14 HE REQUESTS The opinion of Mr. FRERE [1808.

in rallying the remains of Blake's army, at a distance of about two hundred miles. Naturally distrustful of the apocryphal intelligence transmitted by the British military residents, he could rely only on the reports of Colonel Graham and Captain Whittingham; and these, in conjunction with the information which his own officers were enabled to procure, contributed still further to deepen the gloom by which his mind was overcast.

Nov. 27.]

It was in such circumstances, and under the influence of such feelings, that Sir John Moore wrote to Mr. Frere, the new minister at Madrid, whose opinions he had been instructed to receive with deference and attention, proposing as a question what course he should pursue, in case the army of Castanos, which yet shewed front to the enemy, should be defeated. Should that event occur, must," said Sir John Moore, in a letter dated twenty-seventh November, "either march upon Madrid, and throw myself into the heart of Spain, and thus run all risks, and share the fortunes of the Spanish nation; or I must fall back on Portugal. In the latter case, I fall back upon my resources, upon Lisbon; cover a country where there is a British interest; act as a diversion in favour of Spain, if the French detach a force against me; and am ready to return to the assistance of the Spaniards, should circumstances again render it eligible."

On the day following the date of this communication, intelligence arrived for which Sir John Moore was certainly not unprepared. Castanos had been defeated at Tudela with great loss, and the road to Madrid was now open to the French armies. In this state of things, without waiting for the answer of Mr. Frere, Sir John Moore determined on immediate retreat. With this intention, he transmitted orders to Sir David Baird at Astorga, and Sir John Hope at the Escurial. The former of these officers was directed to retire on Corunna, the latter to push for

Nov.] AS TO WHAT MEASURES HE SHOULD FOLLOW. 15

ward, if possible, to Salamanca. Sir David Baird was likewise directed to write immediately to England, that a supply of transports might be sent to the Tagus. "They will be wanted," said Sir John Moore; "for when the French have Spain, Portugal cannot be defended."

Having thus formed his decision, the Commanderin-Chief directed a Council of General Officers to assemble at head-quarters. He laid before them a full statement of the intelligence he had received, and made known the resolution which it had induced him to adopt. His tone was manly and decided. He informed the generals that he had not called them together to request their counsel, or to influence them to commit themselves by giving any opinion on the course he had determined to pursue. He took the responsibility entirely upon himself; and he only required that they would immediately take measures for carrying the plan into effect.

When the resolution of their General was made known to the army, it was received by all ranks with more than murmurs of dissatisfaction and disgust. The British army had suffered no disaster; it had never been brought into contact with the enemy; and all felt that to retreat with untried prowess from the scene of contest, would fix a tarnish on our arms, and, by diminishing the confidence of the Spanish nation in our zeal and devotion to their cause, would proportionally contribute to strengthen and consolidate the power of the usurper. Even the personal Staff of Sir John Moore did not attempt to conceal their dissatisfaction at the adoption of a system so adverse to their hopes. All lamented the order for retreat, all felt that it must cast a blight on that cause which they were prepared to defend by the outpouring of their blood. In his reply to the letter of Sir John Moore, Mr. Frere protested strongly against the measure of retiring on Portugal. He assured him it was one most deeply deprecated by the Spanish govern

16

SIR JOHN MOORE PERSISTS [1808.

ment. He urged the expediency of advancing to cooperate in the defence of Madrid, by every argument in his power. "Of the zeal and energy of the people," said Mr. Frere, "I have no doubt. The government are new, and have been hitherto too numerous to be very active; but I trust that this inconvenience will soon be remedied. They are resolute; and I believe every man of them determined to perish with the country. They will not, at least, set the example which the ruling powers, and higher orders of other countries have exhibited of weakness and timidity." In case, however, the arguments which he most emphatically urged for an advance on Madrid, should not to Sir John Moore appear sufficiently conclusive to authorize the adoption of the measure, Mr. Frere suggested the alternative of taking up a position in the strong country around Astorga. "A retreat from Astorga to Corunna," said the minister, "would be less difficult than through Portugal to Lisbon; and we ought, in that position, to wait for the reinforcements of cavalry from England, which would enable the army to act in the flat country which opens immediately from that point, and extends through the whole of Leon and Old Castile.”

