198

STATE OF SPAIN.

[1810.

CHAPTER X.

INVASION OF PORTUGAL BY MASSENA.

SINCE the commencement of the year, the campaign had hitherto been one of almost uninterrupted disaster. The Spaniards, had no army of any magnitude in the field; their most important fortresses were reduced or blockaded; and three-fourths of the kingdom had been overrun. The southern provinces had fallen, with scarcely the semblance of resistance. The wealth and resources of Andalusia had passed, without a struggle, into the hands of the enemy; and Spain beheld the chief nursery of her armies, the provinces from which fresh bands of patriots might still have gone forth to combat, if not to conquer, in her cause, at once torn from her grasp. The British army had been compelled to limit its exertions to the defence of Portugal; and it was already evident that a mighty effort would soon be made for the reduction of that kingdom.

Never at any period had the cloud which lowered on the cause of Spanish liberty shed a darker or more impenetrable gloom. Those whose confidence in the zeal, the devotion, the native and untamed energy of the Spanish people had led them to predict a successful termination to the contest, now wavered in their hope. The British government, urged by the enthusiasm of the people, had at first rushed blindfold into the contest. The vast resources of England had been ineffectually wasted;

April.]

PUBLIC FEELING IN ENGLAND.

199

her utmost efforts had been found unequal to arrest the progress of the French arms; and the lamentable expedition to the Scheldt, had exposed the counsels of her rulers to the ridicule of Europe.

Under such reverses, the enthusiasm of the British nation had begun to subside. The bright and glowing colours, which in their eyes had beautified the prospect, gradually faded into fainter and more sober hues. True, indeed, the voice of England was still for war; there was no flinching or faintness of heart among her sons, but it was not as heretofore, for sudden, desultory, and ill-judged operations,-for hasty advance and precipitate retreat-for profuse expenditure of blood and money in pursuit of " British objects,"-objects indeed, generally so truly British that no other government on earth would have thought them worth the expense and hazard of pursuit.

Thus the blunders and incapacity of the ministry had in a great measure lost them the confidence of the country. Even their warmer partisans-those who exonerated the men, did not venture to vindicate their measures. The government had to encounter a strong and vehement opposition both in Parliament and in the country. The policy of withdrawing our army from the Peninsula,-of husbanding the resources of England, till time and circumstances should be more favourable for their efficacious exertion, found many advocates among the greatest and most enlightened statesmen of whom England could boast.

But party spirit was abroad in its violence; and the doctrine of opposition, though generally salutary, was scarcely applicable to the crisis at which England had arrived. At all events it was carried too far. Pertinacity on one side had generated exaggeration on the other. Prudence is not a popular virtue; and the tame doctrine of temporary inaction, though supported by a considerable

200 REINFORCEMENTS CROSS THE PYRENEES. [1810.

body of the nation, was but little in harmony with the pugnacious appetite of the majority. The Whigs were distrusted and disliked; and many who condemned the ministry, were still anxious to retain them in power. In Parliament, a trial of strength took place on the debate on the Walcheren Expedition, and the Tories triumphed. The government, aware of the necessity of retrieving the disgrace of former failures, determined to prosecute the war with increased vigour. At the expense of nearly a million sterling, the Portuguese subsidiary force was augmented to thirty thousand men, and all the troops immediately disposable were sent out to augment the army of Lord Welling

ton.

In the meanwhile, strong reinforcements had crossed the Pyrenees, and the French at this period had a force in Spain, of not less than three hundred thousand men, distributed over the whole surface of the country; Gallicia, Valencia, and Murcia, being the only provinces which remained free. Had even half of this force been concentrated, there was nothing in the Peninsula which could oppose its progress; but the nature of the warfare waged by the Spaniards, required its subdivision into numerous small bodies, to maintain the subjection of the conquered provinces, and to scatter the irregular bands which occupied the mountain strong-holds, and rarely suffered an opportunity of successful action to escape. These objects were not to be accomplished without heavy and continual losses. The animosity of the people was working in silence the destruction of the invaders; and Napoleon, in a country which his leaders had represented as conquered, beheld his armies gradually melting, and his efforts rendered nugatory, by the silent operation of causes which he could neither mitigate nor control.

But the most prominent and immediate obstacle to the success of his projects, was the presence of a

May.]

MOVEMENTS OF LORD WELLINGTON.

201

British force in the Peninsula. Till the "Leopard should have been driven into the sea," a large army in Spain was required to watch its movements. The force thus employed could lend no aid towards the general object of extending and securing the submission of the people to French authority. Its efforts were necessarily directed to one single and paramount object; and till that had been accomplished, it was for all other purposes entirely useless.

Lord Wellington, therefore, at once perceived that the force at his disposal was not strong enough for offensive operations; and he knew, besides, that the loss attendant even on a victory, might be ruinous in its consequences. Determined to abandon the Peninsula only in the last extremity, he waited therefore the approach of the enemy, prepared to take advantage of every circumstance which might contribute to his security, and enable him to baffle the powerful efforts of a superior enemy.

In the beginning of May, Lord Wellington was apprized of some movements in the French army, which indicated their intention of advancing against Ciudad Rodrigo. He accordingly moved towards the frontier, establishing his head-quarters at Celorico, and his divisions at Pinhel, Alverca, Guarda, Trancoso, and along the valley of the Mondego, as far as Cea; and on the opposite bank of that river, at Fornos, Mangualde, and Vizeu. The corps of Sir Rowland Hill remained in the neighbourhood of Abrantes, to check any operation on the part of Regnier. In this position Lord Wellington determined to watch the movements, and await the approach of the enemy.

During the long period of tranquillity which had elapsed, both parties had been engaged in great and important preparations.* Under command of Mas

* At this period a change took place in the organization of the French armies. The first, fourth, and fifth corps, which had invaded

202 STRENGTH OF THE HOSTILE ARMIES. [1810.

sena, perhaps the most celebrated of the great captains of Napoleon, a powerful army was assembling for the invasion of Portugal. It consisted of the corps of Marshals Ney and Junot, and of General Regnier; while the corps of Mortier threatened an advance on the frontier of Alentejo. Besides these, General Montiniere was at Valladolid, with nine thousand infantry and four regiments of cavalry; and to give still greater importance to this imposing demonstration, a strong body of the Imperial Guard crossed the Pyrenees, and the remainder was held in readiness to follow,-circumstances conveying a strong intimation that Napoleon intended to assume the personal command. On his side, Lord Wellington directed the works of Almeida and Abrantes to be strengthened and repaired, and determined to obstruct the progress of the enemy by every means in his power. Though anxious as long as possible to prevent the tide of war from rolling onward from the frontier, he had determined, on the advance of the enemy, to fall back on his resources, and thus to add materially to the difficulties of his opponent, by compelling him to weaken his force in the occupation of distant provinces, and extend the line of his communications through a hostile country.

The numerical force of the hostile armies may be thus calculated :

British and Portuguese Army. The corps with Lord Wellington,

30,000 The corps with Lieutenant-General Hill, 14,000

Carried over,

44,000

Andalusia, formed the army of the south, and was commanded by Soult, having under him Victor, Sebastiani, and Mortier.

The army of the centre, under the immediate orders of Joseph, was composed of the Royal Guard, of several corps which had been raised in his service, and of the French garrisons within the district allotted for its occupation.

The army of Portugal consisted of the second, sixth, and eighth corps, under the command of Massena.