session yet remaining to us. Under the operation of these motives, I had resolved to give a silent vote, until I felt myself bound, by the defying manner of the arguments advanced in support of the renewal, to obey the paramount duties I owe my country and its constitution; to make one effort, however feeble, to avert the passage of what appears to me a most unjustifiable law. After my honorable friend from Virginia (Mr. Giles) had instructed and amused us, with the very able and ingenious argument, which he delivered on yesterday, I should have still forborne to trespass on the senate, but for the extraordinary character of his speech. He discussed both sides of the question, with great ability and eloquence, and certainly demonstrated, to the satisfaction of all who heard him, both that it was constitutional and unconstitutional, highly proper and improper, to prolong the charter of the bank. The honorable gentleman appeared to me in the predicament in which the celebrated orator of Virginia, Patrick Henry, is said to have been once placed. Engaged in a most extensive and lucrative practice of the law, he mistook, in one instance, the side of the cause in which he was retained, and addressed the court and jury in a very masterly and convincing speech, in behalf of his antagonist. His distracted client came up to him, whilst he was thus employed, and, interrupting him, bitterly exclaimed, you have undone me! You have ruined me!' 'Never mind, give yourself no concern,' said the adroit advocate; and, turning to the court and jury, continued his argument, by observing, may it please your honors, and you, gentlemen of the jury, I have been stating to you what I presume my adversary may urge on his side. I will now show you how fallacious his reasonings, and groundless his pretensions, are.' The skilful orator proceeded, satisfactorily refuted every argument he had advanced, and gained his cause!-a success with which I trust the exertion of my honorable friend will on this occasion be crowned.

It has been said, by the honorable gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Crawford), that this has been made a party question; although the law incorporating the bank was passed prior to the formation. of parties, and when congress was not biassed by party prejudices. (Mr. Crawford explained. He did not mean, that it had been made a party question in the senate. His allusion was elsewhere.) I do not think it altogether fair, to refer to the discussions in the house of representatives, as gentlemen belonging to that body have no opportunity of defending themselves here. It is true that this law was not the effect, but it is no less true that it was one of the causes, of the political divisions in this country. And if, during the agitation of the present question, the renewal has, on one side, been opposed on party principles, let me ask if, on the other, it has not been advocated on similar principles. Where is the Macedonian phalanx, the opposition, in congress? I believe, sir, I

shall not incur the charge of presumptuous prophecy, when I predict we shall not pick up from its ranks one single straggler! And if, on this occasion, my worthy friend from Georgia has gone over into the camp of the enemy, is it kind in him to look back upon his former friends, and rebuke them for the fidelity with which they adhere to their old principles?

I shall not stop to examine how far a representative is bound by the instructions of his constituents. That is a question between the giver and receiver of the instructions. But I must be permitted to express my surprise at the pointed difference which has been made between the opinions and instructions of state legislatures, and the opinions and details of the deputations with which we have been surrounded from Philadelphia. Whilst the resolutions of those legislatures-known, legitimate, constitutional, and deliberative bodies have been thrown into the back-ground, and their interference regarded as officious; these delegations from selfcreated societies, composed of nobody knows whom, have been received by the committee, with the utmost complaisance. Their communications have been treasured up with the greatest diligence. Never did the Delphic priests collect with more holy care the frantic expressions of the agitated Pythia, or expound them with more solemnity to the astonished Grecians, than has the committee. gathered the opinions and testimonies of these deputies, and, through the gentleman from Massachusetts, pompously detailed them to the senate! Philadelphia has her immediate representatives, capable of expressing her wishes, upon the floor of the other house. If it be improper for states to obtrude upon congress their sentiments, it is much more highly so, for the unauthorized deputies of fortuitous congregations.

