is clearly embraced in the title, as is the case here, all legal consequences flowing from it will for the purposes of this constitutional requirement be regarded as embraced within the title also."-(Timm v. Harrison, 109 Ill. 593.)

In 1858, the legislature passed "An Act in relation to the Construction of Statutes, (Laws of 1857, p. 45), which provided "That in any law of this territory now in force or hereafter to be enacted, every term implying one only, shall, when required, be construed to mean two or more, * * except in

cases where the number is a substantive part of the act; and every term implying sex, shall, with a like exception, when necessary, be construed to mean, both, either or neither." Under this law no statute could be held to exclude women where it referred to citizens.

The Act of Nov. 14, 1879, "To establish and protect the rights of married women," abolished the civil disabilities of the wife, but provided "That this shall not confer the right to vote or hold office upon the wife, except as is otherwise provided by law."

It did not enfranchise or disfranchise her.

The so-called common law rule had been abrogated long before. In 1861, the civil practice act of Jan. 30, 1861, provided:

"A married woman may sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, without joining or having her husband joined with her in the action."-(Laws of 1861, p. 51.)

The exemption law of the same date provided:

"That all real and personal estate belonging to any married woman at the time of her marriage, and all which she may have acquired subsequently to such marriage, or to which she shall hereafter become entitled in her own right, and all her personal earnings, and all the issues, rents and profits of such real estate, shall not be liable to attachment for, or execution upon any liability or judgment against the husband so long as she or any minor heir of her body shall be living." -(Laws of 1861, p. 53.)

The disability of coverture was recognized in sec. 11 of the limitation act of 1860, p. 29, Laws of 1860. This was repealed

Jan. 31, 1861, by striking out the words "a married woman." -(Laws of 1861, p. 61.)

If the so-called rule of the common law, of the theoretical unity of husband and wife, had existed prior to 1861, these laws abrogated it.

In the Code of 1881, the word "male" was inserted in the election law before the word "eitizens."-(Sec. 3050, Code.) This amendment of the election law was arbitrary, and in violation of the right of suffrage recognized by the Organic Act as belonging to citizenship. No such power of disfranchisement on account of sex was conferred by Congress on the legislature. There must be a clear delegation of power on the part of Congress to authorize the territorial legislature to deprive any citizen of a right belonging to citizenship.

"The theory upon which our political institutions rest is, that all men have certain inalienable rights-that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that in the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all positions, are alike open to every one, and that in the protection of these rights all are equal before the law. Any deprivation or suspension of these rights for past conduct, is punishment, and can be in no otherwise defined.

"Punishment not being therefore, restricted to the deprivation of life, liberty or property, but also embracing deprivation or suspension of political or civil rights, and the disabilities prescribed by the Missouri constitution being in effect punishment, we proceed to consider whether there is any inhibition in the constitution of the United States against their enforcement."

The Court then pass to the constitutional prohibition that "No State shall pass any bill of attainder" and held: "A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial."-(Cummings v. State of Missouri, 4 Wall. 323.)

In regard to territorial legislation Congress is bound by the limitations of the constitution, which provides in section 9: "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law can be passed."(Sec. 9, Art. 1 of the Constitution.)

Congress could not, constitutionally, make sex a crime, and authorize the disfranchisement of adult female citizens. Nor can the legislature of this territory usurp a power denied to Congress, and prohibit any class of citizens from voting. The Organic Act recognizes the right of citizens, male and female, to vote and hold office. The right to vote is a right of property. This was denied in 1703, but so held by Lord Chief-Justice Holt, who in Ashby v. White, 2 Lord Raymond, 953, said: "A right that a man has to give his vote at the election of a person to represent him in parliament, there to concur in the making of the laws which are to bind his liberty and property, is a most transcendent thing, and of a high nature, and the law takes notice of it in divers statutes."

"This right of voting is a right in the plaintiff by the common law, and consequently he shall maintain an action for the obstruction of it."-(Ibid. 954.)

In reply to the argument that no action lay for damages "because none had ever been brought," he said: "Indeed, that is an argument, when it is founded upon reason, but it is none when it is against reason."

"Let us consider wherein the law consists, and we shall find it to be, not in particular instances and precedents, but on the reason of the law, and ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus."

