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Jan.] DESCRIPTION OF THE BRITISH POSITION. 59

ed himself averse from adopting this melancholy and disgraceful alternative; and, besides, was exceedingly doubtful whether any such proposal, if made, would be attended with success. Most fortunately, therefore, for his own fame, and most fortunately for the honour of the army he commanded, this degrading counsel was rejected,-and England was not destined to blush for her sons.

The enemy were now rapidly collecting on the Mero, and it became necessary that arrangements should be promptly made for the impending battle. The division of General Hope was directed to occupy a ridge on the left, commanding the road to Betanzos, and sloping with a gradual declivity towards Elvina. The post of Sir David Baird's division was on the right, extending from Elvina along the series of heights, which bent, in an oblique direction, towards the front, and terminated in a valley, which divided this range from another on the opposite side of the Vigo road. the rifle corps was ordered to form a chain across the valley. The reserve, under General Paget, was posted at Airis, a small village in rear of the centre.

The left flank of this position was well protected by the high banks of the Mero, but the right was weak; it rested on the village of Elvina, situated low down, at the extremity of the hills on which the front of the army was formed. To remedy this defect, the division of General Fraser was posted about half-amile in rear of the right, on some high ground commanding the road to Vigo. The artillery was disposed along the front of the line.

[Jan. 13.

During the whole of the thirteenth, Sir John Moore was occupied in making these dispositions. Having completed them, he returned to his quarters, and, writing his last despatch, directed Brigadier-General Stewart to proceed with it to England.

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THE TRANSPORTS ARRIVE FROM VIGO. [1809. On the fourteenth, the enemy commencJan. 14.] ed a cannonade on the left, which was returned by the British artillery, with such effect, that the French at last drew off their guns.

In the evening the transports from Vigo hove in sight.

On the heights, about a league distant from the town, was a powder-magazine, which it was deemed advisable to destroy. It contained about four thousand barrels of gunpowder, which had been brought from England some months before, and, by an unpardonable negligence, had been suffered to remain in store, while the Spanish armies were without ammunition! A few hundred barrels had, on the preceding day, been removed to Corunna-the remainNapier.] der was directed to be blown up. The explosion was tremendous. Corunna shook as if convulsed by an earthquake. Huge masses of rock were cast from their pedestals. The calm waters in the bay became furiously agitated. A vast column of smoke and dust arose perpendicularly and slowly to a great height, and then bursting with a roaring sound, a shower of stones, and fragments of all kinds, reverted to the earth, killing several persons who incautiously had remained too near to the scene of peril. A stillness, only interrupted by the lashing of the waves on the shore, succeeded-and the business of war went on.

On the arrival of the transports, preparations were immediately made for the embarkation of the army. With the exception of eight British, and four Spanish guns, the artillery was sent on board-the ground being considered unfavourable for its use. The dismounted cavalry and a few horses were likewise embarked, the remainder were shot.

The bridge of El Burgo having been repaired, two divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, passed the Mero, and, driving back the British outposts,

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Jan.]

POSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY

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marched into position. On the fifteenth, [Jan. 15. Delaborde's division followed, and took

post on the height of Portoso, forming the right of the army. The ground thus chosen by the enemy, was the ridge of rocky and irregular heights by which the British position was nearly encompassed. Their right was placed on the Betanzos and St. Jago roads, and their left rested on a hill covered with wood, overlooking the British line, of which, after some resistance from the light troops, they succeeded in gaining possession.

In the evening Colonel Mackenzie of the fifth, perceived two of the enemy's guns not far distant, and imagined that by a sudden attack he might surprise them. The attempt failed. Colonel Mackenzie was killed during the advance, and his party were driven back with loss.

During the night of the fifteenth, Marshal Soult succeeded in establishing a battery of eleven guns, on the wooded hill at the extremity of his left. This was an operation of great difficulty. The ground was rugged; the French were in possession of no road, and the horses were weak and exhausted. By great exertion, however, the object was accomplished; and the French thus acquired a decided superiority in point of artillery.

[Jan. 16.

The preparations for embarking were completed on the morning of the sixteenth, and Sir John Moore gave notice, that, in case the enemy should not move during the day, the embarkation of the reserve should commence at four o'clock. The tranquillity of the armies remained undisturbed till noon, when the General, mounting his horse, rode off to visit the outposts. He had not proceeded far, when he received a report from General Hope, stating that the enemy's line were getting under arms; and a deserter who came in at the same moment confirmed the intelligence. He spurred forward. The piquets had already opened fire on the VOL. II.

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