Return to an order of the British house of commons of the funded debt, at the periods under mentioned.

N. B. The books of the exchequer not being found to contain accounts of the public debt for 1700, 1710, and 1720; the above were' therefore the best returns that could be made to the order of the house of commons.

*Heads of the public funded debt, as the same stood on the 1st February, 1800.

N. B. The real value of the above nominal capital would not amount to more than 280 millions, in estimating the 3 per cent. consols at 60, the market price (July 1801,) and the other funds in proportion. The debt is however increased to 507 millions, net. (See page 173, for the British debt of 1806.)

State of the British public revenue from 1700 to 1805 inclusive, computed on the medium of every seven years; also the amount of loans for the same period,

The amount of the permanent and temporary taxes for the year 1805,

estimated at 37,000,000l. viz.

The gross receipt of the permanent revenue, after
deducting repayments for over-entries, drawbacks,
and bounties, amounted, in the year ending the 5th
July, 1805, to

Discretionary tax on income estimated (in 1800) at
Tax on imports and exports, &c.

Pounds,

29,000,000

7,000,000

1,500,000

37,500,000

N. B. By adding the loans, sums raised by lottery, and other extraordinary resources, to the ordinary revenue, the public income of Great Britain is ascertained. The income tax is kept as an extraordinary resource to which the administration may recur only in times of great necessity.

Dr. Price, in his work on annuities, has shewn that one per centum on each loan, if invested in stocks at compound interest at 5 per cent. will sink the principal in 37 years. The principle of Dr. Price has been adopted by the British since the year 1793, on a motion of Mr. Fox, by which the sinking fund, now amounting to more than one hundred and thirteen millions, may extinguish the existing debt in a few years; as may be seen by the additional purchase made by this accumulating fund in 1805, amounting to 12,972,913 pounds in one year only. The increase, by continual purchase, of the stock on interest appertaining to the sinking fund, becomes more rapid by every fall of the funds, now at 62 for 3 per cents, which species of debt composes the bulk of the entire debt of Britain, of which the following is an official return:

Total British debt, Jan. 5th, 1806,

New debt by loans of 1805,

Transferred to redeem the land tax,

Redeemed by the sinking fund,

Leaving on the 31st Jan. 1806, a net debt of which above 4 fifths are three per cents,

STERLING. 603,925,792 38,700,000

642,625,792

22,000,000

620,625,792

113,500,000

1.507,125,792

The whole amount of the British debt at present prices, perhaps, would not exceed 330 millions; and no doubt may be bought up by the commissioners of the sinking fund before the year 1830; after which they may have a sufficient national income for a perpetual naval warfare, if they have no call for foreign subsidies. This is the sum of the reasonings of the friends to the present administration. They are, indeed, plausible, and if not correct they are not to be refuted by any existing facts, at least in our possession.

But if the British administration by extending their views to further conquests, should still require new loans, what would they do to defray the interest and reduce the principal? Some of their writers would answer, that they have tried successfully a recourse to an income tax for the deficiencies of their ordinary annual taxes, amounting from twenty eight to near thirty eight millions; or to what is virtually the same, as it affects the interest of their creditors, they may reduce their dividends from 10 to 50 per cent. or to half or even a third, to quadrate with their ability on each and every year's estimate. The abilities of this nation are undoubtedly still increasing, and we repeat that since the failure of Mr. Hume's, D'Avenant's, and Dr. Price's predictions, "that Britain was unequal to a greater burthen than the interest on two hundred millions," no one has attempted to fix a bound to their future resources, although many have expressed their fears that they were at their acme. It is, indeed, asto

nishing that they should be able to bear up under their late annual charges, which for one year amounted to sixty eight millions! in taxes and loans, and yet to occasion a rise in their stock at market. Look at their increasing valuation, their custom house returns of exports; at the vast increase of their country banks, which since the partial or temporary stoppage of the national bank, have been suffered to go on in issuing bills with no further opposition from the bank of England, in consequence of its exclusive charter: hence the rapid increase of public and private credit even in time of war, the operations of which were formerly unfavourable to both. A recent estimate of the paper, inland bills included, in circulation by 430 country and 72 London banks, states the averaged amount to exceed two hundred thousand pounds each, or equal in toto to six hundred millions of dollars for Great Britain alone, exclusive of Ireland. To this increase in the number and ability of the banks to take off new loans of 20 to near. 40 millions each, we must add the physical diminution of the comparative public burthens by the depreciation of all money. (See the tables page 142 and 147 of this book.) The table page 142, though calculated for the United States, will apply in a great degree to Great Britain. This nation by being now THE FIRST IN COMMERCE, is the chief cause, perhaps by design, of the variation of all money throughout the commercial world; unless we admit that above thirty annual millions of specie, from the Spanish and other mines, has had an equal effect on the comparative value of every merchantable commodity, and of course on all old debts, on all private and public bonds, stocks, and on monied obligations of every description.

