CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (continued).

pavement. The tax need not be a general one on the city. Willard
v. Presbury, 676.

CONTRACT.

1. In the matter of a contract, a distinction sometimes exists between a
motive which may induce entering into it and the actual consideration
of the contract. This subject illustrated. Philpot v. Gruninger, 570.
2. A consideration moving to A. and B., with whom C. afterwards enters
into partnership, and of which consideration C. thus gets the benefit,
will support a promise by C. Ib.

3. Confederate treasury notes, which were in ordinary use during the re-
bellion, how far a valid consideration for. Delmas v. Insurance Com-
pany, 661.

4. Equity will not readily set aside a reasonable one, made for the sake of
peace, though want of money may have been an inducing cause with
one of the parties to the making of it. French v. Shoemaker, 315.
CONTRACTOR. See Satisfaction of Claim.

CORPORATE EXISTENCE. See National Banks, 2.

CORPORATE SECURITIES.

When a corporation has power under any circumstances to issue nego-
tiable securities, the bona fide holder has a right to presume that they
were issued under the circumstances which give the requisite authority,
and they are no more liable to be impeached in the hands of such a
holder for any infirmity than any other commercial paper. City of
Lexington v. Butler, 282.

CORPORATION. See Corporate Securities.

COUPON.

Statutes of limitation will not bar suit on, unless the time be sufficient to
bar suit on bond also. City of Lexington v. Butler, 282.

COURT AND JURY. See Evidence, 8; Practice, 7.

1. When a plaintiff presents as an important part of his case a written
proposal, and then insists on a recovery on the ground of mere sus-
picion that there was a verbal proposal differing from it, it is the duty
of the court, if there is no evidence at all of such different verbal
proposal, to tell the jury when requested that there is none; and to tell
them that they may in such a case find such a verbal proposition is
Ward v. United States, 28.

error.

2. Where there is such a written proposal it is the duty of the court, at
the request of either party, to construe it, and in doing so the ad-
mitted facts concerning the relation of the parties to the transaction
are to be considered.. Ib.

3. Parties may by consent waive a jury in the District Court, and state a
case for the court independently of any legislative provision. Hen-
derson's Distilled Spirits, 44.

4. Whether-under a policy which provides that fraud or false swearing
in furnishing the preliminary proofs of loss, or in an examination
which by the terms of the policy the assured, on a claim for loss, was

COURT AND JURY (continued).

bound to submit to-there has been such fraud or false swearing is a
question for the jury. Insurance Company v. Weides, 375.

5. Whether the evidence before a jury does or does not sustain the allega-
tions in a case is a matter wholly within the province of the jury,
and if they find in one way, this court cannot review their finding.
Gregg v. Moss, 564.

COURT OF CLAIMS.

1. The 4th and 5th rules regulating appeals from, were designed to enable
a party to secure a finding of fact on any point material to the de-
cision by that court. Mahan v. United States, 109.

2. But a failure of the court to find the fact as the party alleges it to be,
will not justify the bringing of all the evidence on that subject befor
the Supreme Court, though on a refusal of that court to make an
finding on the subject, the Supreme Court may remand the case fo
such finding. Ib

8. Directed, by the Supreme Court, to interpret an act of Congress, passe
for the furtherance of hearing a claim against the government, in▸
liberal spirit, and not in a narrow view of the legislative intention,
and so as to give substantial effect to technical defences.
Cross 1.
The United States, 479.

DAMAGES. See Patent, 4-8.

DE INJURIA.

Replication of. The effect of the same considered on the authorities. Er-
skine v. Hohnback, 613.

DECEDENTS' ESTATES. See Parties, 2-5.

DEED.

1. When one executed by a single partner in the firm name may be re-
garded as that of the firm. Gibson v. Warden, 244.

2. One executed by an attorney appointed by a husband and wife under a
power drawn in France, and with the verbiage which notaries there
usually indulge in, to sell the lands in the United States of the hus-
band and wife, the husband owning lands here, but not the husband
and wife, held sufficient in favor of a bonâ fide purchaser, long in pos-
session, to convey the husband's lands. Dolton v. Cain, 472.
DEMURRER.

