5. In case of an insurance thus effected, where no representations are made
with regard to the persons who compose the firm, there is no misrep-
resentation on that subject which avoids the policy. Ib.
6. And where the firm has no actual care or custody of the property in-
sured (grain), but so far as regards its preservation from fire, it is
entirely in the control of the other parties, and is so understood to
be by the company making the insurance; the omission to inform the
insurance company of an agreement of dissolution previously made
cannot be considered a concealment which will avoid the policy. Ib.
INTEREST. See Patents, 7, 8.
Eight per cent., with annual rests, held to have been properly charged
against a fraudulent administrator in a State where as high as ten per
cent. is allowed. Hook v. Payne, 252.
INTEREST WARRANT. See Coupon.
INTERNAL REVENUE. See Collector; Forfeiture; Stamps.
1. A removal of distilled spirits from the place where distilled to a bonded
warehouse of the United States, if made with intent to defraud the
United States of the tax due on the spirits, is illegal, and, though the
intent was never executed, the spirits removed are subject to for-
feiture. Removal to even such a place may be part of a scheme to de-
fraud the government of its duties. Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 44.
2. The 5th section of the act of July 14th, 1870,-by which the power of
collectors of internal revenue to post-stamp certain instruments of
writing and remit penalties for the non-stamping of them when issued,
is extended in point of time,-applies to notes issued before the pas-
sage of the act as well as to notes issued subsequently. Pugh v. Mc-
Cormick, 361.
3. On a distiller's bond, given under the 7th section of the Internal Reve-
nue Act of July 20th, 1868, conditioned that the obligors “shall in
all respects comply with all the provisions of law in relation to the
duties and business of distillers," the condition is prospective as well
as present, and embraces such provisions of law relating to the duties
and business of distillers as may be in force during the term for which
the bond is given, whether enacted before or after its execution.
United States v. Powell, 493.
4. The "distillery warehouses" which distillers are required by the 15th
section of the same act to provide, situated on their distillery prem-
ises, are bonded warehouses," within the meaning of the joint reso-
lution of Congress of March 29th, 1869, which declares that the pro-
prietors of all "internal revenue bonded warehouses" shall reimburse
to the United States the expenses and salary of all storekeepers put
by it in charge of them. Ib.
5. These expenses properly include per diem wages paid to storekeepers for
taking charge of them on Sundays. Ib.
INTERPRETATION OF ACTS OF CONGRESS.
Acts for the furtherance of hearing a claim against the government in the
INTERPRETATION OF ACTS OF CONGRESS (continued).
Court of Claims, not to be interpreted in a narrow view, and so as to
give substantial effect to technical defences. Cross v. United States,
479.
INVENTION. See Patents.
JUDGMENT. See Pleading, 1, 4.
JUDGMENT, CONCLUSIVENESS OF. See Parties, 2-5.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
Courts may take judicial notice of the fact that, by the common consent cf
mankind, certain rules of navigation, fixing the number, color, posi.
tion, power, &c., of lights to be used at sea by night, on steamers and
sailing vessels respectively, so as the better to guard against collision
at sea, by establishing a uniform rule on the subject, have been acqui-
esced in as of general obligation. The Scotia, 170.
JURISDICTION. See Ministerial Officers.
I. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. Of appeals from the highest State courts, under the 25th section of the
Judiciary Act, only in a limited number of cases, and this court, in a
pointed way, calls the attention of the bar of the court generally to
the fact that much expense would be saved to suitors, if before they
advised them to appeal from decisions of these courts to this one, they
would see that the case was one of which this court had cognizance
under the section. Hurley v. Street, 85.
2. Of a judgment of a State court holding void a contract of which the
consideration was the notes of the Confederate States in ordinary use
as money during the rebellion, when the judgment holding the con-
tract void was based on a constitutional or legislative enactment
passed after the contract was made and not on general grounds of
public policy. Delmas v. Insurance Company, 661.
8. (Other things allowing) of a writ by one defendant, on a judgment
against three, the defendant who prosecutes the writ having given no-
tice to his co-defendants of his intention to prosecute it, and there
being a refusal by them to co-operate. O'Dowd v. Russell, 402.
