Sessions made an order, and the magistrate afterwards issued a warrant of commitment. These facts may be controverted (1). LORD DENMAN, Ch. J.: We are of opinion that you cannot go into a statement as to other facts.) The articles and depositions do not properly appear to have been sworn. The whole should have been headed, "A., B., and C. swear, and each for himself and herself swears." Or, if, without such heading, they make separate depositions, each ought to have a distinct jurat. Here one general jurat is given, "sworn by the several deponents above named " &c.; and there is nothing to connect the depositions with each other or with the articles. Taken apart, none appears to be sworn. Perjury could not be assigned on any. The articles now returned differ from those exhibited. Interlineations have been made. (LORD DENMAN, Ch. J.: We can look only at what is returned.) The articles are, in substance, insufficient. "Surety of the peace is grantable," according to Hawkins (2), "wherever a person has just cause to fear that another will burn his house, or do him a corporal hurt, as by killing, or beating him, or that he will procure others to do him such mischief"; and the justice "is bound to grant it, upon the party's giving him satisfaction upon oath that he is actually under such fear; and that he has just cause to be so, by reason of the other's having threatened to beat him, or lain in wait for that purpose." No such reason is suggested here for expecting any injury of the kind. The law requires that some threat should have been used; mere apprehension is not sufficient; the grounds of it should appear. The precedents, in such cases, show acts of violence towards the exhibitant, and reasons for expecting further violence. And the menace should be of something which, if carried into effect, would be a breach of the peace. Here, nothing like a threat is stated, and the acts complained of amount to no more than annoyance, which is not a ground of fear. (Following up this argument, he proceeded to comment on the several (1) Sir fully, 12 R. R. 317 (13 East, 171, m.). See Leonard Watson's case, 48 R. R. 659 (9 Ad. & El. 731, 787). (2) Hawk. P. C. 5, Book 1, c. 60, s. 6, 7th ed. statements in the articles.) Any letters relied upon as a ground of the application should be fully set out, as would be done in moving for a criminal information for provoking, by letter, to a breach of the peace. The party now applying has already been imprisoned upon articles of the peace, not materially differing from those since exhibited ; few circumstances only are now added. From that imprisonment he was discharged by habeas corpus; and, therefore, his present detention is contrary to stat. 31 Car. II. c. 2, s. 6, which forbids, after discharge by habeas corpus, recommitting the party for the same alleged offence, " any colourable pretence or variation in the warrant or warrants of commitment notwithstanding." The order of Sessions is irregular. That Court has not jurisdiction to bind a party to appear at the next General or Quarter Sessions for the county after the expiration of two years. The order does not state a time from which the two years are to And it was made without hearing the defendant. run. The COURT then said that they doubted if the grounds for apprehending injury were sufficiently set forth in the articles, and desired to hear the counsel supporting the return, on this point. Sir J. Campbell, Attorney-General, Bodkin, and M. Chambers, The Court of Quarter Sessions appears by the articles to have had jurisdiction, and has decided that Miss Coutts had reason to apprehend personal injury. That decision cannot be reviewed here. If the Sessions exceed their jurisdiction, the remedy is to bring up the order by certiorari, and quash it; but, where there is no excess, this Court cannot interfere. The articles in this case, however, showed a good ground for the order. Justices of the peace, by their commission, are to cause to come before them "all those who to any one or more of our people concerning their bodies or the firing of their houses, have used threats, to find sufficient security for the peace or their good behaviour, towards us and our people " (2). But the threats need not be by word of mouth; they may be by conduct; and conduct may have a different effect in different cases, according to the age, sex, or condition of the party, or to other (1) November 5th. Before the same Judges. (2) 5 Burn's Just. 4, tit. Justices of the Peace II., ed. D'Oy. & Wms. 3 REG. v. DUNN. [ *611 ] [ *612 ] circumstances; as, the party complained of being known or a stranger. This view of the law is consistent with the passage quoted on the other side from Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 60, s. 6. If the conduct complained of tends to a breach of the peace, the case for interference arises; the magistrate is not to wait for an actual breach. His duty on this point lies, according to Dalton (Dalt. Just. cap. 3), "in preventing the breach of the peace (wisely foreseeing and repressing the beginnings thereof) by taking surety for the keeping of it, or for the good behaviour of the offenders, as the case shall require." A party exhibits articles quia timet. (COLERIDGE, J.: You must contend that the binding by a single justice, as well as by the Sessions, is conclusive.) Willes v. Bridger (1) shows that it is. (COLERIDGE, J.: It was not necessary to decide the point there, because the warrant was held valid.) One magistrate bound