178 CONDUCT OF THE SUPREME JUNTA. [1809.

itself, observed Samaniego, had given way before the constancy of the Geronans. It may be added, that brass will be found less durable than the tribute which shall be paid, by all noble and generous spirits, to the heroism and devotion of these intrepid patriots.

After the battle of Ocana, the Central Junta displayed little of that energy which, on former occasions, had contributed to bear them through increasing difficulties. They endeavoured to conceal from the nation the full extent of their misfortunes. The discovery of a conspiracy for a change of government contributed yet more to their alarm. They knew themselves to have become unpopular with the nation. Libels were poured forth on them in all quarters ; and the chief efforts of the Junta were directed rather to the maintenance of their own precarious authority, than to any measures of effective resistance to the enemy.

Yet for such measures the time imperatively called. The enemy threatened Andalusia; and it was evident that by nothing but a rapid and vigorous concentration of the national efforts could his projects be successfully opposed. Under these circumstances, the Junta issued proclamations to the people, couched in the same high tone of chivalrous patriotism which had formerly produced so animating an effect. But it was already apparent that the nation had lost confidence in the government. The Provincial Juntas had in many places resumed their authority; and Spain was probably on the verge of relapsing into the state of confusion from which the formation of the Central Junta had delivered it, when the progress of the enemy put a stop to these intestine dissensions.

So unpopular indeed had the Junta become, that no officer of reputation would consent to serve under them. In Gallicia, the Conde de Noronha had already reared the standard of rebellion. Romana, to

Dec.]

CONDUCT OF THE SUPREME JUNTA.

179 whom the chief command of the armies had been offered, declined its acceptance. The Duke del Albuquerque, who commanded a corps of about twelve thousand in Estramadura, was an object of fear and jealousy to the Junta. Castanos was in disgrace at Algesiras; and the chief command in Andalusia, at a crisis so important, was, almost from necessity, intrusted to the imbecile Arisaigo. Worse placed it could not be.

THE year had closed in Spain triumphantly for the French arms, as it had commenced. The Spanish armies had sustained a series of unparalleled defeats. The British had retired into Portugal; and the efforts of Lord Wellington, were, for the present, limited to the defence of that kingdom. England had wasted her resources in a fruitless and ill-judged expedition to the Isle of Walcheren, where disease had done the work of the sword. A triumphant peace had been concluded with Austria; and the whole of the immense forces of the French empire were thus disposable for the reduction of Spain.

At Paris, Napoleon, in a speech to the senate, recounted the triumphs of the year, and intimated his intention of returning to Spain, to complete the conquest already almost achieved. "When I shall shew myself beyond the Pyrenees," said he, in metaphor somewhat staled by frequent repetition," the frightened Leopard will fly to the ocean to avoid shame, defeat, and death. The triumph of my arms will be the triumph of the genius of good over that of evil, -of moderation, order, and morality, over civil war, anarchy, and the evil passions!"

The war minister reported, that, of the conscriptions already decreed, there still remained eighty thousand men uncalled into service. Of these, thirty-six thousand were to be immediately embodied.

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PROSPECTS OF THE ALLIES.

181

Thirty thousand men, collected at Bayonne, were ready to repair the casualties which had diminished the French armies in Spain; and an additional force of twenty-five thousand, raised from the conscription of the year following, would be at the disposal of the Emperor.

Such was the threatening aspect of affairs at the commencement of eighteen hundred and ten. Yet Lord Wellington did not despair of the cause in which he had embarked. When he entered Spain, but a few months before, he had done so in co-operation with an army of considerable strength, against a comparatively small and extended body of the enemy. Since that period, the Spanish armies had been routed and dispersed; and, whatever ideas he might have previously formed, it was now evident, that neither the talents of their leaders, nor the character of the troops, gave any prospect of vigorous and effective resistance to the progress of the enemy. But Lord Wellington likewise knew, that the security of Spain did not depend on the conduct of her armies, that an indomitable spirit of hostility was abroad among her people,-that a desultory but destructive war was carrying on in all her provinces,— and that the expense of life, at which the French maintained their hold on the country, was one which could not fail gradually to enfeeble the invaders, and call for a succession of efforts, of such magnitude, as France, in the precarious state of Europe, might soon be unable to support.

In the meantime, it was obvious that defensive war was the only one which could be waged with any prospect of success. It was the policy of England to protract the contest; to lead the enemy to divide his forces by distracting his attention, and thus to subject him to the full operation of that petty but pervading hostility which was ever wasting his numbers. For the present, therefore, Lord Wellington determined to confine his efforts to the deVOL. II.

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SOULT ENTERS

ANDALUSIA :

[1810. fence of Portugal, yet to stand prepared on the occurrence of more favourable circumstances, again to widen the sphere of his operations, and advance into Spain.

On crossing the Tagus, he moved his head-quarters to Vizeu; and the army went into cantonments, extending from Coimbra Pinhel, while the corps of General Hill remained at Abrantes and its neighbourhood. In this position, the troops remained for some time inactive, in order to recover the effects of the preceding campaign, and the sickness which had been engendered by the unhealthy station to which they had subsequently removed.

At this period, Marshal Soult, with an army of about fifty thousand men, was preparing to advance into Andalusia. The Junta, blind to the approaching danger, felt secure that the giant range of the Sierra Morena would oppose an impenetrable barrier to the progress of the enemy. The passes of these mountains had been fortified with care, and a force of about twenty thousand men, under Arisaigo, was posted for their defence. But on the twentieth of January, the pass of Despena Perros was Jan. 20.] forced, with but little resistance from the troops, whose spirit was depressed by the remembrance of Ocana. In order to distract the attention of Arisago, Soult divided his army into three columns, which advanced simultaneously on the three principal debouches of the Sierra. The right, under Victor, by Almaden; the centre, under Mortier, by the road from Madrid; the left, under Sebastiani, by Villa Nueva. Several mines had been placed by the Spaniards at the narrow parts of the defile, but the explosion of these produced little effect. On Jan. 29.] the twenty-first, Soult's head-quarters were at Baylen; and, on the twenty-ninth, the corps of Victor effected its junction with the army before Seville.

In Seville-where, till now, nothing had been heard