INDEX.

ABANDONED AND CAPTURED PROPERTY.

An inference that the proceeds of, had been paid into the treasury,
drawn
from the prima facie presumption of law that the military and fiscal
officers of the United States had done their official duty. The money
restored to a loyal owner accordingly. United States v. Crusell, 1.

ACCEPTANCE OF TRUST. See Trust.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. See Satisfaction of Claim.
ACTIONS, LIMITATION OF. See Lien in Admiralty.

ACTS OF CONGRESS.

For the furtherance of hearing claims against the government in the Court
of Claims not to be interpreted in a narrow spirit, and so as to give
substantial effect to technical defences. Cross v. United States, 479.

ADMINISTRATOR. See Annual Rests.

ADMIRALTY. See Bill of Lading, 3; Collision; Derelict; Libel in Admi-
ralty; Lien in Admiralty; Lights at Sea and on Rivers; Practice, 10-
12; Restitutio in Integram; Salvage; Tug and Tow.

ADVERSE POSSESSION. See Virginia.

Continuity of in law, held to have been broken when, perhaps, continuous
in fact, in a special case under certain statutes of Virginia regarding
the redemption of land sold for taxes. Armstrong v. Morrill, 120.
AFFREIGHTMENT.

Distinguished from an equitable ownership in the party hiring propor-
tioned to money paid for hire, with the privilege of purchasing at a
price fixed. Propeller Company v. United States, 670.

AGENT. See Bill of Lading, 3; Partnership.

As ex. gr. the cashier of a bank, when made consignee of goods under a
bill of lading, may libel vessel for their non-delivery. The Thames, 98.
ANNUAL RESTS.

In a State where the law allows as high as ten per cent. per annum in-
terest, a decree will not be reversed, because it allows against a fraud-
ulent administrator eight per cent. with annual rests. Hook v. Payne,
252.

( 683 )

ANSWER.

An amended answer in admiralty setting up an improbable defence, and
one quite departing from that set up in the original answer, treated
unfavorably. The Mabey and Cooper, 204.

APPEALS. See Court of Claims, 1, 2.

ARMY RANK. See Rank in the Army.

ASSIGNMENT OF PATENT. See Patents, 9.

ATTORNEY IN FACT.

To execute a bond, who in executing it, makes by accident a mistake in
the baptismal name of the obligor, does not impair the efficacy of the
bond; the accident being shown. Dolton v. Cain, 472.

AUCTION SALES.

Where the Land Department of the government, denying an unfounded
pre-emption claim in the government lands set up by a person in-
debted to several persons, proceeds to sell the lands at public auction
as part of the public lands, and the debtor and several of his creditors
enter into an agreement that the land shall not be bid up, but on the
contrary shall be struck off at as low a price as possible to one of the
creditors, who shall divide it among such creditors as will come into
an agreement to receive it in satisfaction of their debts, and the land
is thus sold at an under price, creditors who have not come into the
arrangement cannot set the arrangement aside. The government
alone can interpose. Easley v. Kellom et al., 279.

BANKRUPT ACT.

1. A judgment by confession when both parties to it knew of the insol-
vency of the debtor, though taken before the first day of June, 1867,
is an unlawful preference under the 35th section of the Bankrupt Act,
if taken after the enactment of the law. Traders' Bank v. Campbell,

87.

2. The proceeds of the sale of a bankrupt's goods being in the hands of
one sued as a defendant, another person who had a like judgment and
execution levied on the same goods is not a necessary party to this
suit, being without the jurisdiction. The rule laid down as to neces-
sary parties in chancery. Ib.

3. The proceeds of the sale being in the hands of a bank, though it had
given the sheriff a certificate of deposit, the assignee was not obliged
to move against the sheriff in the State court to pay over the money
to him, but had his option to sue the bank which had directed the levy
and sale and held the proceeds in its vauits. Ib.

4. The defendant having money received as collections for the bankrupt
delivered it to the sheriff, who levied the defendant's execution on it
and applied it in satisfaction of the same. This is a fraudulent pref-
erence, or taking by process under the act, and does not raise the
question whether if the defendant had retained the money it could be
set off in this suit against the bankrupt's debt to the defendant. Ib.

BANKRUPT ACT (continued).

5. So taking a check from the bankrupt and crediting the amount of the
check then on deposit, on the bankrupt's note the day before taking
judgment, was a payment by way of preference and therefore void,
and does not raise the question of set-off. Ib.

6. The two clauses of the 35th section of the Bankrupt Act, construed and
held to differ mainly in their application to two different classes of
recipients of the bankrupt's property or means. Gibson v. Warden,

244.

7. Where an assignee in bankruptcy claims a fund as the property of his
bankrupt, which some time before the bankruptcy a firm of which
the bankrupt was a member transferred to a third party, and which
the transferee now claims adversely to the assignee, the proceedings
in the District Court should not be summary and under the first sec-
tion of the Bankrupt Act, but formal and under the second clause of
the third section. Smith v. Mason, Assignee, 419.

8. An appeal from a proceeding in bankruptcy disposing, under the first
section, of such a claim, lies (other requisites allowing it) from the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to this court.

Ib.

1 The bill delivered to the shipper of the goods shipped is the bill that
makes the contract concerning them, and if it is different from the
one retained by the ship, it and not the "ship's bill," is evidence of
the contract. The Thames, 98.

2. Goods shipped under a bill of lading must be delivered to the person
named in it or to his order, and under no circumstances may be de-
livered to a mere stranger. The obligation of the ship stated where
the indorsec of the bill is unknown. Ib.

3. The indorsee of a, may libel a vessel for non-delivery of the goods
shipped, though he be but an agent or trustee of the goods for others.
Ib. And see The Vaughan v. Telegraph, 258.

