may dissolve Parliament before the expiration of its ordinary term of existence if he has reason to believe that it is not in accord with the opinion of the country on any question of policy. But as the sovereign acts on the advice of ministers, and ministers never recommend the dissolution of a Parliament in which they have a working majority, the value of the remedy may be easily understood. If, however, members were held responsible to their constituents during the whole term for which they were elected, there would be no difference of opinion between them on any important question, nor would there ever be any urgent necessity for an extraordinary appeal to the country, as Parliament and the country would always be in accord.

This right of appeal is itself a recognition of what I contend for, as the Crown, whenever it dissolves Parliament because it is not in accord with the country, by that very act acknowledges the principle of the continuity of representation. Parliament itself also practically acknowledges the same principle on every occasion that it defers to public opinion or gives way to outside pressure; and the fact that this pressure is applied in an unconstitutional manner rather strengthens my argument than otherwise, as we must assume that Parliament would prefer this pressure to be applied in a constitutional manner if provision

were made for the purpose. The same thing may be said with regard to extra-parliamentary utterances. Every member of Parliament who asks for a vote of confidence at a public meeting recognizes the right of the electors to control their representatives. He says, in effect, "this is a question on which you have not been consulted, and as I cannot wait till the general election in order to ascertain your opinion in a constitutional way, I shall take the next best thing-the opinion of this meeting." Earl Derby put this view of the matter very clearly on a recent occasion. In returning thanks for the House of Lords at a dinner of the Civil Engineers in March, 1880, Earl Derby said " Only a generation ago Parliament had, not merely the legislative power, which it still necessarily retains, but also a practical monopoly of the discussions conducted on all important national affairs. Now that monopoly has gone under the yearly increasing competition of the platform and the newspaper press. I have often thought how it would astonish a politician of the days of Canning and Castlereagh if he could rise from his grave and see what has been going on now for some years past. He would see ministers and ex-ministers, and all the most notable politicians of the country attacking one another, and defending themselves not merely at election times, but every year, and all the year

through, on provincial platforms, discussing most difficult and the most important questions of foreign and domestic policy before electors and non-electors, and addressing not a limited public, but the nation as a whole. There may be abuses attending upon the system, but I have no doubt that in the main it is an enormous advantage. We do not speak merely to Parliament or to the public once in seven years, but to the whole nation continually, and we are, to a great extent, guided by their judgment as to the course which shall be followed. For my part, I rejoice at that, because the larger proportion of the public that is called in to deliberate and to actively participate in the discussion of public affairs, the more nearly we approach to that which in the idea of all is a benefit, namely, a self-governed country." The great advantage of the system to which Lord Derby calls attention lies in the fact that it affords the public an opportunity of discussing important questions from day to day as they arise; and if the opinions expressed in this manner were really the opinions of the country, and Parliament were really guided by them, we should have a system, although an altogether unconstitutional one, of continuous representation. If septennial elections are practically useless for ascertaining the current public opinion, which Lord Derby tacitly admits, it is evident no

great advantage would be gained by shortening the term of Parliament unless important public questions could be held over. But questions of this nature, as a rule, cannot be held over, and in these days of telegraphs, railways, and ocean steamships, they are always coming to the fore. There is no reason, however, why such questions should not be dealt with as they arise, and in a constitutional way. If we wish to preserve the Constitution, we must amend it as soon as its defects have been discovered; and as far as it is defective in the present instance it can very easily be remedied. What is wanted is a system of continuous representation; and one very simple and efficient way of obtaining it is by providing that the constituencies shall have the same power over their representatives which the Crown exercises over Parliament, namely, the power of dismissal.

There is another objection to periodical elections held at long intervals. It is almost impossible to determine with anything like certainty the meaning of a verdict pronounced at such an election, as there are invariably several issues, and one and the same answer is returned to all of them. We know which side gets the votes, but we do not know, and we have no means of ascertaining, why they were given. And the explanation is obvious enough. At every general election, and especially at an election held after a

long interval, there is necessarily a large accumulation of questions of various kinds and of greater or less importance, which are usually presented in different aspects to the electors by the several candidates who solicit their votes. One candidate may make one subject the main issue, while another candidate. may ignore that and give prominence to another question which the previous candidate thought of no importance. Even the leaders of the opposing parties may present different issues to the country, as on the occasion of the last election when Lord Beaconsfield put forward one and Lord Hartington another. But in addition to all this, another element of confusion invariably presents itself. The question of the personal fitness of candidates will obtrude itself in a manner more or less prominent at every contest, and the electors will always favour a candidate who is personally popular, who is a fluent speaker, who has influence in the House or with the government of the day; and a certain proportion of them will vote for him on these grounds alone, quite irrespective of his views on any question of state policy. The consequence is that the verdict of every election is a matter of dispute. Scarcely two persons can be met with who are agreed as to the causes which led to the defeat of the Gladstone ministry in 1874. It is only when a single issue can be put before the country, and the

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