goods purchased have to be paid for and the purchaser must sell his own products before he can venture to purchase, the result was sure and unavoidable. Canada bought by so much less in the United States and the United States producers lost so much trade. Is it certain that the class supposed to profit by the Emergency Tariff gained equally or at all by increased prices on their products? Now we do not quarrel with the policy or its application in this particular instance. We have no right to do that nor any wish. I am only pointing out an unavoidable result. Canada, denied entrance into the United States, must seek other outlets. If old water courses are obstructed by dams preventing flow in one direction, the result is to hollow out channels in other directions to relieve the pressure. And that other direction for Canada must be largely to the British market. Years ago, because of alleged menace of disease in Canadian cattle, Great Britain placed an embargo on their import for breeding purposes and since then Canadian cattle entering British ports have to be immediately slaughtered. Though the menace was proved groundless the fiction has been kept up through the opposition of British cattle raisers. Now there is a decided set towards removing the embargo, and if this is done Canada's surplus live stock will be absorbed in Great Britain, and in addition a valuable increase will be made to our shipping cargo eastward. If the embargo is retained, then Canada must turn its attention to the preparation of refrigerated meats and build up a trade in them with Great Britain. In either case the course of a great product will be diverted from the United States, and once diverted will scarcely again return. And with that diversion goes the equivalent imports by Canada which will be transferred from the United States to Great Britain or elsewhere. It is to be noted that the Canadian tariff on the classes of agricultural products included in the Fordney Bill is considerably lower than the rates imposed by the latter, so that in no sense was the Canadian tariff provocative of the almost prohibitive rates of the Fordney Act. Both countries should keep in mind the necessity and advantage of reasonable fiscal legislation in the general interests. Neither doctrinaire on the one hand nor class on the other should have undue influence in closing up these national gateways of commerce. Sectional and seasonal differences in need and supply should not be overlooked, and vision may well be invoked in the establishment of every national policy. The doctrinaire, be he protectionist or free trader, will always magnify his panacea, the class claimant his own particular contribution to the essential well-being of the State, and party politics will stand careful scrutiny as to how far its vote-getting enthusiasms dominate its desire for the general good. And though tariffs are made for the present, it should not be forgotten that they vitally affect the future in many ways. They hollow out channels of trade for the nation which, once set, tend to deepen and widen and render changes difficult, and when they do come more or less disastrous. But it must be remembered that they also tend to set channels of trade for the other nations affected— counter channels which debouch in other countries, and these when once set are difficult and sometimes impossible to change. There is a general business sense that may be adversely affected and which will manifest itself in redressing its disadvantages by turning in other directions, and which once turned is with difficulty brought back to former trade connections. And there is a national sense that, answering to and reinforcing this business sense, may be widely awakened to the desirability of cultivating better relations elsewhere, of relaxing any efforts to reopen the barred channels, and possibly of following a quoted example in rearranging its own tariff on the model furnished. And our cousins in the United States must not forget that what affects trade and sentiment with a people to their north now numbering nine millions will still more affect them when they become twenty millions and thereafter fifty millions and ultimately a hundred millions and more. Trade which assumes an importance of millions of dollars to-day may have a possibility of billions in the future, but such possibility may be imperilled by the feeling engendered by present preventive legislation. My conclusions are that at present there are few, if any, chances for a reciprocity arrangement between the two countries, but that despite even present and possible near future United States tariffs, there will still be a large and profitable exchange of commodities. The Fordney Bill and its successor, if it issues fully clothed as now foreshadowed, will largely diminish these exchanges, and possible consequent changes in the Canadian tariff, rendered necessary by these enactments, may tend still further to diminish the aggregate trade. There are wide possibilities in the list of articles now purchased from the United States that Canada can do without or get from other countries, and there is cause for reflection as to what might happen for instance if access by foreign countries to Canadian sources of wood and wood products were limited. What Canada loses on exchanges with United States she will recoup in added trade within the Empire and in foreign markets, other than the United States-for neither the progressive spirit of her people nor her immense resources for development will permit any diminution of her continuing expansion. GEORGE E. FOSTER. DISPOSAL OF ENEMY PROPERTY BY JOSEPH CONRAD FEHR NEARLY two years have passed since America's Treaty of Peace with Germany was signed pursuant to the Porter-Knox Peace Resolution, and still the Alien Property Custodian has in his possession approximately $350,000,000 worth of real and personal property, stocks and bonds, cash, etc., which formerly belonged to German and Austrian nationals. Most of this property was seized during the war, although some of it was taken over subsequent to the signing of the Armistice. And the question uppermost in the minds of statesmen and business men who are trying to remedy the economic ills of America, as well as of the former enemy nations, is predicated upon the many proposals that are offered for the disposition of this vast amount of private property. The practice of confiscation of private enemy property, although sanctioned by the law of nations as it obtained for centuries, and in English and American jurisprudence up to the time of the War of 1812, is no longer tolerated by the enlightened thought of the world. Confiscation has long been repugnant to the theory of fair dealing and the development of international enterprise. Accordingly economists in and out of Congress are to-day trying to devise ways and means of disposing of the property in the hands of the Alien Property Custodian in a manner that will be fair and equitable to its real owners and at the same time will safeguard the interests of American nationals who have claims against Germany and German nationals in an amount that extends into hundreds of millions of dollars. It is urged by some that America should make an unconditional return of all enemy owned property. Others insist that the United States should hold this property as a set-off against American claims, thus forcing the enemy Government to reimburse the American nationals. The most radical American claimants are asking for an outright confiscation of this property by the American Government. And still another view is that the United States should hold this property as collateral security in the nature of a pledge, in behalf of American claims against these former enemies. In defining the present policy of the United States Government concerning the disposition of all former enemy property, Congress will have to govern itself to a large extent by the policy adhered to by the Government in the past. Never was a nation more generous to its enemies than the United States has been upon the termination of its various wars. Those who now insist upon an unconditional surrender to former owners of all enemy property, point with considerable effect to the fact that Alexander Hamilton, first Secretary of the Treasury in Washington's Cabinet, assumed in behalf of the newly formed Federal Govern ment the payment of every cent of the property, both real and personal, which had been taken from British nationals, non-resident as well as resident, by orders of confiscation of the thirteen original Colonies during the Revolutionary War. The early treaties entered into by the United States with Great Britain, Germany and other European nations, recognized the principle that privately-owned property ought never to be confiscated in time of war. Chief Justice Marshall, as early as 1814, in laying down his famous decision in the case of Brown v. the United States (8 Cranch, 110, 128), recognizing the physical power and the practice of confiscation in the past, stated in unequivocal terms that "according to the modern usage" private property of the enemy found in national territory "ought not to be confiscated". He added further that "this usage be disregarded by (the sovereign, without obloquy". This dictum was reiterated by Mr. Justice Wilson in Ware e. Hylton & Dallas [U. S. 1796] 198), who stated in his opinion that "by every nation, whatever its form of government, confiscation of debts has long been considered disreputable". And debts, of course, are merely one form of property. Mr. Justice CIHford, in Hanger 1. Abbott € Wall T. &. 1867, 682,, designated combaton" 4 naked and impolitie right condemned by the enlipired onscience and judgment of modern time". Dina ) Vam bom can not |