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CHAP. II.

Mediation offered by Austria, and its failure---New system of warfare adopted by Buonaparte---His Commercial Edicts, and our Orders in Council--Dispute with America---Effect produced in England---The Peace Party--The Anti-Commercialists---Misconduct of the War.

THE new year began with an offer on the part of Austria to become the mediator of a general peace. A similar offer had been made 1807. in the spring of the preApril 18. ceding year, the Emperor of Austria then equally inviting the cabinets of Petersburgh, of Berlin, and of the Thuilleries, to adopt the same conciliatory views; and, in order to facilitate the opening of negociations, proposing that they should be held at any place in his dominions, the situation of which might be convenient for all parties, and not too near the seat of war. The offer was accepted April 25. by our court, provided it should also be accepted by all the other belligerent powers; with respect to the place, it was added, his Majesty would not object to any which was sufficiently remote from the immediate influence of the events of the war, and which would afford to the British government, in an equal degree with all the other powers concerned, the opportunity of a prompt and uninterrupt

ed communication with its Nov. 20. plenipotentiaries. Seven months elapsed, and nothing farther was heard concerning

this mediation. Prince de Starhemberg, the Austrian Envoy Extraor dinary, then transmitted another note to the secretary of state for foreign affairs, stating, that he had received positive orders from his court, to make the most earnest representations of the importance of putting an end to the struggle which still existed between England and France, the effects of which might produce to all Europe the most fatal consequences. The Emperor, therefore, officially and earnestly requested a formal assurance from the British government of its readiness to enter into a negociation for a maritime peace. This language was evidently dictated by 1807. France, and Mr Canning, Nov. 23. after expressing some surprise that the court of Vienna should apply for a renewed declaration of sentiments, whereof it had been so long and so formally in possession, repeated, nevertheless, that his Majesty was now, as he had at all times been, prepared to enter into negociation for the conclusion of such a peace as should be consistent with fidelity to his allies, and should provide for the tranquillity and secu rity of Europe.

1808. On the first of JanuaJan. 1. ry, Prince de Starhemberg transmitted another note. He was charged, he said, obeying the orders of his court in conforming to the desires of that of the Thuilleries, to propose to the English ministry that they should immediately send plenipotentiaries to Paris, for the purpose of treating for the establishment of peace between all the powers at present at war with England. And he added, that, to avoid every species of delay, he was authorized by France to give passports to the ministers who might be appointed. The reply was becoming the spirit and dignity of Jan. 8. the British nation. It noticed, what could not but be perceived, that the Prince de Starhemberg, when proposing that plenipotentiaries should be sent to Paris, had omitted to explain from whom he had received that commission, whether from his imperial master, or from the government of France; if from the former, his Majesty was concerned that, in framing this proposal, so little reference should have been had to the correspondence which had already taken place between the courts of London and Vienna. So long ago as in April, the offer of mediation had been accepted, yet now the same offer was repeated, without any notification of the acceptance of those conditions which were then stated by his Majesty to be indispensable preliminaries to a negociation; and the present proposal extended only to the powers combined with France in the war against Great Britain, and not to the allies of Great Britain in the war with France. If, on the other hand, the Prince de Starhemberg

were acting not otherwise from his own court than as being authorized to receive and convey whatever communications the government of France might think fit to entrust to him, the statement of some precise authority, and the production of some specific and authenticated documents, were then necessary. The previous settlement of a basis of negociation, (as had indeed been sug gested by the Emperor of Austria in his first offer) was indispensable, the experience of the last attempt at treating with France having placed that question beyond controversy; but, upon this subject, no intimation was now given. His Majesty was willing to treat with France, but it must be on a footing of perfect equality; he was ready to treat with the allies of France, but the negociation must equally embrace the interests of the allies of Great Britain: as soon as the basis was settled, he would be prepared to name plenipotentiaries, but he would not again consent to send them to a hostile capital. This frank and unequivocal exposition of his Majesty's sentiments, was made to the minister of the Emperor of Austria, but no authority was given to the Prince de Starhemberg to speak ir. the name of England to the government of

France. Four days after Jan. 12. the date of this answer, the Prince de Starhemberg demanded his passport. *

This prelude to a declaration of war on the part of Austria, scarcely in the slightest degree excited the public attention. Sorrow and indignation had been felt at the conduct of the Emperor Alexander; indignation at the baseness with which he had become a sharer in the spoils of

* Appendix, No. 1. (Austrian State Papers.)