See Pleading, 2.

DERELICT. See Salvage.

The master, officers, and crew of a vessel, with every person on board,
having gone off, in extreme anxiety for their personal safety, from the
vessel on to another which they had brought to them by signals of
distress, the mere expressed intention by the master to employ if pos-
sible a tug to go and rescue his vessel (she then lying at anchor in a
violent gale), to which expression of intention, the person to whom
it was made replied, that he "could not get a tug that would come
and bring the boat in, as the weather was too rough," was held not
sufficient to deprive the vessel of the character of a derelict, so far as
timely effort to save her was contemplated. The Laura, 336.

DESIGNS. PATENTS FOR. See Patents, 1, 2.

DISTILLED SPIRITS. See Internal Revenue, 1

DISTILLERS' BOND. See Internal Revenue, 3.

DISTILLERY WAREHOUSE. See Internal Revenue, 4
DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE. See Parties, 2-5.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

An appeal from a proceeding in bankruptcy disposing under the first sec-
tion of the Bankrupt Act of certain claims (see supra, Bankrupt Act,
8), lies from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, to the
Supreme Court of the United States. Smith v. Mason, Assignee, 419.
EJECTMENT. See Pleading, 1.

EQUITABLE OWNERSHIP.

In a party hiring a vessel with the privilege of buying her at a price
named, crediting the money paid for hire, distinguished from an af-
freightment. Propeller Company v. United States, 670.

1. The rule stated as to necessary parties in a proceeding in. Traders'
Bank v. Campbell, 87; Bigler v. Waller, 297.

2. Will not set aside a contract whose purpose is a settlement of disputes,
simply because one party to it was in want of money when he made
it, and because such want may have been an inducing cause for his
making it; the party having been an intelligent person, who acted
deliberately and with knowledge of what he was doing. French v.
Shoemaker, 315.

8. Will consider that a party to a contract who, when the act of the other
side renders impossible literal performance, has performed all that
can be reasonably expected of him, comes in certain cases within the
character of a party performing his part. Dolton v. Cain, 472.
4. Will look through forms to substance, and protect a bona fide purchaser
long in possession under a deed of cestui que trusts, and plainly in-
tended for their benefit, from disturbance by conveyance, long after-
wards, from the heirs of the party named in the deed as trustee, and
now claiming the land under a sharp and mere technical rule of con-
veyancing. 1b.

EVIDENCE. See Charter Party, 2; Court and Jury; Insurance, 1.
1. Parol evidence not admissible to show, in the case of a "clean" bill of
lading, that there was an agreement to stow the goods on deck. The
Delaware, 579.

2. A presumption exists primâ facie that the military and fiscal officers of
the United States have done their official duty. United States v. Cru-
sell, 1.

8. To show that a person to whom a deed has been made conveying prop-
erty in trust did not accept the trust, a declaration not under seal, but
signed by him, nine years after the deed, making known to all whom
the matter concerned, "that immediately on his receiving notice of

EVIDENCE (continued).

the conveyance he did positively refuse to accept, or to act under the
trust intended to be created, and that he had at no time since accepted
the trust or acted in any wise as trustee in relation to it," is proper
evidence; the party making the declaration being dead and his hand-
writing proved. Armstrong v. Morrill, 120.

4. Courts may take judicial notice of the fact that, by the common consent
of mankind, certain rules of navigation, fixing the number, color,
position, power, &c., of lights to be used at sea by night, on steamers
and sailing vessels respectively, so as the better to guard against col-
lision by establishing a uniform rule on the subject, have been acqui-
esced in, as of general obligation. The Scotia, 170.

5. An amended answer in admiralty, setting up an improbable defence,
and one quite departing from that set up in the original answer,
treated unfavorably. The Mabey and Cooper, 204.

