and I trust that, in spite of all constitutional and other scruples, here or elsewhere, an appropriation will be made to complete that road. I confess, however, freely, that I am entirely unable to conceive of any principle on which that road can be supported, that would not uphold the general power contended for.

I will now examine the opinion of Mr. Madison. Of all the acts of that pure, virtuous, and illustrious statesman, whose administration has so powerfully tended to advance the glory, honor, and prosperity of this country, I most regret, for his sake and for the sake of the country, the rejection of the bill of the last session. I think it irreconcilable with Mr. Madison's own principles — those great, broad, and liberal principles, on which he so ably administered the government. And, sir, when I appeal to the members of the last congress, who are now in my hearing, I am authorized to say, with regard to the majority of them, that no circumstance, not even an earthquake, that should have swallowed up one half of this city, could have excited more surprise than when it was first communicated to this house, that Mr. Madison had rejected his own bill— I say his own bill, for his message at the opening of the session meant nothing, if it did not recommend such an exercise of power as was contained in that bill. My friend, who is near me, (Mr. Johnson, of Virginia,) the operations of whose vigorous and independent mind, depend upon his own internal perceptions, has expressed himself with becoming manliness, and thrown aside the authority of names, as having no bearing with him on the question. But their authority has been referred to, and will have influence with others. It is impossible, moreover, to disguise the fact, that the question is now a question between the executive on the one side, and the representatives of the people on the other. So it is understood in the country, and such is the fact. Mr. Madison enjoys, in his retreat at Montpelier, the repose and the honors due to his eminent and laborious services; and I would be among the last to disturb it. However painful it is to me to animadvert upon any of his opinions, I feel perfectly sure that the circumstance can only be viewed by him with an enlightened liberality. What are the opinions which have been expressed by Mr. Madison on this subject? I will not refer to all the messages wherein he has recommended internal improvements; but to that alone which he addressed to congress, at the commencement of the last session, which contains this passage:

'I particularly invite again the attention of congress to the expediency of exercising their existing powers, and, where necessary, of resorting to the prescribed mode of enlarging them, in order to effectuate a comprehensive system of roads and canals, such as will have the effect of drawing more closely together every part of our country, by promoting intercourse and improvements, and by increasing the share of every part in the common stock of national prosperity.'

In the examination of this passage, two positions force themselves upon our attention. The first is, the assertion that there are existing powers in congress to effectuate a comprehensive system of roads and canals, the effect of which would be to draw the different parts of the country more closely together. And I would candidly admit, in the second place, that it was intimated, that, in the exercise of those existing powers, some defect might be discovered which would render an amendment of the constitution necessary. Noth ing could be more clearly affirmed than the first position; but in the message of Mr. Madison returning the bill, passed in consequence of his recommendation, he has not specified a solitary case to which those existing powers are applicable; he has not told us what he meant by those existing powers; and the general scope of his reasoning, in that message, if well founded, proves that there are no existing powers whatever. It is apparent, that Mr. Madison himself has not examined some of those principal sources of the constitution from which, during this debate, the power has been derived. I deeply regret, and I know that Mr. Madison regretted, that the circumstances under which the bill was presented to him (the last day but one of a most busy session) deprived him of an opportunity of that thorough investigation of which no man is more capable. It is certain, that, taking his two messages at the same session together, they are perfectly irreconcilable. What, moreover, was the nature of that bill? It did not apply the money to any specific object of internal improvement, nor designate any particular mode in which it should be applied; but merely set apart and pledged the fund to the general purpose, subject to the future disposition of congress. If, then, there were any supposable case whatever, to which congress might apply money in the erection of a road, or cutting a canal, the bill did not violate the constitution. And it ought not to have been anticipated, that money constitu tionally appropriated by one congress would be unconstitutionally expended by another.

I come now to the message of Mr. Monroe; and if, by the communication of his opinion to congress, he intended to prevent discussion, he has most wofully failed. I know that, according to a most venerable and excellent usage, the opinion, neither of the president nor of the senate, upon any proposition depending in this house, ought to be adverted to. Even in the parliament of Great Britain, a member who would refer to the opinion of the sovereign, in such a case, would be instantly called to order; but under the extraordinary circumstances of the president having, with, I have no doubt, the best motives, volunteered his opinion on this head, and inverted the order of legislation by beginning where it should end, I am compelled, most reluctantly, to refer to that opinion. I cannot but deprecate the practice of which the president has, in this instance, set the example to his successors. The constitutional

order of legislation supposes that every bill originating in one house, shall be there deliberately investigated, without influence from any other branch of the legislature; and then remitted to the other house for a like free and unbiased consideration. Having passed both houses, it is to be laid before the president; signed if approved, and if disapproved, to be returned, with his objections, to the originating house. In this manner, entire freedom of thought and of action is secured, and the president finally sees the proposition in the most matured form which congress can give to it. The practical effect, to say no more, of forestalling the legislative opinion, and telling us what we may or may not do, will be to deprive the president himself of the opportunity of considering a proposition so matured, and us of the benefit of his reasoning applied specifically to such proposition. For the constitution further enjoins it upon him, to state his objections upon returning the bill. The originating house is then to reconsider it, and deliberately to weigh those objections; and it is further required, when the question is again taken, shall the bill pass, those objections notwithstanding? that the votes shall be solemnly spread, by ayes and noes, upon the record. Of this opportunity of thus recording our opinions, in matters of great public concern, we are deprived, if we subunit to the innovation of the president. I will not press this part of the subject further. I repeat, again and again, that I have no doubt but that the president was actuated by the purest motives. I am compelled, however, in the exercise of that freedom of opinion which, so long as I exist, I will maintain, to say, that the proceeding is irregular and unconstitutional. Let us, however, examine the reasoning and opinion of the president.