The arguments of Mr. Frere did not succeed in changing the opinions of Sir John Moore. He still adhered to the resolution he had previously formed, and only awaited the arrival of Sir John Hope, to commence his retreat on Portugal. This general, when within sixty miles of Salamanca, had been compelled to make a considerable detour in order to avoid the enemy.

In the meantime, the Supreme Junta had despatched two Spanish generals to the head-quarters of the British army, in order to concert with its commander an united plan of operations. These missionaries corroborated the exaggerated statements of Mr. Frere with regard to the strength of the Spanish ar mies. They asserted that they were undismayed and

Nov.]

IN HIS RESOLUTION.

17

increasing every hour; and that General San Juan was in possession of the pass of Somosierra, which he had fortified so strongly, as to render abortive all the enemy's hopes of reaching Madrid. Unfortunately for the credit of the generals, Colonel Graham had just arrived with intelligence that the pass had been already gained by the French. Sir John Moore was filled with perhaps merited contempt for their ignorance and weakness of character, and on that account felt less disposed to accede to their solicitations. that he would form a junction with Romana, and thereby create a diversion favourable to the defence of the capital.

At the head of the Junta, was Don Thomas Morla, who had formerly succeeded Solano as Governor of Cadiz, and now exercised the chief influence at Madrid. The conduct of this man has been attributed to treason; of which the subsequent surrender of Madrid is considered-not uncolourably-as the overt consummation. It has been supposed, therefore, that his object at this period was, by false representations, to draw the British army nearer to the capital, and thus to throw them into the hands of the French. On a review of the whole circumstances, however, we think the imputation unwarranted by proof. The truth we take to be, that Morla was a cold, unprincipled, and selfish man, not unwilling to resist, while resistance did not compromise his own safety, but ready to join the victors, whenever adverse circumstances should threaten to involve his own in the wreck of his country's interests. But even though acquitted of previous treason, enough of infamy will be connected with his name. His acceptance of service under the intruder admits of no palliation; and he will stand recorded as a man whose conduct is irreconcilable with honour or patriotism, and whose base desertion of a noble cause marks him as unworthy to have ever been numbered among its assertors.

VOL. II.

2*

18 LETTERS OF MORLA AND CASTELFRANCO. [1808.

Dec. 5.]

From this person, and from the Prince of Castel-franco, Sir John Moore received, on the fifth of December, a joint letter, informing him that about twenty-five thousand men of the army of Castanos were falling back on Madrid; that ten thousand from the Somosierra were likewise concentrating; and that nearly forty thousand other troops were prepared to join in the defence of the capital. With these forces Sir John Moore was strongly invited to unite his army, or else to take such a direction as would enable him to fall on the rear of the French. "The Junta," concluded the letter, "cannot doubt that the rapidity of your Excellency's movements will be such as the interests of both countries require."

Before Sir John Moore had made any decision on the contents of this letter, Colonel Charmilly, a French emigrant in the British service, arrived with despatches from Mr. Frere. On the first of December, Charmilly had been in Madrid. He had witnessed the strongest and most unequivocal demonstrations of ardour among all classes of the people. The whole mass of the population was rising in arms; the streets were broken up, houses barricaded, and peasants from all quarters were flocking into the city, to bear part in the defence. The Duke del Infantado had commissioned him to make known this state of things to the British general, and to intreat him to make some movement that might operate as a diversion for the capital, which its defenders had determined to hold out to the last extremity.

In passing Talavera, to which place the Junta and Mr. Frere had retired, the latter strongly enforced the same considerations, and intrusted Charmilly with a letter to Sir John Moore, urging him to relinquish the resolution of retreat. In case, however, this letter should prove ineffectual, he gave Charmilly another, to be delivered only in the event of the General still persisting in his determination,