6. A statement in figures of the value of certain merchandise destroyed
by fire, which statement professed to be a copy of another and origi-
nal statement contained in a book-itself destroyed in the fire-accom
panied by proof that on a certain day the witnesses took a correct
inventory of the merchandise and that it was correctly reduced to
writing by one of them and entered in the volume burnt, and that
what is offered is a correct copy, may, on a suit against insurers, be
received in evidence to fix the value of the merchandise burnt, even
though there be no independent recollection by the witnesses affirming
to the correctness of the original statement of what they found the
value of the merchandise to be. Insurance Companies v. Weides, 375.
7. The result of an undertaking is sometimes a safe criterion by which to
judge of an act which caused it. The Steamer Webb, 406.

8. The Supreme Court on error to judgments of Circuit Courts when act-
ing in the place of juries, under the act of March 3d, 1865, cannot
pass on the weight of evidence. Dirst v. Morris, 484.

9. A plaintiff in ejectment, claiming under a deed made on a sale in a
foreclosure of a mortgage, may properly put in evidence the record
of the proceedings in foreclosure, even though the defendant claim by
a deed absolute made by the mortgagor, prior to giving the mort-
gage under which the foreclosure took place. Ib.

10. On an issue between a partnership and third parties as to the day when
the partnership was formed, the mere articles of partnership are not
evidence in favor of the partnership It must be shown by extrinsic
evidence, that they were made on the day when they purport to have
been made. Philpot v. Gruninger, 570.

EXECUTOR. See Annual Rests.

FORECLOSURE. See Evidence, 9.

Where the terms of a mortgage or deed of trust require that before any
foreclosure or sale under it is made, sixty days' notice shall be given
in certain newspapers, a sale without the notice conveys no title.
Bigler v. Waller, 297.

FORFEITURE. See Internal Revenue, 1.

Where a forfeiture is made absolute by statute, a decree of condemnation
relates back to the time of the commission of the wrongful acts, and
takes effect from that time, and not from the date of the decree. The
doctrine strictly applied and to a hard case. Henderson's Distilled
Spirits, 44.

FRAUD. See Auction Sales; Insurance, 5-6; Purchaser without Notice.
FRAUDULENT ADMINISTRATOR. See Annual Rests.

FRAUDULENT PREFERENCE. See Bankrupt Act, 1, 4, 5.

"FULL FAITH AND CREDIT." See Purchaser without Notice, 2.
GOLD. See Legal Tender.

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR. See Satisfaction of Claims.
HOMESTEAD LAWS OF ILLINOIS.

The nature of the homestead right under them and the effect of a judicial
sale of the property in which it exists or has existed considered.
Black v. Curran, 463.

HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Deed, 2.

ILLINOIS. See Homestead Laws of.

What is

Under certain of its limitation laws, it is not necessary in ejectment that
the defendant's entire title be evidenced by acts of record.
sufficient, stated. Dolton v. Cain, 472.

INFRINGER. See Patents, 2; 4-8.

INNOCENT PURCHASER. See Purchaser without Notice.

INSURANCE. See Court and Jury, 4; Evidence, 6.

1. Under a policy one of whose conditions is that in case of loss tho
assured, after furnishing evidence of his loss, shall submit to an ex-
amination under oath, and until such examination should be per-
mitted, no loss should be paid; the insurers cannot as a condition of
recovery compel the assured to answer questions as to the sum per
cent. of claim for which he had settled with other parties insuring
him. Insurance Companies v. Weides, 375.

2. Under a policy one of whose conditions is that fraud or false swearing
on the part of the assured in an examination which, by the terms of
the policy, he was bound to submit to on a claim by him for loss, it is
only fraudulent false swearing in furni: hing the preliminary proofs
or in the examination which avoids the policy. Ib.

8. What may not be asked for, when one of the conditions is that in case
of loss the assured shall produce "certified copies" of all bills and in-
voices, the originals of which have been lost, and exhibit the same for
examination to any person named by the insurers, and that until the
proofs, declarations, and certificates are produced and examinations
and appraisals permitted the loss shall not be payable. Ib.

4. Insurance may be effected in the name of a nominal partnership where
the business is carried on by and for the use of one of the partners
Phoenix Insurance Company v. Hamilton, 504.