over in Rex v. Tregarthen (2); it was contended before this Court (on motion for a certiorari) that the words which he had treated as a threat were used metaphorically; but PARKE, J. said, "the magistrate having, in the exercise of his discretion, thought that there was ground for requiring the defendant to enter into recognisances to keep the peace, this Court cannot interfere." And the rule was refused. (COLERIDGE, J.: If this Court could not interfere either on certiorari or on habeas corpus, there would be no remedy in such a case, however gross the error might be.) The order, if wholly irregular, might be treated as a *nullity. (COLERIDGE, J.: In Rex v. Tregarthen (2) the Court went farther than was absolutely necessary, because the words, taken in one point of view, did afford ground for requiring sureties. But suppose there had been none. Instances are given in the books in which articles cannot be exhibited, as where the threat is not against a party himself, but against his servant or property. Suppose that appeared upon the articles, the complainant nevertheless (2) 39 R. R. 619 (5 B. & Ald. 678). (1) 20 R. R. 434 (2 B. & Ald. 278). swearing that he was in fear of bodily injury; or suppose, in this case, the only ground of fear stated had been the waving a handkerchief.) If the Sessions did not exceed their jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case, there would be no remedy, unless the magistrates were shown to have acted malâ fide. The case is like many others in which an inferior Court has power to decide conclusively, as on commitments for contempt. The finding of such a Court on a matter of fact within its jurisdiction cannot be interfered with. (COLERIDGE, J.: The jurisdiction here is limited to the case of certain threats; none have been used; but a threat is to be inferred; can the Sessions, by drawing such an inference, from whatever facts, give themselves a jurisdiction not to be interfered with ?) If a phrase is ambiguous, they are to judge of it; and they have judged accordingly of the passage from a letter, set out in these articles. In Rex v. Holloway (1), where sureties of the peace had been required by magistrates out of Sessions, application was made to Taunton, J. in the Bail Court to remove the proceedings, that the amount of sureties might be reduced; but the learned Judge said, "if the proceedings were before the Court, *there seemed no power to reduce the amount of the security required by the magistrates; they were the conservators of the peace, and the amount of the security which the defendant was to find was in their discretion. The Court could not interfere to control that discretion." (COLERIDGE, J. referred to Rex v. Bringloe (2).) There, upon an ambiguous expression in the articles, this Court held the charge sufficient; but the articles appear to have been exhibited in this Court. No precedent is shown for an application of this kind, after the allowance of articles of the peace by justices; yet, if this Court had had power to review their decision in such cases, precedents would not have been wanting. (COLERIDGE, J.: An analogous proceeding to that of binding to the peace is the taking surety for good behaviour, which it appears that justices are empowered to do by stat. 34 Edw. III. c. 1, on indictment or suspicion. But their discretion in that case must (1) 2 Dowl. P. C. 525. (2) 12 R. R. 316, n. (13 East, 174, n.). REG. V. DUNN. [ *614 ] REG. v DUNN. [ 615] be exercised according to law, and on good cause of suspicion and whether the cause be such or not the judges of this Court are to decide: Rudyard's case (1).) As to the want of a jurat, the Court, looking at the documents returned to the certiorari, will now presume omnia ritè acta. (LORD DENMAN, Ch. J.: You need not consider that question. If there had been no depositions and no jurat, the exhibition of articles would be sufficient. There would be no difficulty in framing an indictment for perjury: and, as to the jurat, the swearing might be proved aliundè.) Then, even supposing that this were not a case already adjudicated upon by the Sessions, but an original application, the articles are sufficient in substance. (They then commented upon the facts set forth in the articles, and relied particularly on the words extracted from a letter of defendant, "If you refuse this request, you will, when it is too late, repent a course, the consequences of which will sooner or later fall on yourself and your family.") (COLERIDGE, J.: Do the articles refer to the statements in the depositions, so as to show that the facts stated in those were known to the exhibitant, and tended to excite her bodily fear?) That is, in substance, shown; and, if it were not, the justices might take into consideration the articles coupled with the depositions. The exhibitant states that she is in bodily fear, and the depositions support that statement by showing reason for the fear. The COURT said that they would consider the case with reference to the sufficiency of the articles; and that, if they found them sufficient, the defendant (who said he had further objections to make) might conclude his argument. Cur. adv. vult. LORD DENMAN, Ch. J., in the same Term (November 9th), delivered the judgment of the COURT: Articles of the peace having been exhibited before the Court of Quarter Sessions for this county by Miss Coutts, against Richard Dunn, and that Court having required him to find sureties to keep (1) 2 Ventr. 22. See judgment of TYRREL, J. |