folutions; efpecially as new circumftances had fince occurred, which had an alarming influence on the commercial credit of the country, and tended to impair its ability of carrying on the war? He charged adminiftration with indulging a fpirit of intrigue, when the welfare not only of this but other nations of Europe was concerned, and when it fhould clearly be understood on what terms this country was willing to make peace. Administration was much to blame, in rifking the events of war, by refufing to treat for peace, after the reduction of Valenciennes, fince which time thofe events had turned in favour of the enemy. France, he faid, had as good a right to retain Belgium, as this country to retain Canada, in 1783, or the Cape of Good Hope, any treaty that might now be agreed on.

in

After

The marquis of Lanfdowne lamented to fee a motion of fuch importance paffed over in the fhuffling manner in which minifters feemed inclined to treat it. the measures of diftrefs, to which we had lately been obliged to recur, we ought not to adhere to the determination of December thirty, or of any former period.-It was idle, after the fhock given to public credit, to talk of half measures. Nothing fhort of making bank notes a legal tender, with all the calamities incident to this ftep, could fave us. The minifter muft know this, and only waited, perhaps, to have the call to do fo, from the public. If fo, he was ready for one, to make the call, and to fhare in the refponfibility for a measure which alone could give us time to look about us. He did not defpair of his country, but, the longer the fyftem of

war was pursued, the difficulties, in' the way of peace, would be increafed. It was by relieving the balance of trade, by reviving commerce, by reftoring public confidence, and, above all, by peace, that the dangers which threatened us were to be averted. He wifhed the prefent minifters might accomplish this point; but if they avowed that they knew not how, it would become them to furrender the talk to thofe who did. He referred to the correfpondence of lord Malmefbury, and obferved, it was impoffible to form a right judgement of the fteps taken in that negociation, when only a part of that correfpondence was laid before the house, and the inftructions and intentions of minifters were kept back: without this knowledge it was impoffible to fay which was the unreafonable party; but if it could be proved, by the documents, to be the enemy, it would unite the hearts and hands of the people in this country.

Lord Borringdon did not at all. approve the motion, which tended to deprefs the fpirits of the people ; nor of the words of it, which refembled thofe of the minutes of the executive directory more than the language of the British houfe of peers.

The earl of Guildford faid, that his majefty's minifters, it appeared, perfevered in their resolution not to enter upon any negociation which fhould not make the restoration of Belgium a fine qua non. He who, during the whole courfe of the war, had queftioned their fincerity in negociating, muft own that they were confiftent in acting upon the addrefs of December; fince they had, by that method, fecured themfelves

from the means of attaining peace, and called upon the houfe to declare, that they would not negociate for any that they were likely to

obtain.

The earl of Spencer ridiculed the idea, that minifters were not fincere in their profeffed wishes for peace. A reference to the papers would fhew that the propofals were not given as an ultimatum. The adoption of the motion, inftead of accelerating peace, would retard it: as it would prove to France, and to Europe, that we were willing to make peace on any terms.

The earl of Guildford replied, that lord Malmesbury, though he defired M. de la Croix to fuggeft a contre-projet, had exprefly made the furrender of Belgium a fine qua non. Now, if he underflood diplo. matic language, a fine qua non was

an ultimatum.

The duke of Bedford alfo observed, that when miniftry, through their ambassador, called for a centre projet, they had, at the fame time, exprefsly declared, that the furrender of Belgium was a fine qua non. But what demonftrated the infin. cerity of minifters was, their not investing their ambaffador with intelligible powers. He was inceffantly difpatching couriers for inftructions. When called on to prefent his terms, he had none to offer; and, at length, made a fine qua non of a matter which they had previously declared they would not concede as a principle. The duke believed, in his confcience, that the prefent ministers could not negociate a peace on fo good terms as other perfons of more capacity, and more fincerity and truth, would be able to obtain.

The earl of Carlisle lamented the

degeneracy of the times, which were now fo changed, as to make an addrefs of gratitude and loyalty a matter of charge and fufpicion. When he was young, no time was loft in approaching the throne with thanks. He profeffed, upon his honour, to believe that minifters were fincere in their wishes for peace: nor could he conceive a reafon for them to be otherwise.

The marquis of Lansdowne reminded his lordship, that he had himself been fent on an embassy of peace to America, and doubts were entertained to this day of the fincerity of their million.

Lord Grenville did not know in what diplomatic di&ionary the noble lords had found thata fine qua non was fynonimous with an ultimatum. A fine qua non meant only a condition not on any account to be given up or departed from. An ultimatum, the last and best terms of any kind that would be offered. A noble duke had infinuated now, as he had often done before, not only the infincerity but the incapacity of minifters, for their fituations. He thanked God, however, that a very different opinion was entertained of his majesty's confidential fervants, by that houfe, with the exception of four or five lords, as well as by more than three-fourths of the other houfe. The virtues, as well as talents, of the prefent minifters, he said, were known and acknowledged by the whole British nation: nor could the people of England be eafily induced to think that the most proper perfons to make peace were perfons agreeable to the enemy.