'A difference of opinion has existed from the first formation of our constitution to the present time, among our most enlightened and virtuous citizens, respecting the right of congress to establish a system of internal improvement. Taking into view the trust with which I am now honored, it would be improper, after what has passed, that this discussion should be revived, with an uncertainty of my opinion respecting the right. Disregarding early impressions, I have bestowed on the subject all the deliberation which its great importance and a just sense of my duty required and the result is, a settled conviction in my mind, that congress does not possess the right. It is not contained in any of the specified powers granted to congress; nor can I consider it incidental to, or a necessary mean, viewed on the most liberal scale, for carrying into effect any of the powers which are specifically granted. In communicating this result, I cannot resist the obligation which I feel, to suggest to congress the propriety of recommending to the states the adoption of an amendment to the constitution, which shall give the right in question. In cases of doubtful construction, especially of such vital interest, it comports with the nature and origin of our institutions, and will contribute much to preserve them, to apply to our constituents for an explicit grant of power. We may confidently rely, that, if it appears to their satisfaction that the power is necessary, it will always be granted.'

In this passage, the president has furnished us with no reasoning, no argument in support of his opinion—nothing addressed to the understanding. He gives us, indeed, an historical account of the operations of his own mind, and he asserts that he has made a

laborious effort to conquer his early impressions, but that the result is a settled conviction against the power, without a single reason. In his position, that the power must be specifically granted, or incident to a power so granted, it has been seen, that I have the honor to entirely concur with him; but, he says, the power is not among the specified powers. Has he taken into consideration the clause respecting post-roads, and told us how and why that does not convey the power? If he had acted within what I conceive to be his constitutional sphere of rejecting the bill, after it had passed both houses, he must have learned that great stress was placed on that clause, and we should have been enlightened by his comments upon it. As to his denial of the power, as an incident to any of the express grants, I would have thought that we might have safely appealed to the experience of the president, during the late war, when the country derived so much benefit from his judicious administration of the duties of the war department, whether roads and canals for military purposes were not essential to celerity and successful result in the operations of armies. This part of the message is all assertion, and contains no argument which I can comprehend, or which meet the points contended for during this debate. Allow me here to say, and I do it without the least disrespect to that branch of the government, on whose opinions and acts it has been rendered my painful duty to comment; let me say, in reference to any man, however elevated his station, even if he be endowed with the power and prerogatives of a sovereign, that his acts are worth infinitely more, and are more intelligible, than mere paper sentiments or declarations. And what have been the acts of the president? During his tour of the last summer, did he not order a road to be cut or repaired from near Plattsburgh to the St. Lawrence? My honorable friend will excuse me, if my comprehension is too dull to perceive the force of that argument, which seeks to draw a distinction between repairing an old and making a new road.

[Mr. Nelson said, he had not drawn that distinction, having only stated the fact.]

Certainly no such distinction is to be found in the constitution, or exists in reason. Grant, however, the power of reparation, and we will make it do. We will take the post-roads, sinuous as they are, and put them in a condition to enable the mails to pass, without those mortifying delays and disappointments, to which we, at least in the west, are so often liable. The president, then, ordered a road of considerable extent to be constructed or repaired, on his sole authority, in a time of profound peace, when no enemy threatened the country, and when, in relation to the power as to which alone that road could be useful in time of war, there exists the best understanding, and a prospect of lasting friendship, greater than at any other period. On his sole authority the president acted, and we are

already called upon by the chairman of the committee of ways and means to sanction the act by an appropriation. This measure has been taken, too, without the consent of the state of New York; and what is wonderful, when we consider the magnitude of the state rights which are said to be violated, without even a protest on the part of that state against it. On the contrary, I understand, from some of the military officers who are charged with the execution of the work, what is very extraordinary, that the people through whose quarter of the country the road passes, do not view it as a national calamity; that they would be very glad that the president would visit them often, and that he would order a road to be cut and improved, at the national expense, every time he should visit them. Other roads, in other parts of the union, have, it seems, been likewise ordered, or their execution, at the public expense, sanctioned by the executive, without the concurrence of congress. If the president has the power to cause these public improvements to be executed at his pleasure, whence is it derived? If any member will stand up in this place and say the president is clothed with this authority, and that it is denied to congress, let us hear from him; and let him point to the clause of the constitution which vests it in the executive and withholds it from the legislative branch.

There is no such clause; there is no such exclusive executive power. The power is derivable by the executive only from those provisions of the constitution which charge him with the duties of commanding the physical force of the country, and the employment of that force in war, and the preservation of the public tranquillity, and in the execution of the laws. But congress has paramount powers to the president. It alone can declare war, can raise armies, can provide for calling out the militia, in the specified instances, and can raise and appropriate the ways and means necessary to those objects. Or is it come to this, that there are to be two rules of construction for the constitution one, an enlarged rule, for the executive, and another, a restricted rule, for the legis lature? Is it already to be held, that, according to the genius and nature of our constitution, powers of this kind may be safely intrusted to the executive, but, when attempted to be exercised by the legislature, are so alarming and dangerous, that a war with all the allied powers would be less terrible, and that the nation should clothe itself straightway in sackcloth and ashes! No, sir; if the power belongs only by implication to the chief magistrate, it is placed both by implication and express grant in the hands of congress. I am so far from condemning the act of the president, to which I have referred, that I think it deserving of high approbation. That it was within the scope of his constitutional authority, I have no doubt; and I sincerely trust, that the secretary at war will, in time of peace, constantly employ in that way the military force. It will at the same time guard that force against the vices