THE PEACE PROBLEM

BY JOHN BASSETT MOORE

Ir is inevitable that in times of stress and of trouble our usual sense of the relations of things should be impaired, if not wholly lost. The mind, burdened with the griefs as well as with the pressing problems of the moment, is disposed to think of the past only as a failure and to regard the temporary wreck of its hopes and aspirations as a finality. From the depressing clutch of a vision thus distorted it is not unprofitable now and then to disengage ourselves. Sooner or later, normal conditions will return; and although certain changes, the durability of which the future alone can determine, may then have taken place, we shall find ourselves dealing, not with a new heaven and a new earth, but with the same terrestrial globe and the same firmament, and with problems which, because they inhere in human activities, are as old as man himself.

Of these problems none is more fundamental than that which I have chosen as the subject of the present paperthe peace problem. It is fundamental because it involves life itself, the very existence of peoples and of states, and the preservation of those accumulated benefits of human thought, effort and experience, which, in their aggregate, we call civilization. And for the reason that the problem bears this character, for the reason that it touches all the springs of action and is as complex as human nature itself, I shall not undertake to offer here a new and ready solution of it. While the fakir who sold pills that were said to be good for the earthquake may have excited the applause and the patronage of his hearers, it is not related that he gained their permanent gratitude. In order that we may be sure of our remedy, or in order that we may at any rate avoid the dangers of a want of vigilance and of effort, it is necessary to

know the nature of our malady and the precise forms of its manifestation. So, if we would find a remedy for war, we must understand its nature and symptoms. We must examine the conditions and impulses that produce it. To this preliminary but essential task I propose in the main to devote myself here, in the hope that its performance may contribute to the intelligent direction of our aims as well as to the cure of illusions and the prevention of mistakes.

The past three hundred years, to say nothing of earlier times, have not been wanting in plans for the preservation of peace, some of which have proceeded from men of great eminence. Sully, in his Memoirs, ascribes to Henry IV of France a 66 grand design" for the rearrangement of the states of Europe in such manner as to do away with jealousies and apprehensions regarding the balance of power. There were to be in all fifteen states, of which six-France, Denmark, Great Britain, Lombardy, Spain, and Sweden-were to be hereditary monarchies; five-the German Empire, Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, and the Papacy-were to be elec tive monarchies; and four-Venice, and three others established respectively in Italy, Switzerland, and the Belgic provinces-were to be republics. For the regulation of the relations of the independent states thus formed, there was to be a general European council, modelled on the Amphictyonic, but to sit continuously and to consist of about seventy persons, of whom four were to be sent by each of the larger Powers and two by each of the lesser. There were also to be local councils, from which appeals might be taken to the general council, whose decrees were to be final. This project has often been described, not inappropriately, as a plan for the abasement of the House of Austria, and for this reason alone it could hardly be treated in its day as a practical measure.*

**

After more than a hundred years the scheme of federation was elaborated by the Abbé de St. Pierre, but with an animus less obviously partisan. The Christian sovereigns of Europe were to form a permanent union for the preservation of peace, and, after a certain number had entered, the rest were if necessary to be coerced into joining. Agreeing

* A comprehensive and highly philosophical discourse on the occasion and means of establishing peace and liberty of commerce by all the world may be found in "Le Nouveau Cynée" (Paris, 1623), by Emeric Crucé, a reprint of which, edited, with an English translation, by Thomas Willing Balch, Esq., was published in Philadelphia in 1909.

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to be content with the territory they severally possessed or with what was to be allotted by treaty, the members of the union were to establish through their representatives a Senate, which, besides codifying the laws of commerce, was to compose differences by mediation, or, if this failed, by arbitration. No sovereign was to take up arms, or commit hostilities, except against one who had been declared an enemy of the European society. Any sovereign taking up arms before the Union had declared war, or refusing to execute a regulation of the Union or a judgment of the Senate, was to be declared such an enemy, and the Union was then to make war upon him until he should be disarmed or until the regulation or judgment should be executed, in addition to which he was to pay the cost of the war and to lose any territory taken from him before the close of hostilities. When the forces of the Union were thus employed, each State was to furnish the same number of troops, but the expenses were to be paid by the more powerful sovereigns; nor was there, in time of peace, to be an inequality of forces, except that a powerful sovereign might, with the consent of the union, employ foreign troops for his garrisons, so as to prevent seditions. When the Union declared war against a sovereign, a generalissimo was to be named by a majority vote. It was further proposed that the European Union should endeavor to bring about the formation in Asia of a permanent society like that in Europe.

