she was well furnished or thoroughly fitted out is not the question, if she was so supplied as to proceed on her way."

In this case the court held that a vessel must be considered as committing hostilities within the meaning of section 5283, Revised Statutes, when it forms a part of a hostile expedition either by carrying troops for the purpose of making, if necessary, a forcible landing for them or by acting as a base of supplies for the expedition.

The court said: "It matters but little, in the effect of her hostilities, whether she throw shot and shell from her ports or despatch boat-loads of men from her gangways."

The "Carondelet," 37 Fed. Rep., 799.-In this case the court expressed the opinion that "when the arming is on the high seas, through another vessel, proof that both were despatched from our ports as parts of a concerted scheme made here, is justly held proof of an attempt, within the limits of our jurisdiction, to fit out and arm' the vessel with intent to commit hostilities, and hence within. the statute."

In this case the court said that "there can be no obligation of neutrality except towards some recognized state or power, de jure or de facto. Neutrality presupposes at least two belligerents; and, as respects any recognition of belligerency, i. e., of belligerent rights, the judiciary must follow the executive. To fall within the statute, the vessel must be intended to be employed in the service of a foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens, or property of another, with which the United States are at peace.' The United States can hardly be said to be at peace,' in the sense of the statute, with a faction which they are unwilling to recognize as a government; nor could the cruising, or committing of hostilities, against such a mere faction well be said to be committing hostilities against the 'subjects, citizens, or property of a district or people,' within the meaning of the statute." The "Conserva," 38 Fed. Rep., 431.-In this case it was held that in order to justify the forfeiture of a vessel under Section 5283, Revised Statutes, it must be shown that the government against which it is alleged the vessel is intended to commit hostilities has been recognized by the United States.

See also 13. Op. Atty, Gen. 177, in which it was said that when a nation undertakes to procure vessels to enforce its recognized authority in its own domains, "in a legal view this does not involve a design to commit hostilities against anybody."

The transportation of arms for hostile purposes does not bring a vessel within the purview of section 5283, Revised Statutes.

U. S. v. The Robert and Minnie, 47 Fed. Rep., 84; U. S. r. Trumbull, 48 id., 99; U. S. v. Itata, 49 id., 646.

Hendricks v. Gonzalez, 67 Fed. Rep., 351.-The court said: "On the other hand, it is the duty of every government to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping of vessels which it has reasonable ground to believe are intended to engage in naval warfare with a power with which it is at peace. These are familiar rules of international obligation, in the light of which the particular statute is to be read. It is intended to prevent the departure from our ports of any vessel intended to carry on war, when the vessel has been spe

cially adapted, wholly or in part, within this jurisdiction, to warlike

use.

In this case the court held that collectors of customs are not justified under the provisions of Section 5290, Revised Statutes in refusing clearance to a vessel, simply because it is the purpose of her intended voyage to transport arms and munitions of war for the use of an insurrectionary party in a country with which the United States are at peace.

6

The "Laurada," 85 Fed. Rep., 760.-In this case the court said that "the term 'hostilities' is certainly not expressly limited' in its scope by the section [5283, Revised Statutes] to strictly maritime warfare, and may include all hostilities for which a vessel is adapted.

The court held that to bring a vessel within the purview of section 5283, Revised Statutes, the intention to employ her in the prohibited service must be formed within the territorial limits of the United States.

Aid to insurgents.

The "Three Friends," 166 U. S., 1.—This was the case of a vessel seized and libeled on behalf of the United States for having been fitted out and armed in the service of "a certain people" then engaged in armed resistance to the King of Spain in the island of Cuba. The court held that, within the meaning of Section 5283, Revised Statutes, "the word 'people' taken in connection with the words colony' and district' covers * * * any insurgent or insurrectionary body of people acting together, undertaking or committing hostilities,' although its belligerency has not been recognised."

* *

Vessel intended for the use of insurgents.

