, both in its principle other cases, which have adjudged that expres- and object, and that he had no doubt the court sion to be the cause of a different construction, would abide by its decision in that case. In and for the reason that it could not have been the course of the argument, when the bearing intended that the survivor was to take only of the case of Anderson v. Jackson was fully after an indefinite failure of issue, as that understood, it was proposed to stop the counevent might happen long after the death of all sel, so far as the decision in that case was the survivors. Thus stood the question when called in question; and the chancellor (Sanford) the Chief Justice was transferred to the Court expressed his determination to adhere to that of Chancery, no diversity of opinion having decision. That he understood it to fix distinctexisted on the bench upon the question, accord-ly a construction upon the clause which devises ing to the reported cases. The next case that to Joseph Eden, and was prepared to say it did came before the court was that of Jackson v. not carry an estate tail, but a fee determinable Staats, 11 Johns. Rep. 337, in the year 1814; on his death without issue then living. And and the construction of a similar clause in a although the counsel were allowed to proceed, will was under consideration. Spencer, J., in and the question again fully argued, the court, delivering the opinion of the court, observes, when they came to pronounce judgment, disthat "the point, whether the limitation over claimed, in very strong language, any intention operates as an executory devise, or to create an to call in question the decision of Anderson v. estate tail, admits of very little difficulty. The Jackson. Cramer, senator, observes: "The case of Fosdick v. Cornell is in point; that this court has been called upon, in a very solemn is a good executory devise;" and adds, "I be- manner, to review its decision on an important lieve none of us have ever doubted the correct rule of law affecting titles to real [*167 ness of the decision in that case, and it would property. But we have not, in my view of the be a waste of time to review the authorities subject, the power (and by power I mean there cited." So that the law on this point was right) now to question or impeach that judgconsidered settled, and not open to argument, ment rendered by this court, and founded on the until it was again stirred, in the case of Ander- uniform decisions of the Supreme Court durson v. Jackson, in the Court of Errors, upon ing a period of more than seventeen years. the clause in Eden's will, now under considera- Wills have been made, and estates settled, on tion; and the rule of construction settled in the the principle of these cases, which have been Supreme Court was considered applicable to deemed and treated as the settled law of the this will, and governed the decision in the land." And the judgment of the Supreme Court of Errors. Again, in the year 1823, the Court was unanimously affirmed, with the exconstruction of this same clause in Eden's will ception of one senator. came before the Supreme Court, in the case of Lion v. Burtis, 20 Johns. Rep. 483, and Spencer, Ch. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, referred to the case of Anderson v. Jackson, in the Court of Errors, and said, it was there decided that the devise to Joseph Eden did not create an estate tail, but that the devise over, upon the event of his dying without issue, was a limitation over as an executory devise to Medcef, the survivor. That the opinion of the 166*] court was, that the devise over to the survivor did not depend on an indefinite failure of issue, but only on a failure of issue at the time of Joseph's death. "This, then," said the Chief Justice, "is the law of the land, and must govern every other case coming within the same principle. And I must be allowed to say, that subsequent reflection has confirmed my conviction of the soundness of the decision in the Court of Errors. Stare decisis is a maxim essential to the security of property. The decisions of courts of law become a rule for the regulation of the alienation and descent of real estate; and when that rule has been sanctioned and adopted in our courts, it ought to be adhered to, unless manifestly wrong and unjust." Other questions were, however, embraced in this case, and it was afterwards brought before After such a settled course of decisions, and two of them in the highest court of law in the state, upon the very clause in the will now under consideration, deciding that Joseph Eden did not take an estate tail, a contrary decision by this court would present a conflict between the state courts and those of the United States, productive of incalculable mischief. If, after such an uninterrupted series of decisions for twenty years, this question is not at rest in New York, it is difficult to say when any question can be so considered. And it will be seen by reference to the decisions of this court, that to establish a contrary doctrine here, would be repugnant to the principles which have always governed this court in like cases. It has been urged, however, at the bar, that this court applies this principle only to state constructions of their own statutes. It is true, that many of the cases in which this court has deemed itself bound to conform to state decisions, have arisen on the construction of statutes. But the same rule has been extended to other cases; and there can be no good reason assigned why it should not be, when it is applying settled rules of real property. This court adopts the state decisions, because they settle the law applicable to the case; and the reasons assigned for this course, apply as well to rules of construction growing out of the common law, as the statute law of the state, when applied to the title of lands. And such a course is indispensable, in order to preserve uniformity, otherwise the peculiar constitution of the judicial tribunals of the states and of the United States, would be productive of the greatest mischief and confusion. 