On appeal to the House of Lords, C. J. Holt argued: "Let all people come in and vote fairly; it is to support one or the other party, to deny any man's vote. By my consent, if any such an action comes to be tried before me I will direct the jury to make him pay well for it; it is denying him his English right, and if this action be not allowed, a man may be forever deprived of it."

Ward, C. B., and Bury and Smith, Barons, concurred with him, and judgment was given to the plaintiff by a vote of 50 lords to 16.

This settled as English law, that the right to vote was a common law right, a property right, and that the right to sue for a denial of it did not depend on precedents, but on reason which was the foundation of the law.

This was the common law rule in 1703, and as the right

of suffrage then belonged in county elections to the freeholders, who were accounted the full freemen, or to the inhabitants of boroughs who were freemen of the borough, it was a personal right which belonged to freemen as such. When the colonists revolted against English tyranny, and demanded the rights of freemen, they demanded the full measure of political rights as well as property rights.

Taking the common law of England as a guide, there is no propriety in excluding woman from voting on the ground that she has no political rights at common law.

Parish elections in England were the same as town elections here. Women voted at such elections.

In 1739, Sarah Bly had been chosen Sexton of St. Botolph Parish by a vote of 209, while her opponent named Olive had 196 votes. He contested the election because 40 women voted for her, and on the ground that women had no right to vote. Chief-Justice Lee decided that women were entitled to vote, and Mrs. Bly was legally elected. He cited cases showing that women had voted for members of parliament.-(Olive v. Ingram, 7 Mod. Reports, 264.)

In Holt v. Lyle, in Catharine v. Surrey, and in Coates v. Lyle, it was decided that women, having the qualifications of a male voter, had a right to vote.

In Yorkshire, from 1407 to 1445, the returns of election were made by indentures signed by the attorneys of the great lords of the franchise, who appeared and voted by these attorneys. In 1411, the electors were the attorneys of six lords, and the attorney of Lucia, countess of Kent, who were common suitors to the county court. In 1414, the indentures are sealed by the attorneys of the archbishop of York, the earl of Westmoreland, the earl Marshall, the Lord le Scrobe of Mesham, Peter de Manley, Sir William Mesham, the Lord de Ross, Margaret lady Vavasour, and Henry Percy.-(Stubb's Const. History, p. 425.)

The custom in the boroughs varied. In some, the right to vote was placed in the freemen of the borough; "the character of a freeman being personal, and not connected with tenure of land or contribution to the public burdens." In others the

members of parliament were returned by the lord or lady of the manor.

In 1572, Dame Dorothy Packington, lady of the manor of Aylesbury, returned the two members.-(3 Stubb's, 433, 434.) Even upon the theory that the duty of bearing arms and the right to vote were inseparable, women had the right to vote. In 1297, the King called for troops and ordered all ecclesiastics and widows holding lands in chief, that is, not under any lord, to furnish their due service.-(2 Stubb's, 297.)

The commutation, by money payment, of personal military service, was established in 1159, and the tenants of the crown, who did not choose to go to war, paid a tax of two marks on the knight's fee.-(1 Stubb's Const. Hist., 493, 494.)

In 1311, the church paid for its quota of military service by tax, and "one man at arms was to be furnished by every township to serve forty days *** but it was generally redeemed by money payment."-(2 Stubb's, 368.)

This was the custom in England prior to 1776, and effectually explodes the theory that only able-bodied men fit for military duty were, and should be entitled to vote. Military service then as now, was paid for-and the taxes came from women as well as men. Persons who possessed a freehold voted, whether men or women, unless the female freeholder was married, and after the time of the Norman Conquest the female freeholder endowed the husband with the right to vote during her life.

The decision in the case of Harland v. the Territory, rendered by Justices Turner and Langford at the January Term, 1887, held that the suffrage acts of 1883 and 1886 were invalid because the titles purported to amend simply a section of the Code of 1881. The validity of these titles under the organic law was not contested, nor ruled upon in the District Court.

The record of the Harland case shows that Harland objected to married women as grand jurors, because they were not householders, not because they were not electors. Exception was taken on that point as to the qualification of jurors, and on no other point. The assignment of errors covered that and