4. As of a "final" judgment, of a judgment in a court of last resort, that
a judgment against A. (who had been sued for not faithfully discharg-
ing the duties of a vendue-master of a city and been held discharged
under the Bankrupt Act) be reversed. As also as of the same final
nature, of a judgment in a court of last resort, that a judgment in an
inferior court, holding B. and C. (the sureties of A. on his bond as
vendue-master) liable, be affirmed. Ib.
5. Of appeals from proceedings in bankruptcy from the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia in certain cases. Smith v. Mason, Assignee,
419.
(b) It has NOT jurisdiction—
6. Under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, unless it can be seen from
the record that a State court decided the question relied on to give
this court jurisdiction. Cockroft v. Vose, 5.
JURISDICTION (continued).
7. Nor under that section, when the decision of the State court is made on
precedents of general jurisprudence of this court or on one of its own
similar pre-existent rules; notwithstanding (in the latter case) that
the State have subsequently made the rule one of the articles of its
constitution. Caperton v. Bowyer, 216; Tennessee Bank v. Bank of
Louisiana, 9; Palmer v. Marston, 10; Sevier v. Haskell, 13.
8. Nor under that section, if the judgment of the State court may have
been given on grounds which the section does not make cause for
error, as well as upon some ground which it does so make. Sternes v.
Franklin County, 15; Kennebec Railroad v. Portland Railroad, 23.
9. Nor under that section, when nothing appears in the record to show on
what grounds the decision of the matter in which the Federal ques-
tion is alleged to be involved was made. Caperton v. Bowyer, 216.
10. Nor under that section, of necessity, and in the presence of disproof in
the record, merely because a certificate of the presiding justice of the
highest court of a State may certify that there was drawn in question
the validity of an act of the State, on the ground that it was repugnant
to the Constitution of the United States, and that the decision was in
favor of its validity. Ib.
11. Nor under that section, unless the record shows that more than one
Federal question was decided when the certificate certifying that a
certain one which it mentions was, is silent as to any other, and when
this court considers that the certificate in what it does mention is dis-
proved by the record; and when, moreover, the case may have been
well decided on grounds not Federal. Ib.
12. Nor under that section when the writ is taken on the ground that the
provision of the Constitution which ordains that "full faith and
credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other State," has been violated by a re-
fusal of the highest State court to give proper effect to a judicial record
of another State, unless it appear that the record have been authenti-
cated in the mode prescribed by the act of May 26th, 1790, "to pre-
scribe the mode in which the public acts, records, and judicial pro-
ceedings in each State shall be authenticated, so as to take effect in
every other State." Caperton v. Ballard, 238.
18. Nor where the decision of the State court consists only in granting or
refusing to grant a motion for a rehearing in an equity suit. Steines
14. Nor (when the State court is composed of a chief justice and associates)
unless the writ be allowed by the chief justice himself. Bartemeyer
v. Iowa, 26.
II. OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
(a) They HAVE jurisdiction-
15. Under the act of March 2d, 1867, of a suit brought by the assignee of a
chose in action, when the case has been transferred under that act
from a State court into one of them. City of Lexington v. Butler, 282.
16. Of negotiable paper (other things allowing), though the plaintiff be au
assignee of it. Ib.
JURISDICTION (continued).
(b) They have NOT jurisdiction-
17. (Where the suit is between citizens of the same State) of a suit which
does not relate to some matter already litigated in the same court by
the same persons, and which is not either in addition to, or a continu-
ance of, an original suit. Such second suit is an original and not an
ancillary suit. Christmas v. Russell, 69.
III. OF THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
IV. OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
May be considered as created by the published rules of navigation of a
great commercial nation (as Great Britain) regulating the subject of
lights at sea on her vessels; which rules are afterwards adopted by
another great commercial nation (as the United States) for hers,
and adopted finally by nearly all other commercial nations of what-
ever size and importance having any shipping on the sea, as the law
of their vessels, respectively, there. The Scotia, 170.