168*] The case of M'Keen v. DeLancy's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 32, arose upon the construction of a statute. And the court say, "If the act then in question was for the first time to conformity to a settled course of adjudications for twenty years past. After such a series of adjudications for such a length of time, in the state courts, upon the very point now before us, and relating to a rule of landed property in that state, we do not feel ourselves at liberty to treat it as an open question. Judgment affirmed with costs. ARMSTRONG be construed, the opinion of the court would [Lex Loci. Probate of Testamentary Paper.] be, that the deed was not properly proved, and, therefore, not legally recorded. But in construing the statutes of a state, on which land titles depend, infinite mischief would ensue, LEAR, Administrator (with the will annexed) should this court observe a different rule from that which has been long established in the state." And whether these rules of land titles of Kosciuszko. country, even if executed so as to give it the effect A testamentary paper, executed in a foreign of a last will and testament by the foreign law, cannot be made the foundation of a suit for a legceived probate here, in the court having the peacy in the courts of this country, until it has reculiar jurisdiction of the probate of wills and other testamentary matters. PPEAL from the Circuit Court for the Dis Atrict of Columbia. grow out of the statutes of a state, or principles of the common law adopted and applied to such titles, can make no difference. There is the same necessity and fitness in preserving uniformity of decisions in the one case as in the other. So. also, in the cases of Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 98, and Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. Rep. 127, the construction of state statutes respecting real property was under consideration; and the court say they The bill, filed on the chancery side of the will adopt, and be governed by, the state con- Circuit Court, stated that Thaddeus Kosciuszstruction, when that is settled, and can be as-ko, on the 5th of May, 1798, placed a fund in certained, especially where the title to lands is the hands of Thomas Jefferson, and executed in question. But in the case of Blight's Lessee a will, as follows: "I, Thaddeus Kosciuszko, v. Rochester, 7 Wheat. Rep. 550, which arose being just on my departure from America, do in Kentucky, the question was not upon the hereby declare and direct, that, should [*170 construction of any statute, but related to the I make no other testamentary disposition of doctrine of estoppel, between vendor and ven- my property in the United States, I hereby dee; and it was urged at the bar, that the authorize my friend, Thomas Jefferson, to em. question was settled by authority in Kentucky, ploy the whole thereof in purchasing negroes, and cases cited to establish the point. The from among his own, or any others, and giving authorities were examined, and considered by them liberty in my name, in giving them an the court as not deciding the question; but no education in trade or otherwise, and in having intimation is given that they were inapplica- them instructed for their new condition in the ble, because the question did not involve the duties of morality, which may make them good construction of a statute. And the case of neighbors, good fathers or moders, husbands or Daly v. James, 8 Wheat. Rep. 535, which arose wives, in their duty as citizens, teaching them in Pennsylvania, is directly in point. The to be defenders of their liberty and country, question there was upon the interpretation of and of the good order of society, and in whatsoa clause in a will, which had received a ju- ever may make them happy and useful. And dicial construction by the Supreme Court of I make the said Thomas Jefferson my executor that state. And it was urged, as it has been of this. (Signed) T. KOSCIUSZKO, 5 May, here, that it was not one of those cases where the decisions of state courts, on questions of local law, established rules of property which this court could not disturb. But the court said, they always listened with respect to the adjudications of the different states, when they apply. And in a question of so much doubt, 169] they were disposed, upon this point, to acquiesce in the decision of the Suprenie Court of that state, Smith v. Folwell, 1 Binn. 546, that the word "heirs" in the will is to be construed to be a word of limitation. In that case this court adopted a single decision of the state court upon the question. But, in the case now under consideration, there have been two decisions in the two highest courts of law in the state upon the identical question now in judgment, and which were in 1798." The bill farther stated that the said Kosci uszko, about the 18th of June, 1806, being then domiciled in Paris, executed a certain will or writing testamentary, as follows: "Know all men by these presents, that I, Thaddeus KosStates of America, in their revolutionary war ciuszko, formerly an officer of the United against Great Britain, and a native of Liloane, in Poland, at present residing in Paris, do hereby will and direct, that, at my decease, the sum of $3,704, current money of the aforesaid other state, see note to Darby's Lessee v. Mayer, 10 NOTE. As to effect of the probate of wills in anWheat. 