The well known plan of William Penn, though far less elaborate than that of the Abbé de St. Pierre, which it antedates, lays much stress on the judicial function of the central body, and embraces the idea of the association of forces for the purpose of compelling the submission of disputes and the performance of judgments. Nor can it be denied that Penn manifested a keen sense of the delicacy of the matter with which he was dealing, when he proposed that the room in which the central body or diet was to meet should be round, and should have several avenues of entrance and of exit, in order that quarrels as to precedence might be avoided.

A century later two great philosophers, Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham, one German and the other English, who were destined to leave a deep impress upon the world's thought, applied themselves to the baffling problem on lines not identical but by no means divergent. They both recom

mended a limitation of armaments, but in the main relied upon the creation of a state of public right in the progressive development of which the desired consummation would be gradually attained. Bentham, with characteristic predilection for legal processes, particularly emphasized the importance of establishing a common judicature for the determination of international disputes, reasoning that, if such a tribunal existed, war would no longer follow from a difference of opinion, since the decision of the arbiters would save the credit and the honor" of the contending parties. That this conception, which was by no means original with Bentham, is intrinsically valid, can hardly be questioned; for, not only has it inspired all intelligent and successful efforts to promote international arbitration, but its soundness has been exemplified in the actual settlement and termination of many grave and important controversies.

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While enough has been disclosed to justify the conclusion that recent proposals for the preservation of peace by means of leagues or alliances contain little that is new, a cursory examination of the records of the past will also show that their principle has often received a practical application.

It was tried, with a considerable measure of success, in the Amphictyonic League among the states of ancient Greece. This league, whose objects were at first religious, then religious and political, and at last chiefly political, held, through its council, two meetings a year; and while the council did not perform the functions either of a national assembly or of a tribunal of arbitration, it acted as an organ of consultation, through which its constituents were enabled to act in concert for the preservation of peace. With the exception of the fact that it was a permanent body and held stated meetings, its functions were not unlike those that have been performed by the international congresses which have from time to time been held in Europe during the past three hundred years. These conferences have indeed more frequently been held for the restoration than for the preservation of peace; but, whether held before or after war, their chief object has been to establish a condition of things under which peace might be maintained. Especially has this been the case since the Congress of Westphalia, which finished its work in 1648. The international system established by this congress, in spite of the wars that super

vened, reached its formal end only with the peace of Amiens in 1802. It was eventually replaced with a new system, created at Paris and Vienna in 1914 and 1915, the dominant thought of which was the substitution of the principle of concert for that of the balance of power, on which, in spite of all efforts, the states of Europe have tended to range themselves and are now actually aligned.

In a work recently published, under the title of The Confederation of Europe, by Mr. W. A. Phillips, an eminent English historian, many interesting disclosures are made concerning the attempt, during and after the Napoleonic Wars, to found, under the auspices of certain Powers, what may be termed a league to enforce peace. The leader in this movement was the Emperor Alexander I of Russia, a deeply religious man with a tendency towards mysticism, who in his youth imbibed from his tutor, a Frenchman named Frédéric César de La Harpe, an exponent of the transcendental "philosophy of humanity," the ideas of liberty and equality of the French Revolution. In weighing the aspersions sometimes cast on Alexander's character and motives, it is well to bear in mind that the efforts to discredit his proposals were by no means always disinterested; that if, as the result of assassinations and other incidents, he eventually fell under reactionary influences, he only manifested a susceptibility from which no one is wholly exempt; and that, between malevolence and an obtrusive benevolence, the methods and results do not always enable us clearly to distinguish. Nor is it out of place to say that if, in the Holy Alliance and other acts which he promoted, he evidently regarded himself as a chosen instrument of God, he merely manifested a human tendency from which even elective rulers are not invariably exempt. It is indeed strange that one who has, whether by birth or by the suffrages of his fellow-citizens, been elevated to a high station, should regard Providence as having had a hand in the work, and should think no worse of Providence or of himself on that account!

As early as 1804, Alexander, in secret instructions to his confidential agent in England, M. de Novosiltzoff, which were supplementary to those given to the Russian ambassador in London, proposed the "combination of the resources and forces of Russia and Great Britain," in order to constitute "a vast mass of power," with a view" to fix the future peace of Europe on a solid and permanent basis."