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Prussia; sorrow, that one whose natural disposition had discovered such rectitude of feeling, should have been deluded into measures so prejudicial to the interests of his country, and so fatal to his own reputation. When, therefore, he is sued his hostile manifesto, these feelings were expressed in the best state paper that has proceeded from the court during the present war; the futility of its alledged grievances was exposed, its insolence repelled, and the rights and principles of Great Britain calmly and resolutely * asserted. The whole tone and temper of this declaration was what it should be; its conclusion might have occasioned some serious thought, and melancholy reflection, in the great autocrat, had he been less overawed by the reputation, and less completely duped by the artifices, of his new ally. "Whenever," it said, "the opportunity for peace between Great Britain and Russia shall arrive, his majesty will embrace it with eagerness. The arrangements of such a negociation will not be difficult or complicated. His majesty, as he has nothing to concede, so he has nothing to require; satisfied if Russia shall manifest a disposition to return to her ancient feelings of friendship towards Great Britain; to a just consideration of her own true interests, and to a sense of her own dignity as an independent nation."--These were the feelings of the nation, as well as the government; but, when Prussia declared against England, and Austria also prepared to join the same confederacy, the only sentiment which prevailed was pity for the abject state of subjection to which

these courts were reduced, and the wretched thraldom which their mutual jealousy, and mutual misconduct, had brought upon Germany.

Russia possessed a navy, and it was doubtless a part of Buonaparte's plan to bring against us the whole maritime force of the north; but the expedition against Copenhagen frustrated this, while it robbed our sai-. lors of a triumph in which all English hearts might have united. Prussia and Austria were inland states; their power to annoy us was as little as their inclination. But the barbarian, who, far more by the misconduct and fatuity of his opponents, than by' his own ability, had now become the master of the continent, was waging a new species of warfare against England. During the last war, the flourishing state of trade was the constant boast of ministers; and the books of the custom-house were referred to as proofs of national prosperity, from which there could be no appeal. This wretched folly imposed upon the people, and it imposed upon the enemy also; nor is it to be wondered at, if, while the English confounded the wealth of nations with their welfare, Buonaparte should mistake it for their strength. He called us a nation of shopkeepers; and, reasoning as if we were so, concluded, that by ruining our trade, he must ruin us. Upon this avowed principle, he prohibited all trading in English merchandize, ordered every article of merchandize belonging to England, or coming from her colonies, or of her manufacture, to be seized as lawful prize, and declared the British islands in a state of blockade. This latter part of the decree

* Appendix, No. II. (Russian Declaration, and Declaration against Russia.) † Appendix, No. III. (Series of French Decrees against British Goods.)

VOL. 1. PART I.

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was marked in all our newspapers with a note of contemptuous admiration; and no person perused it without a smile of surprise, and a triumphant sense of security, Lords as we are, and will be of the ocean. The tyrannical clauses affected others more materially than us; it remained to be seen whether America, the only nation which could properly be called neutral, would remonstrate against a measure so injurious to her trade. But, in the government of America, there was a manifest disposition to crouch at the feet of France. After, therefore, it had been intimated to the neutral powers in vain, that, if they submitted to have theirships confiscated in France, when bound to, or sailing from, an English port, we should seize and confiscate all ships and cargoes bound to or from France, the threat was 1807. followed by an order in Nov. 11. council, enacting, that all neutral ships, with neutral goods on board, bound for France, or any of the countries under her controul, should come into an English port, and there pay duty to the Engsh custom-house, so that no goods should enter France but such as we had previously taxed. This decree exasperated Buonaparte, Dec. 17. and he immediately issued an edict at Milan, † declaring, that every neutral which submitted to be searched by an English ship, or paid any duty whatsoever to the English government, should be considered as thereby denationalized, as having forfeited the protection of its own government, and become English property; and, in consequence, liable to be seized as law ful prize by French ships of war: and