465; and as to effect of judgments and decrees of one state in another, see note to Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481. A foreign will is admissible in evidence by pro United States, shall of right be possessed by, and delivered over to the full enjoyment and use of Kosciuszko Armstrong, the son of General John Armstrong, minister plenipotentiary of the said States at Paris; for the security and performance whereof, I do hereby instruct and authorize my only lawful executor in the United States, Thomas Jefferson, President thereof, to reserve, in trust for that special purpose, of the funds he already holds belong ing to me, the aforesaid sum of $3.704 in principal, to be paid by him, the said Thomas Jefferson, immediately after my decease, to him, the said Kosciuszko Armstrong, and in case of his death, to the use and benefit of his surviving brother. Given under my hand and seal, at Paris, this 28th day of June, 1806. "(Signed) "THADDEUS "In presence of KOSCIUSZKO. ("Signed) Charles Carter. James M. Morris." [Seal.] 171] *That the said testator, on the day of the date of the said writing, signed and sealed it in presence of two competent witnesses, who attested the same, and acknowledged it on the same day, as his act and deed, before Fulwar Skipwith, commercial agent, and agent for prize causes for the said United States at Paris, and delivered it to the said John Armstrong. That the complainant is advised that the said paper is a last will and testament, and must operate as such, and revokes, pro tanto, the bequests and appropriation made in the will first mentioned. That General Kosciuszko died the 15th of October, 1817, leaving said testament unrevoked. That said Jefferson refused to take letters testamentary under said will, and that the defendant was duly appointed administrator with the will annexed; that the estate has come to his hands, and that he has been often requested to pay to complainant the $3,704 aforesaid, with interest, and refuses to pay until an order or decree of this court in the premises. The bill prayed for a discovery of the funds in defendant's hands, and whether the said writing made at Paris is authentic, and payment of said legacy with interest, and for general relief. The answer of the defendant admitted that he was administrator with the will annexed of General Kosciuszko, and that the instrument mentioned in complainant's bill, and exhibited with it, was executed and acknowledged as it purports to be, and that said Kosciuszko was at the time domiciled and resident at Paris; but submitted whether he was bound to pay said legacy upon an instrument so executed and acknowledged, inasmuch as Mr. Jefferson received a letter from General Kosciuszko dated as late as the 15th of September, 1817, in ducing in the same way as a domestic will a probate by a probate court within the state, granted either upon original proof or upon production there of an exemplified copy of a foreign probate. Ancillary probate thus granted within the state, is equivalent as evidence to original probate here Bromley v. Miller, 2 Thomp. & Cook, N. Y. 575; Townsend v. Downer, 32 Vt. 183, 216; Miller v. James' L. R. 3 Perry & D. 4. The foreign exemplification, even if itself receivable in evidence, by virtue of the act of Congress (U. S. Rev. Stat. secs. 905, 906), and competent on the question of the rights and liabilities of the parties which he thus affirms his first will: "After my death you know its invariable destination," (speaking of this fund). The answer admitted that Mr. Jefferson renounced, and the defendant was appointed, administrator with the will annexed, as stated in the bill. The defendant admitted funds to have come to his hands to an amount larger than stated in the bill. The answer further stated that among the papers received by the defendant from Mr. Jefferson, is a letter from Mr. Politica to said Jefferson, inclosing a dispatch from the Vice-Roi of Poland to him, by which it appears that [*172 the whole estate of said Kosciuszko may hereafter be claimed by a Major Estko, as the heirat-law of said Kosciuszko; that there were also two letters from a Mr. Zeltner to Mr. Jefferson, by which it appears that Kosciuszko had disposed of the greater part of his fortune in favor of the children and other relations of Zeltner. The cause was set down for a hearing in the court below upon the bill and answer, and a pro forma decree dismissing the bill was entered by consent, and an appeal taken to this court. Mr. E. Livingston and Mr. Wheaton for the appellant, argued, (1) that the testamentary paper of 1806 was a revocation of the will of 1798 pro tanto.1 (2) That the will of 1798 was to be considered as wholly void, as being contrary to the laws and policy of Virginia and Maryland, and the defendant considered as a trustee for the first will.' (3) That supposing the case was to be determined by any peculiar law, as affecting the testator or his property, it must be either the law of France, where he was domiciled in 1806, when the will was made, or of this country, where he had placed the fund in question, and of which he might be considered a citizen, or the conventional law between France and the United States. The rule of international law as to personal property appeared to be settled by the general current of authority, that as to successions ab intestato, they are to be governed by the law of the country where the party was domiciled at the time of his death; and in the case of a will, by the law of the place where it was made.' 1.-2 Atk. 86; 2 Philim. Eccl. Rep. 35-31; 1 Bro. Civ. and Adm. Law, 293, 333; Swinb. pt. 1, p. 74, note 75, and cases cited by Powel, Ed. 2.-4 Wheat. Rep. 1; 5 Harris & Johns. 392; tit. Charitable Use (N.) 1. Bridg. Duke's Charit. Uses, 349, 466; Com. Dig. 3.-Huber. tom. 2, 1. t. 3; 2 Bos. & Pull. 229, note (a); 6 Bro. Parl. Cas. 566; 5 Ves. Jun. 785; 1 Binn. 336, 349, note (a); 1 Mason, 381, 408; 3 Ves. Jun. 201. arising in such other state, cannot be received for the purpose of affecting title to land within the state (unless expressly authorized by the statutes of the state); but if it has not been recorded in a probate court, within the state, the original will must (for such purpose) be produced, or its loss accounted for so as to admit secondary evidence. Abbott's Trial Ev. 128; Robertson v. Barbour, 6 T. B. Monr. Ky. 523; Graham v. Whitely. 26 N. J. L. 260. Whether the original is competent without such probate, depends on the local statutes. Ives v. Allen, 12 Vt. 589; Barstow v. Sprague, 40 N. H. 27. |