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neglect the precautions and remedies his situation required; and he continued to perform his duty till approaching dissolution rendered farther exertion impossible. When no longer able to mount his horse, he was placed in a carriage, and conveyed to CorunThere he expired amid the universal regret of his fellow-soldiers; and his remains were deposited in a grave on the ramparts, near that of his commander.

na.

The campaign of Sir John Moore has perhaps given rise to greater differences of opinion than any other portion of the Spanish war. Almost every operation by which its progress was marked has been made to furnish matter for vehement and angry discussion. By one party, the combinations of the General have been indiscriminately lauded as a masterpiece of strategy; by another, the misfortunes of the army are considered to have solely originated in the vacillation and timidity of its leader. Friends have praised, enemies have abused, and both have at last rested in conclusions from which more unbiassed reasoners will probably feel inclined to dissent. The indiscriminating defenders of Sir John Moore are actuated by motives, generous though mistaken; his opponents, by somewhat more of personal and political prejudice, than can be made to comport with the character of disinterested and impartial inquirers after abstract truth.

But, thank heaven! party spirit is not eternal, though truth is. Twenty years have passed since the retreat to Corunna, and the time has at length come, when it is possible to write with strict justice and impartiality of Sir John Moore. In doing so, there is no fear of derogating from his just and wellearned reputation. The fame of Moore is not, as the injudicious eulogies of his friends would leave us to believe, a sickly and infirm bantling, which requires to be nursed and cockered into life by praise and puffery. The column of his honour rests, not

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[1809. on any single achievement of extraordinary genius, but on the broad pedestal of a life actively, zealously, and successfully devoted to his country's service, of a character marked by a singular combination of high and noble qualities, and of a death worthy of such a character and such a life.

Nothing, perhaps, can now be said of Sir John Moore's campaign which shall be found either new or original; and he who is neither influenced by the zeal of a partisan, nor the hostile vehemence of a declared opponent, may be expected rather to restrict both the praises and the censures of his predecessors within due limits, than to furnish novelty of thought or illustration, on topics which have so frequently been made the subject of ardent and copious discussion. This fact is undoubted, that, in the very outset of the campaign, Sir John Moore was placed by his government in a situation of difficulty, to which no General should be deliberately exposed. He was sent into Spain without any concerted scheme of operations, or the possibility of forming one. He was left utterly in the dark, with regard to the plans of the Spanish Government. He was without any organized channel of communication with the chiefs of the armies; and the fundamental assumption on which he had been directed to rely, was soon proved to be fallacious. He was not enabled to concentrate his forces under the protection of the Spanish armies on the Ebro. These were successively defeated; and Sir John Moore, before he could effect a junction with the divisions of Baird and Hope, found himself exposed to an enemy, who might at any moment take advantage of his situation and force him to retreat.

At Salamanca, therefore, Sir John Moore was surrounded on all hands by circumstances of peril. Yet part of his difficulties must be admitted to have proceeded from his own arrangements. Deceived by an imperfect survey of the roads in Portugal,

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while the infantry proceeded by Almeida, the cavalry and artillery were directed to advance by Merida and Truxillo; and the consequence was, that the difficulty of collecting his army was prodigiously enhanced, and Sir John Moore was compelled to remain above a month inactive at Salamanca. Precious time was thus lost. The thoughts of the General were bent only on retreat. The army did not move till the eleventh hour, and action was unfortunately delayed till the precise period when action could no longer be available.

Had Sir John Moore, when he first announced the resolution of retiring on Portugal, adhered steadily to his purpose, we know not that the measure, in a merely military point of view, could be held liable to censure. An army on certain calculations had been advanced into Spain. These, by a succession of unforeseen events, had been utterly nullified. The relative conditions of the hostile parties, which had formed the very basis of the measure, had undergone a sudden revolution. The Spanish forces had not only been defeated, but dispersed; and a retreat on Portugal might only be regarded as the withdrawal of an army from a point where its services could be of trifling avail, to another where it might operate with greater efficacy on the fortunes of the war.

But, in such a case, the measure of retreat cannot be regarded as an independent military operation. The moral influence it could not fail to exert must likewise be regarded. The Spanish nation would have considered it as a disgraceful dereliction of their cause. It would have depressed the spirit of the people; and thus would have operated injuriously in every quarter, where resistance was yet offered to the enemy. To that enemy it would have lent encouragement; nor do we think, in a comprehensive view of all the circumstances, the step would have admitted of vindication, unless it could be satisfactorily

1

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[1809. proved that the safety of the army imperiously demanded its adoption. It is in necessity alone that a full justification of retreat could be found; and it is by a reference to the existence or non-existence of such necessity, that its wisdom must be judged.

In this view of the question, it has been matter of regret to many, that Sir John Moore was not led to regard with a more favourable eye the project of defending Gallicia. No part of Spain offers equal advantages for a defensive war. Its natural strength is very great; and, by judiciously occupying its almost impracticable defiles, an army could maintain its ground against an enemy of immense numerical superiority. The geographical position of Gallicia is likewise highly favourable. By means of its numerous sea-ports, an easy and rapid intercourse, might be maintained with England. Protected by a strong frontier from the direct line of the enemy's operations, its proximity to it was still so great, as continually to endanger his communications. A victory achieved at any time by an army on the border of Gallicia, must have paralysed the operations of the enemy throughout the whole peninsula. The mere presence of a British force in that quarter must have prodigiously increased the difficulties of Napoleon. It would have demanded the continual employment of an army greatly superior, to watch its operations; it would have narrowed, cramped, and hampered the whole schemes of the enemy; it would have lent new spirit and vigour to the Spanish people; it would have constantly acted as a powerful diversion in favour of the Spanish armies in every part of the peninsula.

The documents given in the Appendix to Colonel Napier's history, abundantly prove that it was to this quarter that the anxieties of Napoleon were chiefly directed.* In the preceding campaign he

* Vide chap. 8, of the first volume, in which some extracts relative to this subject are given.

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repeatedly expresses his conviction that it was by the Gallician army alone that a blow could be struck by which Madrid might be endangered. In a communication, written under his dictation to Savary, he expresses his opinions on this matter very strongly. He declares that the occurrence of the smallest reverse to Marshal Bessieres-then commanding in Leon-would cut off the whole communications of the army, and even compromise its safety.

{

Dated.

Dec. 8.

Such being the importance of Gallicia, and such the extended influence which an army, posted on its frontier, must have exercised on the war in every part of the peninsula, it will probably, we think, to an impartial observer, appear extraordinary, that Sir John Moore, with this important province within his grasp, should never have adopted any serious measures for its occupation. That the subject was brought under his consideration, the following extract of a letter from Sir David Baird, will shew. "It has often occured to me," says that distinguished officer, "that in the event of our being obliged to adopt defensive measures, it might be more advantageous for the combined British army to cover Gallicia and part of Leon, than by my proceeding to join you at Salamanca, to abandon the defence of these provinces. The Asturias might be occupied by the troops of the Marques de la Romana, and, if you judged it proper, by a flank movement, to join us in the neighbourhood of Astorga, I entertain a confident belief that, by occupying the strong ground behind it, we should be able to cover the country in our rear, and might wait until it is seen what efforts the Spanish nation is disposed and determined to make in defence of the national independence. The royal road from Corunna to this place (Villa Franca) and Astorga is remarkably good, although mountainous; and, with the sea open to us, we should be able to receive with facility such reinforcements and supplies as the British