While recommending a close attention to the financial history of Britain, we would refer the reader to the observations of D'AVENANT, ARCHIBALD HUTCHESON, in his collection of treaties, published 1720, GORDON's tracts, 1722, WM. RICHARDSON's view of the decline of foreign trade, 1738, LORD LITTLETON's address to a friend, 1739, LORD BOLINGBROKE's state of the nation, 1749, HUME'S essays, 1776, DR. PRICE's repetition of D'AVENANT's presage, that two hundred millions would probably sink the public debt to nothing; premising, however, that the reading of such writers only, if done with an aversion for every friendly view of British measures, so natural to political opponents, might prevent our ever arriving at the truth! It is remarked of the Romans that wherever they met with sublime traits in the character of their neighbours, and even of their enemies, they immediately imitated their manners, or inquired into the circumstances that gave rise to the objects of their admiration; they even altered their armour to the shape of that of their successful opponents, and when they discovered that the Carthagenians owed their superior elevation to a navy, they did not waste their breath in crying down the folly and expense of a marine force, they built a superior fleet, and with it went to Carthage and thus changed the question of delenda est, to UBI EST CARTHAGO? So will the emperor

of the French, if the British do not persevere in their successful

efforts to prevent a single power from RULING THE UNIVERSE both by sea and land, to which a cherished ambition and a love of military glory, now almost irresistibly impel heroic Frenchmen.

66

Perhaps the intelligent Mr. Hume, while he was with the opposition, discovered more political imprudence than any other British author of equal celebrity ever committed to paper, (Bolingbroke and Swift not excepted) when in his ninth essay on public credit he says, a prudent man would rather lend money to the public after we had taken a sponge to our debts, than at the present moment;" for continues he, " an opulent knave is a preferable debtor to an honest bankrupt." This he first said in 1775, when the entire debt was but one hundred and twenty three millions, (as may be seen in the preceding table) or nom. rally, only one-fourth of what it now is: but before referring to this return of British debts, it is proper to examine the physical difference of the respective burthens, thus;....If by a total valuation of the real and personal estates, Britain contains double the wealth of 1775, and all money has depreciated one half in the mean time, then Britain does not owe more in reality than she did thirty years ago, with above four times the nominal amount. It is, however, certain, that the United States by this fair and only fair mode of estimating our public burthen, would not now owe one-third of the nominal debt they funded in 1790, if we had never yet redeemed a single cent of the principal in question, by our sales of public lands and the other sinking funds. This being an important financial view it cannot be too often considered by our present and future financial committees, and by all the active politicians of these United States.

A foreign writer, in 1805, on the British debt, observes, that "the INCOME TAX of Mr. Pitt" (though not so unjust as the sponge of Mr. Hume)" was deemed the boldest measure ever tried in England, since the PUBLIC CREDIT of Britain had so far obtained throughout Europe, as to enable her to furnish the means of war by annual loans from the purses of her enemies!! As her BRISK CIRCULATIONS of the money obtained by these loans have greatly promoted the agriculture, the manufactures, and commerce of the country, and as these have greatly increased the number of BRITISH SEAMEN, THE PRINCIPAL DEFENSIVE STRENGTH OF THE COUNTRY, it is not surprising that the predicted destruction of the nation has hitherto failed; and small as the island of Britain may be, in comparison with the fertile territory of her warlike neighbours, their delenda est Britannia will never avail if the British administration should become more economical in their expenses, and leave foreign subsidies and possessions to nations who have less industry and less knowledge in the pacific arts of agriculture, manufactures and commerce. If a defensive naval war only was to be continued in future, annual loans for a less sum than the annual depreciation of all money, if added to the permanent taxes of Britain, would, with good economy, keep the British debt at the state in which it is at present, a good, an inestimable national bond, combining even the poor of the nation, who often hold from 10 to 50 pounds in the funds; these stockholders, being connected