Aug.] WELLESLEY FALLS BACK ON BADAJOS.

163

egas was unfortunately induced again to advance, and give battle to the corps of Sebastiani at Almonacid. This engagement, though many of the Spanish troops behaved with great gallantry, terminated in the complete defeat of the [Aug. 11. army of Vanegas. It was driven to the Sierra Morena, with the loss of all its baggage and artillery.

With this action terminated the campaign which had been undertaken for the relief of Madrid, and the expulsion of the enemy from the central provinces of Spain. The British army at Xaraicejo, still served as a shield to the southern provinces, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, (whom the gratitude of his country had now ennobled,) considered it of importance to maintain the position he then occupied. But the total failure of supplies rendered this impossible, and about the twentieth of August he fell back [Aug. 20. through Merida on Badajos, in the neighbourhood of which he established his army. At this period all operations in concert ceased between the English and Spanish armies. The Supreme Junta complained bitterly of the retreat of the former, which left the road to Seville and Cadiz open to the enemy, while the Marquis Wellesley, then ambassador in Spain, made strong representations of the privations to which the British army had been exposed, by the inattention and neglect of the authorities. In the correspondence which ensued, it appeared that the measure of retreat had been forced on Lord Wellington, by the absolute impossibility of supporting his army in the ground he occupied; and that so far from shewing a contemptuous disregard of the wishes of the Junta, it was in compliance with their earnest entreaty that he had retained his army in the neighbourhood of Badajos, notwithstanding the well-known unhealthiness of the situation.

By these unpleasant discussions, however, a spirit of temporary estrangement was generated between

164

OBSERVATIONS ON ITS POLICY. [1809.

the nations, and jealousies were excited which could not fail to operate injuriously on the interests of the

common cause.

Thus ended the campaign. Of its policy we shall say little, because, in truth, little remains to be said. The calculations of the allied Generals appear throughout to have been founded on principles radically vicious, and it seems impossible that any permanent and important benefit could, under the most favourable circumstances, have resulted from the execution of a project so rash and precarious. Fortunately there was no concert in the operations of the adverse Generals. The battle of Talavera was fought by the enemy, in utter recklessness and ignorance of the advantages they possessed. Had Lord Wellington been induced to proceed another march towards Madrid, and had the advance of Soult been accelerated by a single day, the retreat of the British army would have been cut off, and the most fatal consequences must have ensued.

In all the details of the campaign, however, abstracted from the error of its general conception, we find the same skill, promptitude, and unhesitating self-reliance, by which the character of Lord Wellington has been uniformly marked. The ground which he selected to receive the enemy's attack was admirably chosen. His manœuvres during the battle were those of a great general, at once perceiving and preserving the full advantages of his situation. His subsequent determination of attacking Soult, while Cuesta should keep Victor in check, was one which could have originated only in a mind of the highest energy and vigour. All these things are admirable; yet it may be safely asserted, that but a small part of Lord Wellington's military reputation, will be found eventually to rest on the campaign of Talavera.

Oct.]

CHARACTER OF CUESTA.

165

CHAPTER VIII.

OPERATIONS OF THE SPANISH ARMIES.

THE uttter incapacity of Cuesta had been strongly represented to the Spanish government, and that officer was at length removed from his command. He was a man of strong passions and of narrow mind, who too often mistook rashness for courage, obstinacy for firmness, and procrastination for prudence. Buoyed up under every reverse by the most overweening self-confidence, he was disqualified, by narrow bigotry of opinion, from profiting even by the dear-bought lessons of experience. His measures uniformly failed, because they were uniformly adopted on the dictates of temporary impulse, rather than of any patient calculation of probabilities. Yet with all his defects, Cuesta was a man of upright intentions and untarnished honour. While too many of his associates were disposed to truckle to the usurper, Cuesta trod steadily in the path of patriotism and honour. He adhered to the cause of his country through every misfortune; and the sincerity of the zeal with which he laboured to promote its success, has never, we believe, been questioned by friend or enemy.

[October.

On the retirement of Cuesta, the command of his army was assumed by General Eguia, who, in conjunction with Vanegas, could bring into the field an army of about fifty thousand men. Blake, after his defeat at Belchite, had only been able to re-assemble a corps of about six thousand men, with which

166

POSITION OF THE ARMIES.

[1809. his main object was to relieve Gerona. There were in Gallicia about fifteen thousand men, under Noronha, but without cavalry or artillery. The Duke del Parque had nine thousand, at Ciudad Rodrigo.

Such was the disposition and strength of the Spanish armies. The disposable force of the French amounted to about one hundred and twenty-five thousand men, exclusive of garrisons. Of these about thirty-five thousand were occupied in Arragon and Catalonia; the remainder were in the two Castilles and Estramadura. Ney's head-quarters were at Salamanca; and part of his corps was stationed at Ledesma and Alba de Tormes. Soult's were at Placentia ; and he occupied Coria, Galesteo, and the banks of the Tietar and the Tagus, to the bridge of Arzobisbo. The corps of Mortier was at Talavera, Oropesa, and Naval Moral. Victor's headquarters were at Toledo, his advanced posts at Daymiel. The corps of Sebastiani extended from Aranjuez to Alcala. Marshal Jourdan had been recalled, and Soult appointed Major-General of the armies. This appointment gave offence to Ney, who, in consequence, solicited leave to quit the army; and the command of his corps was assumed by General Marchand.

It was in this state of things, when the enemy had a force of above seventy thousand men immediately disposable for its defence, that the Junta adopted the insane project of advancing on Madrid, with the armies of Vanegas and Eguia. The former leader had been superseded by General Arisaigo, a very young man, without talent or experience; and to this person the command of this perilous enterprize was entrusted. In Arisaigo the Supreme Junta calculated on finding a submissive instrument of their schemes; and by these wretched calculators it was thought possible, by a rapid advance, to gain possession of the capital, and thus to

Nov.]

Nov.]

ARISAIGO ADVANCES ON MADRID.

167

strike a signal blow, by which the grasp of the invader would at once be loosened.

Without any communication with Lord Wellington, therefore, and without concerting any combined movement with the other armies, Arisaigo put his force in motion against the capital. The French were unprepared for the suddenness of this advance; and Latour Maubourg, who commanded a considerable body of horse at Madrilejos, on learning that the Spaniards were entering the town, with difficulty effected his escape. The Spanish army were successful in several skirmishes; and on the six[Nov. 16. teenth of November Arisaigo reached Santa Cruz de la Zorza, where he encamped his army on the heights.

On receiving intelligence of this movement, Joseph Buonaparte immediately advanced with the main body of his forces to bring the enemy to battle. In order to deceive the Spanish General, the French at first made demonstrations of acting only on the defensive; but Arisaigo, learning that a large force had assembled at Toledo, on his flank, became alarmed at the peril of his situation, and marched towards Ocana, in order to occupy the great road from Seville to Aranjuez. In the neighbourhood of that town he was attacked on the day following, by the army under Joseph.

Arisaigo waited his approach in a position of which the town of Ocana formed the centre. The country being flat, his wings were without support, the right terminating in an olive-grove, the left extending across the road from Aranjuez. The town was covered by a ravine which ran along its front. The artillery, consisting of about sixty pieces, was chiefly disposed in batteries on the right and left; and the cavalry were formed in a body, a little in advance of the right flank. The second line was posted so near to the first, that, in case of the latter