in existence by continual prorogations and adjournments for a period of seventeen years, which was the longest Parliament which ever existed. The prorogation of Parliament at the convenience of the Crown had now become an established practice. If a Parliament was insubordinate it was either immediately dissolved, or it was prorogued from year to year without being summoned; while, on the other hand, if it did the king's bidding it was retained in favour and might count on a long tenure. With penal dissolutions on the one side, and royal favours on the other, it is easy to see what would be the result. Under this process of manipulation Parliament lost all sense of self-respect, and became the mere instrument in the hands of the sovereign for the attainment of his own ends. At length it became apparent that if something more than the shadow of a Parliament was to be preserved, some effort must be made to curb the royal power and compel the sovereign to summon Parliament at regular periods. It was hardly to be expected that the Commons would take the initiative in this matter, however, as they were to a far greater extent under court influence than the Lords. It was accordingly left to the Lords to bring in a measure for this purpose, and they were strongly supported in their action by the people out of doors. On the 16th of January,

1692, the Lords introduced a Triennial Bill, rapidly passed it through all its stages, and sent it to the Commons. Here it encountered violent opposition from the placemen and court party in the House, ostensibly because the measure had emanated from the Lords, but really because it provided for the early dissolution of the existing Parliament. Sir Charles Sedley, who opposed the bill, said :—“It is argued we are the people's ambassadors, or attorneys, as others say; and they ought to have power to change us, if they find we act contrary to the nature of the trust reposed in us, or are corrupted to a court interest, that they are any way dissatisfied with our prudence or integrity; and therefore be it enacted that a new Parliament shall be chosen every three years. Truly I cannot see any security for the people against an ill Parliament in this act. . . . But my main objection," he continues, "lies against the clause which requires the dissolution of this present Parliament, by an act of the legislative power." Goodwell opposed the measure because "the dissolution of the present Parliament is to revive animosities in new elections, and punish the king, by making it not his grace to call a Parliament." Sir Edward Seymour, Sir John Lowther, Sir Joseph Tredenham, Mr. Finch and others objected to the bill as coming from the Lords, or as being an interference with the

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prerogative of the Crown. The principal speakers in favour of the bill were Mr. Harley, Mr. Pelham, Colonel Titus and Mr. Herbert. Mr. Harley said that " "a standing Parliament can never be a true representative. Men are much altered after being sometime here, and are not the same men as sent up." Mr. Pelham said, "A present member of this House, and also of the Pensioner Parliament, told me that he by order paid pensions to thirty members in that House. The like by a long sitting may be done again." Colonel Titus said, "I never saw long Parliaments good ones. A picture now drawn may be like the person it represents; but in time the colours will fade, and it so alter from itself, that no one can know what it represents. If we would have a picture like, it must be new drawn." Mr. Herbert defended the dissolution clause, and said he "would rather have a standing army than a standing Parliament." The bill was ultimately carried by a majority of 200 to 164, but was vetoed by the king.

A bill for the same purpose was introduced the following session into the Commons, but as there was no serious attempt made to pass it, it was rejected by 146 to 136. The Lords again took the matter up, brought in a bill to the same effect as their last one, passed it through all its stages and sent it to the Commons, where it met with the same fate as the

last, being rejected by 197 to 172. The Commons, pressed on by public opinion out of doors, at length took the matter up in earnest, and at the opening of the next session instructed Mr. Harley to prepare a measure on the subject. Mr. Harley's bill was introduced on the 19th November, 1694, passed the third reading in three weeks; was sent to the Lords, who passed it without amendment, and it received the royal assent before the end of the year.

This is the measure which is known as the Triennial Act of 1694. The intention of the framers of the Act is apparent from the preamble, which sets forth that "whereas by the ancient laws and statutes of the kingdom frequent Parliaments ought to be held; and whereas frequent and new Parliaments tend very much to the happy union and good agreement of the king and people, we, &c." The Act provides that from henceforth "a Parliament should be held once in three years at least ;" that “within three years at furthest after the dissolution of the Parliament then subsisting, and so from time to time for ever after, legal writs under the great seal should be issued by the direction of the Crown, for calling and assembling another new Parliament;" and that "no Parliament whatsoever shall continue longer than three years, to be counted from the first day of the first session."

The Triennial Act was a wise and a moderate measure, and probably the best that could have been carried at the time. But moderate as it was it was far from being acceptable to a large section of the Commons, who were quite ready to make laws to restrain other people, but had no desire to be controlled themselves. So long as the sovereign could call Parliament together or not just as he pleased, the position of a representative was not a desirable one, as all his trouble and expense in getting elected might be thrown away if Parliament never met, or met only to be prorogued or dissolved. It was of little use his being elected if Parliament was never summoned, or was never allowed to exercise its functions. So far, therefore, as the Act compelled the sovereign to summon Parliament at fixed periods, it was acceptable enough to the Commons; but so far as it controlled themselves, it was the reverse of agreeable. They approved of the proviso which compelled the sovereign to hold a session of Parliament once every year, but they had a decided objection to be sent to their constituents every third session, as provided by the Act. To cut short their career at the end of three years was to deprive members of the opportunity of aggrandizing themselves at the public expense. They accordingly soon found an occasion for altering that part of the measure which compelled