*

The "Salvador," 3 Privy Council Rep., 218.—In this case the court found these propositions established beyond all doubt-" There was an insurrection in the Island of Cuba; there were insurgents who had formed themselves into a body of people acting together, undertaking and conducting hostilities; these insurgents beyond all doubt formed part of the province or people of Cuba, and beyond all doubt the ship in question was to be employed, and was employed, in connection with and in the service of this body of insurgents."

Therefore, the court sustained the seizure of the vessel, under the law of Great Britain.

The "Gauntlet," L. R. 3 Adm., 381.-This was a case in which a French vessel which had captured a merchant prize in the FrancoGerman war, brought the prize to an English port, put a prize crew on board and departed. After the prize had remained over twenty-four hours in British waters, she was ordered to depart, and a British steam-tug was employed, which towed the prize to a French port.

Held that the tug did not have reasonable cause to believe that the prize would be used in the French service so as to make her liable to condemnation under the law declaring forfeited to the Crown any ship which is used in despatching any vessel with reasonable cause to believe that the vessel will be used in the service of any foreign state at war with a friendly state.

OBLIGATION OF NEUTRAL TO BE IMPARTIAL REGARDING ADMISSION OF BELLIGERENT VESSELS OR PRIZES TO ITS PARTS-EXCEPTION IN CASE of offending vessel.

A neutral Power must apply impartially to the two belligerents the conditions, restrictions, or prohibitions made by it in regard to the admission into its ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters, of belligerent war-ships or of their prizes.

Nevertheless, a neutral Power may forbid a belligerent vessel which has failed to conform to the orders and regulations made by it, or which has violated neutrality, to enter its ports or roadsteads.-Hague Convention XIII, 1907, Article 9.

Though a belligerent vessel may not enter within neutral jurisdiction for hostile purposes, she may, consistently with a state of neutrality, until prohibited by the neutral power, bring her prize into a neutral port, and sell it. The neutral power is, however, at liberty to refuse this privilege, provided the refusal be made, as the privilege ought to be granted, to both parties, or to neither.

Kent, vol. 1, p. 132.

* * *

A violation of neutrality is not limited to acts of positive hostility. If the neutral state assist one of the belligerents; if it grant favors to one to the detriment of the other; it violates its duties toward the belligerent who is injured by such act or neglect, and is justly chargeable with hostility. Such conduct furnishes good cause for complaint, and, if persisted in, may become just cause of war.

Halleck, p. 629.

A neutral state, by virtue of its general right of police over its. ports, harbors and coasts, may impose such restrictions upon belligerent vessels, which come within its jurisdiction, as may be deemed necessary for its own neutrality and peace, and so long as such restrictions are impartially imposed upon all the belligerent powers, neither can have any right to complain. This right is frequently exercised in prohibiting all armed cruisers with prizes to enter such neutral ports and waters, and, even without prizes, to obtain provisions and supplies. Thus usage is shown by marine ordinances. and text writers of different nations.

Halleck, p. 522.

To furnish succors, or auxilliaries, or to extend privileges to one belligerent, to the detriment of the other, is undoubtedly a violation. of strict neutrality, and, as such, is a just cause of complaint, if not

The rights of neutrality are connected with correspondent duties. Among these duties is that of impartiality between the contending parties. The neutral is the common friend of both parties, and consequently is not at liberty to favor one party to the detriment of the other.

Dana's Wheaton, p. 509.

The progress of modern times has been towards insisting on entire and impartial neutrality. It is difficult to conceive now of a State being permitted to continue a condition of limited and partial neutrality. A belligerent would be justified in treating any State as an enemy throughout, which rendered any aid to its enemy, whether in pursuance of treaty obligations or not, or which gave or withheld belligerent privileges unequally.

Note 203, Dana's Wheaton.

Exception.