1. A cargo was shipped from Canada to New York, October 7th, 1864,
when gold was 101 per cent. above legal tender notes of the United
States. The cargo was wrecked soon after, on the Hudson. On libel
in the admiralty at New York, and on appeal from the District Court,
the Circuit Court, on the 26th of March, 1870, when gold was only
12 per cent. above notes, gave the libellants a decree for the value in
gold of the cargo on the day and at the place of shipment, converting
that value, at the same time, into legal tender notes, at the rate at
which such notes stood as compared with gold on the day of ship-
ment, that is to say, when gold was 101 per cent. above legal tender
notes, or, in other words, when it required $201 legal tender notes to
buy $100 of gold. On appeal to this court (the difference between
gold and notes having now sunk to about 9 per cent.), held that this
decree was right. The Vaughan and Telegraph, 258
2. A decree ordering payment in coin of a debt contracted before the pas-
sage of the Legal Tender Acts reversed, on the authority of the Legal
Tender Cases (12 Wallace, 475). Bigler v. Waller, 298.
A bill of lading indorsed and sent to the consignees, who make, on the re-
ceipt of it, advances on the cargo, gives the consignees sufficient title
to maintain a libel in admiralty against a vessel by whose tortious
collision with the vessel in which the cargo consigned to them was
coming, the cargo has been wrecked and lost. The Vaughan and Tele-
graph, 258. And see The Thames, 98.
1. While courts of admiralty are not governed by any statute of limita-
tions, they adopt the principle that laches or delay in the judicial en-
LIEN IN ADMIRALTY (continued).
forcement of maritime liens, will, under proper circumstances, consti-
tute a valid defence. The Key City, 653.
2. No arbitrary or fixed period of time has been, or will be established, as
an inflexible rule; but the delay which will defeat such a suit must,
in every case, depend on the peculiar equitable circumstances of that
3. When an admiralty lien is to be enforced to the detriment of a pur-
chaser for value, without notice of the lien, the defence will be held
valid under shorter time and a more rigid scrutiny of the delay than
when the claimant is the party who owned the property when the lien
LIGHTS AT SEA AND ON RIVERS.
1. A boat fastened to shore and out of the proper path of vessels navigat-
ing in a port is not bound in the absence of a harbor regulation re-
quiring it to keep a light on deck. The Bridgeport, 116.
2. The sorts of lights which steamers and sailing vessels, British, Ameri-
can, and others are required to show at sea since the rules of naviga-
tion established by the British Orders in Council of January 9th, 1863
(prescribing the sorts of lights to be used on British vessels) and by
our act of Congress of April 29th, 1864, adopting them, and by ac-
ceptance, before April, 1857, as obligatory, by almost all states of the
world which have shipping on the Atlantic Ocean-the whole matter
considered in detail and passed on in a case of collision at sea, and a
rule of uniformity enforced. The Scotia, 170.
8. Although one vessel may be sailing at night with lights other than
those whose use is made obligatory on her by acts of Congress, and
may by actually misleading another vessel tend to cause a collision,
yet this will not discharge the other vessel if she, on her part, have
suffered herself to be misled by the wrong lights when, if she had
been intelligently vigilant, other indications would have pointed out
or led her to suspect that the vessel was not what her lights indicated.
The Continental, 345.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. See Coupon; Lien in Admiralty.
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF. See Coupon; Lien in Admiralty.
LOUISIANA.
Inchoate rights to land in the Territory of, such as some made A.D. 1789,
were of imperfect obligation on the United States when succeeding
A.D. 1802 to the ownership of the region. Their nature and obliga-
tion stated. Dent v. Emmeger, 308.
Cannot perform the office of appeal or writ of error; and will not lie to a
Circuit judge to compel him to entertain jurisdiction of a cause on
appeal from the District Court, he having once decided that the case-
a controversy between a captain and crew of a Prussian vessel, and
brought by appeal before him from the District Court-was not within
his jurisdiction, but, under a treaty stipulation, within that of the
Prussian consul alone. Ex parte Newman, 152.
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