4. A "clean" bill of lading, that is to say a bill of lading which is silent
as to the place of stowage, imports a contract that the goods are to
be stowed under deck. The Delaware, 579.

5 This being so, parol evidence of an agreement that they were to be
stowed on deck is inadmissible. Ib.

BILL OF REVIEW.

A bill of review held to have been properly entertained on the after-dis-
covery of a lost paper; and a former decree held, on the new evi-
dence, to have been rightly reversed. Easley v. Kellom, 279.
BONA FIDE PURCHASER. See Corporate Securities; Purchaser with-
out Notice, 1.

BOND.

One executed by an attorney in fact, who through what is shown to have
been accident causes the bond to be prepared, and signs it with the
obligor's right family name, but with a wrong baptismal name, is
valid. Dolton v. Cain, 472.

BONDED WAREHOUSE.

See Internal Revenue, 1, 4, 5.

BREVET RANK. See Rank in the Army.

BRIGADIER GENERAL. See Rank in the Army.

CAPTURED AND ABANDONED PROPERTY.

An inference that the proceeds of, had been paid into the Treasury, drawn
from the prima facie presumption of law that the military and finan-
cial officers of the United States had done their official duty; and the
money restored to a loyal claimant accordingly. United States v.
Crusell, 1.

CASE STATED.

The parties to a suit in the District Court may, independently of any
legislative provision, agree on and state a case for the judgment of
the court. Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 44.

CHANCERY. See Equity.

CHARTER PARTY.

1. When the charterer is considered owner for the voyage, and when a
mere contractor for a designated service. Leary v. United States, 607.
2. What conclusive evidence that the ownership had not so passed. Ib.
3. Under charter party what constitutes a war risk and what a marine
risk. Morgan v. United States, 531.

4. What an "extraordinary" and what an ordinary marine risk. Leary
v. United States, 607.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

Seal to, not necessary under the statutes of Ohio. Gibson v. Warden, 244.
CHOSE IN ACTION. See Jurisdiction, 15, 16.

CLAIM. See Patents, 6; Satisfaction of Claim.

COIN. See Legal Tender.

COLLECTORS. See Internal Revenue, 2.

Certain ones entitled to retain, for their own use, moneys received by
them from the owners of steamers, and from engineers and pilots, by
virtue of the 31st section of the act of August 30th, 1852. United
States v. Ballard, 457.

COLLISION. See Lights at Sea and on Rivers.

1. When navigating in a port, it is no excuse for a steamer which runs
against another vessel 200 feet and more outside of the ordinary chan-
nel, and between 300 and 400 feet out of the ordinary track of steam-
ers, that she was rounding a point and coming into her dock; and
that she could not see in consequence of a fog, and that she supposed
she was at the right place to change her course. The Bridgeport, 116.
2. The respective rights and obligations as to keeping or changing their
courses, of steamers and sailing vessels approaching each other at
sea-this matter examined, and the rules deduced and stated in a case
of collision at night. The Scotia, 170.

3. Rules to guard against collision stated, which govern vessels sailing on
intersecting lines at different rates of speed. The Cayuga, 270.

COLLISION (continued).

4. Though a steamship pursuing, in a crowded harbor, for her own greater
convenience in getting into dock in a particular state of the harbor,
a channel not entirely the ordinary one for vessels of her size, be
bound to more than ordinary precaution, yet if she has a right to
use that channel and do take such more than ordinary precaution, she
is not responsible for accidents to other vessels that, with it all, were
inevitable. The Java, 189.

5. The fact that a steamship is in charge of a pilot taken conformably to
the laws of a State, is not a defence to a proceeding in rem against
her for a tortious collision; the laws of the State providing only that
if a ship coming into her waters, refuse to receive on board and pay
a pilot, the master shall pay the refused pilot half pilotage, and no
penalty for the refusa' being prescribed. The China (7 Wallace, 58)
affirmed. The Merrimac, 199.

6. A steamship of 2000 tons having a tug, each of 500 tons, on each side,
condemned as guilty of a rash act for sailing in a place from 70 to 75
feet wide, which had little or no more than the width of the ship and
tugs abreast, between a buoy which indicated an entire obstruction of
navigation, and a ship aground with a steamtug on each side. Ib.
7. Where a ship ordered a tug to tow her out of harbor to sea when the
navigation was made dangerous by wind, tide, and ice, and the master
of the tug remonstrated, and finally went only on the ship's owners in-
sisting and on their agreeing to take the risk of all accident, both
ship and tug were held liable on a libel for a collision, there being in
addition some evidence of faulty navigation. The Mabey and Cooper,
204.

COMMISSIONERS OF TAXES.

1. Though "authorized" under the act of 6th February, 1863, to bid off
property to the United States "at a sum not exceeding two-thirds of its
assessed value," are not bound to bid it up so as to make it bring in
all cases that much. Turner v. Smith, 553.

2. Under this act and that of June 7th, 1862, the tax commissioners are not
bound to hunt up the real owners. The tax laid is a direct tax on the
land and on all the estates, interests, and claims connected with or
growing out of it. A rent charge is accordingly cut off and destroyed
by a sale of the land. Ib.

CONCEALMENT. See Insurance, 6.

CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT. See Parties, 3-5.

CONFEDERATE TREASURY NOTES. See Jurisdiction, 2.

Which were in ordinary use during the rebellion, how far a valid con-
sideration for contract. Delmas v. Insurance Company, 661.

Congress has power to confer on the city of Washington authority to
assess upon the adjacent proprietors of lots, the expense of repairing
streets with a new and different pavement, or of repairing an old