Another case of qualified neutrality arises out of treaty stipulations antecedent to the commencement of hostilities, by which the neutral may be bound to admit the vessels of war of one of the belligerent parties, with their prizes, into his ports, whilst those of the other may be entirely excluded, or only admitted under limitations and restrictions. Thus, by the treaty of amity and commerce of 1778, between the United States and France, the latter secured to herself two special privileges in the American ports:-1. Admission for her privateers, with their prizes, to the exclusion of her enemies. 2. Admission for her public ships of war, in case of urgent necessity, to refresh, victual, repair, &c., but not exclusively of other nations at war with her. Great Britain and Holland * * * complained of the exclusive privileges allowed to France in respect to her privateers and prizes, it was answered by the American government, that they enjoyed a perfect equality, qualified only by the exclusive admission of the privateers and prizes of France, which was the effect of a treaty made long before, for valuable considerations, not with a view to circumstances such as had occurred in the war of the French Revolution, nor against any nation in particular, but against all nations in general, and which might, therefore, be observed without giving just offense to any.

* *

Dana's Wheaton, pp. 518–519.

*

*

It follows that powers not parties to the war must treat both belligerents alike as friends. Hence no privilege can be granted or withheld from one and not equally from the other. Thus, if transit, or the entrance into harbors of ships of war, for the purpose of refitting or of procuring military supplies, or the admission of captured prizes and their cargoes, is allowed to the one belligerent, the other may claim it also. Otherwise a state aids one of its friends in acts of violence against another, which is unjust, or aids a friend in fighting against another party, which is to be an ally and not a neutral.

Woolsey, p. 271.

The wrong doing vessel [which has captured a vessel within the neutral's waters, or in violation of his laws for maintaining neu

trality] may afterwards have entrance into the waters of the injured neutral refused to it, since all admission of war-vessels into neutral waters, unless required by treaty, depends on comity alone. Woolsey, p. 283.

But though, if a vessel so commissioned is admitted at all within the ports of the neutral, it must be accorded the full privileges attached to its. public character, there is no international usage which dictates that ships of war shall be allowed to enter foreign ports, except in cases of imminent danger or urgent need. It is fully recognized that a state may either refuse such admission altogether, or may limit the enjoyment of the privilege by whatever regulations it may choose to lay down. It is therefore eminently to be wished that a practice may be established under which a neutral government shall notify at the commencement of a war, that all vessels mixed up in certain specified ways, whether as agents or objects, with an infringement of its neutrality, will be excluded from its ports. The rules established by the Empire of Brazil during the American Civil War adopted this precaution, though in dangerously vague language, by directing that no belligerent who had once violated the neutrality of the Empire should be admitted to its ports during the continuance of hostilities, and that all vessels attempting acts tending to such violation should be compelled to leave its maritime territory immediately, without receiving any supplies.

Hall, pp. 647. 648; Negrin, p. 179.

It remains to be considered whether any asylum at all ought to be given in neutral waters to belligerent ships of war or their prizes when the former have been fitted out or the latter taken in breach of the neutrality of the very state under the protection of which they seek to shelter. We have seen that by British law and the United States' practice the prize which is in such a case is so far from enjoying an asylum that she ought to be seized and restored. It has been thought that from a ship of war the stain of violated neutrality is wiped away by her commission. Accordingly the Confederate cruisers which had been illegally despatched from English ports were afterwards treated by the British authorities as if there was nothing against them. That view was not accepted by the arbitrators at Geneva, who found that "the Alabama was on several occasions freely admitted into the ports of the colonies of Great Britain, instead of being proceeded against as it ought to have been in any and every port within British jurisdiction in which it might have been found": a finding of similar purport being made as to the Florida, with the addition, "nor can the fact of the entry of the Florida into the Confederate port of Mobile, and of its stay there during four months, extinguish the responsibility previously to that time incurred by Great Britain." This appears to be the correct reasoning. A state which has not adequately enforced the observance of its neutrality is bound to take every opportunity of stopping the mischievous consequences of its slip, nor can its doing so be rightfully complained of by a foreign sovereign who has granted a commission. only rendered possible by the violation of neutrality. At least the obligation resulting from the slip cannot be destroyed by the circumstance that it may involve the state to which the slip is imputable