crew of the vessel. If, therefore, the Cumberland was a vessel employed in the coasting trade, she was exempted from the obligation of taking a pilot; and the pilot, consequently, was not taken on board under and in pursuance of the act. The question also arises, whether the Cumberland, at the time of this injury, was a perfect ship or not; because if she was not, (and being made for steam navigation, she could scarcely be said to be so until provided with the requisite machinery,) she was not yet liable to the operation of the act: if she was liable to the operation of the act, then she was in the coasting trade. Either way, therefore, she was not bound under the act to take on board a pilot. [Bayley J. By the second section ali vessels are to be piloted. I think she must be considered as a perfect vessel sufficiently to come within the words of that section; the only question is, whether she was within the class exempted.] Assuming, however, that she was then a perfect ship, she was at the time of the accident in the coasting trade. She took back a cargo in the course of this voyage; her trading, therefore, commenced with the commencement of this voyage, that is, when she sailed from Carlisle for London. It is clear, if she had brought up a cargo, she would have been deemed to have been in the trade; and there is no difference in effect whether she brought up a cargo and went back without one, or whether she came up without one and took one back. She was, therefore, then in the coasting trade, and it was not compulsory on the owners to take a pilot. It is unnecessary to cite the cases, which are all clear upon the point that where the pilot is taken on board voluntarily, the owners are not exonerated from liability. (a) (a) See Attorney-General v. Case, 3 Price, 302. Sydebotham, 4 M. & S. 77. Abbott on Shipping, 160. Carruthers v. 1829. STEPHENSON v. DIXON, 1829. STEPHENSON v. DIXON. T. Clarkson for the defendants. First, the Cumber land was not a vessel employed in the regular coasting trade of this kingdom. Those words are explained by the 6 G. 4. c. 107. s. 100. to mean "trade by sea from any one part of the United Kingdom to any other part thereof, or from one part of the Isle of Man to another thereof." Before this act, the 52 G. 3. c. 39. s. 2. exempted all coasting vessels. The 6 G. 4. c. 125. s. 59. makes use of the words "employed in the regular coasting trade of this kingdom." These words appear to have been designedly substituted for the former more general words; and the alteration was necessary, because otherwise vessels sometimes employed in foreign trade, or not employed in trade at all, might claim the benefit of the exemption, although the ground of exemption, namely, that the captains and crews might be presumed to know the navigation of the Thames, would not apply to them. All the exceptions, too, in the fiftyninth section speak of trading vessels. The words "regular coasting trade" must, therefore, be strictly construed. Now, the Cumberland cannot be considered as employed in any trade at the time in question; for it is stated that she was sent up in ballast, for a different purpose, viz. to be fitted up with steam-engines, and completed in other respects. The circumstance of her taking back a cargo does not appear to have been a consequence of any previous contract or order, but rather matter of accident. After she had been fitted up with steam-engines, she might have gone into the foreign trade, if the owners had changed their intention: it could not be said what was her trade until it had commenced. The act contemplates a state of actual employment. Besides, it does not appear that she was intended to trade between Carlisle and London, or that there is any regular coasting trade between those two ports. But, secondly, if she was in the coasting trade, it was compulsory on her to take a pilot. The exemption given by the fifty-ninth section, is only when and so long as the owners shall conduct and pilot the ship without the aid of any unlicensed pilot, or any other person than the ordinary crew of the vessel. But here the master and crew of the vessel were ignorant of the navigation of the Thames; they were bound, therefore, to take on board somebody who understood it; in case the vessel had been insured, the policy would have been discharged by a neglect to do so, Law v. Hollingworth (a): but the act precludes them from taking any other person but a Trinity House pilot; the captain of the Cumberland, therefore, took on board a person imposed on him by the law, and acting in pursuance of the act, not his own servant; and the declaration, which states the injury to have been done by the negligence of the defendants and their servants, is not sustained. But, lastly, even if it were not compulsory on the Cumberland to take a pilot; yet having had in fact a pilot duly qualified on board, the owners are discharged from responsibility by the very general words of the fifty-fifth section. Lord TENTERDEN C. J. I do not think the circumstance of this vessel being a new vessel, on her first voyage, would have been material, if she had been then in the coasting trade: but it does not appear that she 1829. STEPHENSON บ. DIXON. (a) 7 T. R. 160. 1829. STEPHENSON บ. DIXON. BAYLEY J. The Cumberland was not in any trade from the port of Carlisle to the port of London, to which she was bound. I think, therefore, she cannot be said to have been in the regular coasting trade of the kingdom within the meaning of the act. LITTLEDALE J. I am of the same opinion. I think that the very statement in the case negatives the fact of the vessel's being in any trade from Carlisle to London, for it specifically states that she was sent up for the purpose of being fitted up with steam-engines, and completed in other respects; and the circumstance of her having taken back a cargo does not alter the case. Postea to the defendants. INDEX TO THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS REPORTED IN THIS VOLUME. payment of it refused. The Held, secondly, that the plain- BANKRUPTCY. See PARTNERSHIP, 3. PRIN- 1. Goods entered in the bankrupt's |