It was communicated to the insurers, that the vessel had commenced that part of her voyage which had reference to M'Quarrie Island, and it was, therefore, clearly within the contemplation of the policy that the vessel should proceed there. Lord TENTERDEN. You do not prove that a voyage to Otaheite was ever contemplated. Sir James Scarlett. The captain might have been going to Otaheite. There is nothing inconsistent with that supposition. Lord TENTERDEN. I cannot presume that it was in the course of a voyage to Otaheite to go to M'Quarrie · Island. The plaintiffs were accordingly nonsuited. In the following term Scarlett moved to set aside this nonsuit, on the ground that, although there was no direct proof of an intention to go to Otaheite, yet Lord's' last letter was large enough to cover all the South Sea Islands. (a) That if the words in the policy might be considered as equivalent to the words "from Sidney, New South Wales, to M'Quarrie Island or Otaheite,” this would be sufficient to protect a voyage to the former place. That the person who effected the policy must have known where M'Quarrie Island was, and that it was not in the direct course to Otaheite, and must have understood, therefore, that the ship was to go there at all events. By the terms, "liberty to call at M'Quarrie Island," a voyage from Sidney to that place must have (a) See on this subject Gairdner v. Senhouse, 3 Taunt. 16. Metcalfe v. Parry, 4 Campb. 123. Bragg v. Anderson, 4 Taunt. 229. Lambert v. Liddard, 5 Taunt. 480. 1828. LORD บ. ROBINSON. 1828. LORD บ. ROBINSON. 2 Str. 1249. 2 H. Bl. 343. been contemplated, whatever might be the ulterior destination of the vessel. That if so, it was not essential, in order to recover on a policy, that the whole voyage insured should be completed. If the loss happened whilst the ship was in the due course of that voyage, it would be sufficient, even though there might have been an intention at some future point to deviate. Heselton v. Allnutt. (a) Lord TENTERDEN. There was no intention of going to Otaheite. The last letter of Lord negatives any such supposition. To satisfy the words," at and from Sidney to Otaheite," you must prove a voyage commenced either to Otaheite direct, or at least to Otaheite round by M'Quarrie Island. The plaintiff's agent, instead of having the word "Otaheite" struckout, and M'Quarrie Island substituted in its place, contents himself with adding the words, " leave to call at M'Quarrie Island." Rule refused. (a) 1 M. & S. 46., and see Hare v. Travis, 7 B. & C. 14. S. P. This was not the case of a deviation, but of a voyage different from the one insured. The distinction is well laid down by Lord Mansfield in Woolridge v. Boydell. (b) In all cases, the termini of the voyage intended, and those of the voyage described in the policy, must be the same. (c) Here the termini were Sidney and Otaheite. If it could have been proved or inferred that there was, at the commencement of the voyage, an intention to go to Otaheite, then, no doubt, the insurers would have been liable at first, and would have continued so, although that intention were subsequently abandoned, until an actual deviation had taken place; but here they were never liable at all. (b) Doug. 18. (c) Ibid. Stott v. Vaughan, cor. Lord Kenyon, Marsh. Ins. b. 1. c. 6. s. 2. BILL TAKEN IN PAYMENT UNDER GUILDHALL, April 19.-Before Lord TENTERDEN Ch. J. SLATER and Others v. WEST. 1828. ACTION by indorsees of a bill of exchange against the Where a bill was taken in payment stances of an action by picion, and in the holders against the acceptor, the naming a person jury found a verdict for the Having selected defendant, on re that the holders had not used due caution in taking the acceptor. The plaintiffs, who are Manchester warehousemen, under circumcarrying on business in King Street, Cheapside, received slight susthe bill under the following circumstances:- A person, calling himself Thomas Symes, came to their warehouse, and said he was recommended to buy from them by one of their customers at Taunton, who occasionally dealt with them. goods to the amount of 561. 2s., he gave in payment the ground the bill in question, which was for 451. payable at two months, and accepted by the defendant; the maining 117. 2s. he paid in cash, and directed the goods, which formed a large package, to be sent to the Rose and French Horn in Wood Street, which was not a booking-house for any public conveyance. The plaintiffs made enquiries as to the persons whose names were on the bill, and the result was satisfactory. Their porter delivered the goods to the person calling himself Thomas Symes, at the Rose and French Horn, and the plaintiffs made no further enquiry till next morning, when they found that he had taken away the package soon after it was brought, having come to the public house a little before in order to receive it from the porter at the time appointed. In fact, Symes was a fictitious name. For the defendant, it was proved, that refused to disturb the verdict by granting a new trial. 1828. SLATER V. WEST. the bill was lost by the drawer's brother when going to get it discounted, and that the loss was advertised. There was no proof, however, of the plaintiffs having any knowledge of the advertisement, Gurney for the defendant thereupon contended, that the plaintiffs, not having used due caution, could not make title to the bill, and he relied on the case of Gill v. Cubitt (a) as being expressly in point. Lord TENTERDEN. If the bill was taken out of the ordinary course of business, and under circumstances which ought to have excited suspicion, the plaintiffs, though they have given full value for it, cannot recover against the present defendant. This doctrine is of modern date. I am the first Judge who decided a case of this kind. It is a subject to be considered with great care; for though, on the one hand, it is necessary for the purposes of trade to encourage a proper circulation of bills; yet, on the other, if too great a facility be given to the negotiating of these instruments, it operates as an encouragement to theft. The evidence to affect the plaintiffs must be confined to what took place at their warehouse; for their porter, even if he had suspicions, had no opportunity of communicating them to the plaintiffs. If you think that the directing the goods to be sent to such a house as that, ought to have excited suspicion, your verdict will be for the defendant, taking into view, however, Symes's remaining at the warehouse some time, and betraying no alarm or apprehension while there. This case is dif ferent from Gill v. Cubitt. There is a difference between taking a bill to be discounted, and giving a bill for goods. Here, perhaps, it was a little suspicious that the place * (a) 3 B. & C. 466. to which the goods were directed to be sent was not a booking-office, and as it was near the warehouse of the plaintiffs, they might have enquired respecting the person who offered the bill. Verdict for the defendant. In the following term Brougham moved for a new trial, on the ground that this verdict was against evidence. He contended, that the only circumstance which could have raised a possibility of suspicion in the minds of the plaintiffs was, that the Rose and French Horn was not a booking-house, and that this was much too slight to warrant the finding of the jury. There was nothing remarkable in ordering a package to be, sent to such a house. The plaintiffs might suppose that the stranger had his lodging there, and they might reasonably conclude that he intended to take the goods with himself on his return to the country. But THE COURT thought that the question had been fairly left to the jury, and that not only was it their province to decide on the facts, but, in a case like this, from their acquaintance with the regular course of business, they were most competent to form a correct judgment. Although, therefore, it was intimated that the Court would have been satisfied if the verdict had been otherwise, yet they refused to disturb it. Rule refused. 1828. SLATER บ. WEST This is certainly an extreme case, and it may be doubted whether another jury would be likely to arrive at the same conclusion. The plausible story told by the stranger, his unsuspicious manner, the reference which he gave, the purchasing of goods to a considerable amount, and the part payment in cash, were circumstances sufficient, one would think, to satisfy the doubts of the most cautious. The case C |