the cargo remained in the government stores, subject to considerable duties claimed by the Brazilian government. Immediately on receiving the news of the capture, the plaintiffs gave the underwriters notice of abandonment, which the latter refused to accept. At the trial before Lord Tenterden C. J. at Guildhall, a verdict passed for the plaintiff. The Solicitor General having obtained a rule nisi for a nonsuit, on the ground that the policy was illegal, having been effected after notice of the blockade, and in contravention of the law of nations; The Attorney General and Tomlinson, in this term, showed cause. The only question is, whether it be contrary to law to effect a policy after notification of the ship's port of destination being blockaded; for it was admitted that the ship sailed before the notification could have reached Liverpool. And there is nothing in the law to prevent an owner from effecting a policy to protect his vessel against all illegal detentions, after he hears of a blockade. The policy is prima facie legal; it is on legal merchandize; and can only be tainted by illegality in the voyage. But the voyage was legal in its inception, and continued so until there should be a warning to the captain of the blockade. Now although the ship certainly sailed from Lochindal after the notification in the Gazette, that is immaterial, unless the underwriters can show that the captain, while there, was informed of the blockade; and there was no evidence whatever of that fact at the trial. But even if the ship had sailed after notification of the blockade, the voyage was not therefore illegal, nor is the policy, effected under such circumstances, illegal. It does not follow that the vessel would commit a breach of the blockade; she may sail with the intention of proceeding to a blockaded port, the owner at the same time giving his captain 1829. HARRATT v. WISE. 1829. HARRATT V. WISE. instructions, in the event of the continuance of the continuance of the blockade, to go into some neighbouring port. In the Shepherdess (a), Sir William Scott considers that a neutral may fit out a ship and sail for a blockaded port, with a knowledge of the blockade. The general terms in the policy respecting the risks insured against will not affect its legality, for legal risks only can be intended, Kellner v. Le Mesurier. (b) Brougham, contrà. In the case cited of the Shepherdess, Sir W. Scott says, the vessel must not go to the blockaded port to make enquiry as to the continuance of the blockade, but to the adjacent ports of the blockading nation: the relaxation of the law of nations, stated in that case, has that material qualification. The policy in this case, effected after public notification of the blockade, was illegal. Can it be said that, provided a vessel has sailed, the owner may insure her or her cargo, though he have full notification of a blockade of the port of her destination? He would then have an equal right to do so in the case of his vessel's sailing for a port, which after her departure becomes a hostile instead of a friendly one. But at all events, the voyage became illegal, the captain having had notice of the blockade before he left Lochindal. He had what amounted in law to complete notice. A notification to the government of a country of a blockade, is a notification to all the subjects under that government. In the case of the Neptunus (c), Sir W. Scott lays it down, that where the government hears of a blockade, the subject must be taken to know it. The case of the Adelaide (d) is to the same effect. Much more are the subjects bound by (a) 5 Rob. Adm. Rep. 264. (b) 4 East, 396. (d) 2 Rob. Adm. Rep. 111. note.. the notification to their government, after the government has notified it to them. Such a notification fixes them from the time when, according to the ordinary course of communication between the seat of government and the respective parts of the empire, the news would reach any particular place. Here twenty days. elapsed between the notification of the blockade in the Gazette, and the ship's sailing from Lochindal. If therefore such a notification, which is a proclamation to all the subjects of the realm, that such a voyage is illegal, be of any use, it must be taken to be a communication to the captain, in this case, of the blockade. At all events, it lay on the plaintiff to prove, under such circumstances, that he had no notice. Cur. adv. vult. On a subsequent day, the judgment of the Court was delivered by Lord TENTERDEN C. J. After reading the notes of the evidence at the trial, his Lordship said, I left it to the jury to say, whether the captain was informed of the blockade at any time between his leaving Liverpool, and his falling in with the Brazilian squadron; and they were of opinion that he was not informed of it. But it was objected that the policy was void; that having been effected with a knowledge of the blockade, it was contrary to the law of nations, and could not be recovered on; and the cases of the Shepherdess, the Neptunus, and the Adelaide, were cited by the defendants as favouring their view of the case. Now here the voyage was not illegal in its commencement; nor do we think that it became so by reason of the ship's having subsequently taken her departure from the harbour of Lochindal at a time when the blockade of Buenos Ayres had been notified by our government, although sufficient time had elapsed for the intelligence to have reached 1829. HARRATT v. WISE. Lochindal before the ship's departure. For although a blockading nation may lay down a general rule as to the time when neutral nations and their subjects shall be bound by a notice given to them, after which period, a ship fitting out for the blockaded port, and taken in an attempt to enter it, is to be deemed guilty of a breach of the blockade; yet such a rule cannot be applied between party and party here. For if distance of time or place were alone decisive of the question of notice, the presumption so drawn might often be contrary to the fact, and much injustice might be done. Whether a party had or had not knowledge of the blockade, is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Sometimes the circumstances will be such, as to raise a strong probability that the party was informed of it; in that case, proof will be required from him that he was not. In the present case, however, the jury having decided that the captain had no knowledge in fact of the blockade, and the notice given in the Gazette not being sufficient in law to raise the presumption of such knowledge, the consequence is, that the rule for a new trial must be discharged. Rule discharged. If a ship, having sailed for a blockaded port before public notifi GUILDHALL, June 16.- Before Lord TENTERDEN C. J. WINDER v. WISE and Others. THIS was also an action on a policy of insurance on goods shipped by the vessel mentioned in the last case, the Ann, from Liverpool to Buenos Ayres. The evidence cation of the blockade in this country, receive at any time during her voyage intelligence of the blockade, but nevertheless continue her voyage to the blockaded port,. and be captured in an attempt to enter it, a policy of insurance on the ship or her cargo is discharged on the part of the plaintiff was of the same nature as in the case of Harratt v. Wise; the mate being the only person to speak to what took place from the time of the ship's leaving Liverpool till she was carried into Rio Janeiro for adjudication. On the part of the defendants there was the additional testimony of three witnesses, who stated distinctly that the blockade of Buenos Ayres was well known at Bowmore, the seaport town of the island of Islay, where the Ann lay, and where the captain was frequently on shore, in three or four days after her arrival in that port: and one of the witnesses stated a conversation which he had held with the captain on the subject of the blockade, in reference to which the captain said, "that he would take his chance, and run all risks." The captain was subpoenaed for the plaintiff, but did not appear. The Attorney General, for the plaintiff, admitted that he could not resist this evidence, and therefore declined to go to the jury upon the facts; but he submitted that still the assured was entitled to recover, on the ground of the voyage having been bona fide commenced, and that under such circumstances the ship was not bound to put back to her port of departure when she heard of her port of destination being blockaded; that having sailed before any notification in England of the blockade, she had a right to continue her voyage to the blockaded port: and he observed that all nations seemed to adopt this principle, by allowing a certain interval of time for other countries to receive intelligence of a blockade, proportioned to their distance from the place of its announcement; and that there would be no use in fixing any precise period, if the question were still open as to whether, at any period of the voyage, news of the blockade had reached the captain or any of the persons on board. |