he declared the British islands in a state of blockade, both by land and sea; his passion not pausing to consider, whether such a land-blockade were intelligible. Our orders in council were in fact seized upon as a pretext for new-wording and colouring a previous commercial decree issued at Milan a few 1807. days after them, but be- Nov. 23. fore they could be known. For this previous decree enacted, that "all vessels which, after having touched at England, from any nation whatsoever, shall enter the ports of France, shall be seized and confiscated, as well as their cargoes, without exception or distinction of commodities or merchandize." The orders in council, therefore, were now represented as the provocation and reason for enacting what had been before enacted.

Under these circumstances, America appeared to have only a choice of evils, to join with one of the hostile powers, to arm her vessels against both for defensive war, or to submit to both, and carry on her trade with England. But the President, and the populace of America, were alike under the influence of hostile feelings towards England. The first state papers of Mr Jefferson were so strikingly contrasted with all which it has been our fortune to see promulgated in Europe, that the feeling of delight which they occasioned in the heart of an Englishman was more than counterbalanced by a sense of humiliation which he could not fail to experience. They spake of plans for national improvement, of expence curtailed, and taxes remitted to the people; and they indicated a spirit of hope not less philosophical than generous, which promised to hasten

Appendix, No. IV. (Orders in Council.) † Appendix, No. V. Appendix, No. V.

the happier ages that it anticipated. But, when trying times came on, and the President was weighed in the balance, he was found wanting. The enmity towards this country, which, as an American, it became him to feel during that unhappy war, of which the termination was to us the least disgraceful part, he continued to feel, long after it behoved him, both as an American and a statesman, to have returned to more natural sentiments. The war against the French Republic undoubtedly contributed to this; something too has been ascribed with great likelihood to wounded vanity. Mr Jefferson had been received with flattering distinction at Paris; in London, he was entertained more according to our usual manners than his real merit de served, or than the commonest policy would have dictated. Whatever were the cause, it was manifest, that, while he regarded France with fear,

or, more probably, with favour, he discovered, on all occasions, a jealous temper towards England; as if it were possible that all natural ties between us could be dissolved while we speak one language, and as if England were not now the only earthly bulwark of liberty, and of all that should be dear to man.

The temper of the American people corresponded but too well with that of their President. That identity of language, which, in better times, it is to be hoped, will bring back the two nations to a family feeling towards each other, gave occasion, in the present troubled state of things, to mutual provocations. Our seamen frequently deserted to them, and their sailors were sometimes

impressed on suspicion of being Englishmen. On both sides there was just cause of complaint. We endured most injury, but they received most insult; and it is less dangerous.

* It is in vain for a man seized under such circumstances, to protest that he is an American, and offer to produce proof of it whenever he can appeal to his consul; effectual care may be taken to prevent this, by always keeping him on board. Sometimes such a man is sulky,--in other words, resolute, and refuses to work: he is then flogged. The captain, finding he can make nothing of him, discharges him, upon nearing an English port, into the ship of an acquaintance, with a bad character, and recommends sound flogging. The second captain refuses to listen to any thing the poor fellow can plead, silencing all his remonstrances by saying, "I got you from an English man of war, and am not bound to take your word for your country. But, while you are in this ship, by G-, you shall do your duty; get out of her how you can." This reasoning is enforced by two or three dozen lashes; and the same game is played over again when the ship goes into port, by discharging him into another, and keeping him as long as possible out at sea; for an American cannot long be mistaken for any thing else, and no affidavits are necessary to prove him not an Englishman. This is not an imaginary case, neither is it a single instance. Even the most certain, indisputable, and legal proofs are of no avail, if the captain does not think proper to admit them ;-letters from his wife, from his father, the clergyman of his native place, with certificates of his baptism and marriage. The admiralty does not hesitate a moment to admit them, and order the man's release; but, till he can make his case known to the admiralty, he is thus tyrannically detained. What must be the effect when the man escapes to his own country, upon his townsmen, his family, his kinsmen, all who hear his story!-There is but little philosophy in the old exclamation, Fiat justitia, ruat mundus: it is by committing injustice that the world is endangered,

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