The marquis of Lansdowne replied to this, that the men, proper to make peace, were not fo much the

men

men that the enemy might like. It was not favour that an enemy demanded, but candour; and this, he believed, was what they could not find in the prefent minifters of England.

The earl of Coventry declared that he could not but ftill confider England as undone, if the agreed to the furrender of Belgium.*

On a divifion of the houfe, the earl of Oxford's motion was rejected by 52 against 16.

It is highly worthy of obfervation, as truly characteristic of the fellifh nefs of men, and especially of fovereign powers, that, in this negociation, the oftenfible fource of the war, the interefts of the injured parties in France, the blood royal, the nobles, and the clergy, were, if mentioned at all, only glanced at in an indirect and indifferent manner. Nor was much greater regard paid, on either fide, to the interefis or wishes of the French and English nations at large. It plainly appeared, from the published correfpondence, between the negociating parties, that notwithstanding their profef fions of a wifh for peace, the moft guarded precautions were practifed by both fides, not to cede or yield any portion of territory upon which peace could be established between the two countries. Though a real patriot, ftatefman, or king, may fome times arife for the confolation of the human race, it is in the nature of all governments and governors to be more folicitous about their own interefts, as contra diftinguished from thofe of the governed, than of the wider circle of their countrymen, and of human nature. But although governments,

like all bodies, are chiefly interested in the prefervation and extension of their own power, although they be often, not to fay for the most part, fcandaloufly indifferent to the good of the communities, over whom, in the courfe of Providence, they are placed, it is not true, converfely, that all that is in oppofition to government, is patriotic, humane, and juft. Thofe inconfiftencies and tergeverfations in public, and that laxity of morals in private life, which had marked the characters of not a few of the members of parliament in oppofition to the British adminiftration, together with a flagrant defire of power, manifefted in a conflent endeavour to thwart the minifter in every meafure, important or trivial, right or wrong: thefe vices and follies, in certain individuals, diffufing, by the affociation of ideas a fufpicious air, over even a constant adherence to pure principles, brought a general difcredit and dif grace on the whole of what was formerly and by fome is ftill, called, the whig party. A party was gradually formed in the nation, fufpicious of both our minifierial and antiminifterial factions. party, which appeared to be daily increafing, encouraged a fmall pha lanx in the houfe of commons, to prefent themfelves as a rallying poft for all who were animated with a fincere and difinterested defire of peace, and the profperity of the country. They difavowed all animofity and rivality towards either of the two great parties, into which the legislature was divided. They recommended unanimity at home, and moderation, juftice, and the enlarged views of a humane philofophy

in our negociations with our foreign enemies. From this elevated and dignified ground they looked around them, to fee whether there yet remained any means, by which the negociation, fo abruptly broken off, might not be renewed. They were inclined to think that a temperate and cool reconfideration of the propofitions tendered by lord Malmefbury, and rejected by De la Croix, would tend to a falutary purpose, and that it was poffible for parliament, without violation or diminution of its dignity, to adopt fome refolutions, which, while they ftrengthened the executive government, might be conciliatory in their nature, and pacific in their effect. Previoufly to any trial of ftrength in parliament, the neutralifts were at pains to explain and diffeminate their principles, both in converfation, and by means of the prefs. The leading features of their plan, for peace, were, political fafety on both fides, and the fecurity of private property. "The liberty of the nation, like that of an individual, it was faid, as defined by Montefquieu, is the right of doing every thing that the law of nations permits. If one nation could do what that law forbids, it would no longer poffefs liberty, because the other nations would, in like manner, poffefs this power. The rights of all nations, dependent and reciprocal, equally demand in each the protection of property: property, which, by its numerous relations, and the circumftances of its production, conftitutes the bond of civil fociety, and the exiftence of public credit. This univerfal banker is equally neceffary to the induftrious poor, who leave their core with the bakers, to minifters,

who borrow millions, and to nations who exchange their productions."

"But where are we to find a law, by which the rights of nations are to be maintained and realized? The inviolability of property and public credit conftitutes the wifdom, and forms the best end of human policy. And it is this bafis of univerfal utility, that forms the moft folid foundation of the law of nations.

"How was this great political truth to be exemplified, and forced at once on the comprehenfions and adoption of mankind? By the explosion and the confequences of the French revolution. It was in vain that the people of France were reprefented by univerfal, or even numerical, fuffrage. That reprefentation, inftead of refpecting the laws of property, and maintaining public credit, violated and reversed its whole fyftem. Adopting fpoliation for plunder, they created the affignats, which confumed the finances of Europe. They maintained the war of France, till the conquered, and fubfifted by foreign fpoil. England, to meet the war of affignats, drew upon the finances of pofterity This country and France have reverfely confumed their capital of the prefert, and that of future generations. Now France is beginning to draw upon posterity, and England to confume her capital of the day. But they have both to learn, that they have but one capital, namely, the produce of induftry, and the foil for the fupport of life. Italy, Spain, Germany, Holland, America, and all the northern ftates are, eventually, fufferers in this great convulfion. Befide the ravages of war, the ufual productions of England and France muft coft them dearer. The spirit of