The first singular feature that attracts attention in this bill, is the new and unconstitutional veto which it establishes. The constitution has required only, that after bills have passed the house of representatives and the senate, they shall be presented to the president, for his approval or rejection; and his determination is to be made known in ten days. But this bill provides, that when all the constitutional sanctions are obtained, and when, according to the usual routine of legislation, it ought to be considered as a law, it is to be submitted to a new branch of the legislature, consisting of the president and twenty-four directors of the bank of the United States, holding their sessions in Philadelphia; and if they please to approve it, why then is it to become a law! And three months (the term allowed by our law of May last, to one of the great belligerents, for revoking his edicts, after the other shall have repealed his) are granted them, to decide whether an act of congress shall be the law of the land or not!- an act which is said to be indispensably necessary to our salvation, and without the passage of which, universal distress and bankruptcy are to pervade the

country. Remember, sir, that the honorable gentleman from Georgia, has contended that this charter is no contract. Does it, then, become the representatives of the nation, to leave the nation at the mercy of a corporation? Ought the impending calamities to be left to the hazard of a contingent remedy?

This vagrant power to erect a bank, after having wandered throughout the whole constitution in quest of some congenial spot to fasten upon, has been at length located by the gentleman from Georgia on that provision which authorizes congress to lay and collect taxes, &c. In 1791, the power is referred to one part of the instrument; in 1811, to another. Sometimes it is alleged to be deducible from the power to regulate commerce. Hard pressed here, it disappears, and shows itself under the grant to coin money. The sagacious secretary of the treasury, in 1791, pursued the wisest course; he has taken shelter behind general high sounding and imposing terms. He has declared, in the preamble to the act establishing the bank, that it will be very conducive to the successful conducting of the national finances; will tend to give facility to the obtaining of loans, and will be productive of considerable advantage to trade and industry in general. No allusion is made. to the collection of taxes. What is the nature of this government? It is emphatically federal, vested with an aggregate of specified powers for general purposes, conceded by existing sovereignties, who have themselves retained what is not so conceded. It is said that there are cases in which it must act on implied powers. This is not controverted, but the implication must be necessary, and obviously flow from the enumerated power with which it is allied. The power to charter companies is not specified in the grant, and I contend is of a nature not transferable by mere implication. It is one of the most exalted attributes of sovereignty. In the exercise of this gigantic power we have seen an East India Company created, which has carried dismay, desolation, and death, throughout one of the largest portions of the habitable world-a company which is, in itself, a sovereignty, which has subverted empires and set up new dynasties, and has not only made war, but war against its legitimate sovereign! Under the influence of this power, we have seen arise a South Sea Company, and a Mississippi Company, that distracted and convulsed all Europe, and menaced a total overthrow of all credit and confidence, and universal bankruptcy. Is it to be imagined that a power so vast would have been left by the wisdom of the constitution to doubtful inference? It has been alleged that there are many instances, in the constitution, where powers in their nature incidental, and which would have necessarily been vested along with the principal, are nevertheless expressly enumerated; and the power to make rules and regulations for the government of the land and naval forces,' which it is said is incidental to the power to raise armies and provide a navy, is given

as an example. What does this prove? How extremely cautious the convention were to leave as little as possible to implication. In all cases where incidental powers are acted upon, the principal and incidental ought to be congenial with each other, and partake of a common nature. The incidental power ought to be strictly subordinate and limited to the end proposed to be attained by the specified power. In other words, under the name of accomplishing one object which is specified, the power implied ought not to be made to embrace other objects, which are not specified in the constitution. If, then, you could establish a bank, to collect and distribute the revenue, it ought to be expressly restricted to the purpose of such collection and distribution. It is mockery, worse than usurpation, to establish it for a lawful object, and then to extend it to other objects which are not lawful. In deducing the power to create corporations, such as I have described it, from the power to collect taxes, the relation and condition of principal and incident are prostrated and destroyed. The accessory is exalted above the principal. As well might it be said, that the great luminary of day is an accessory, a satellite, to the humblest star that twinkles forth its feeble light in the firmament of heaven!

Suppose the constitution had been silent as to an individual department of this government, could you, under the power to lay and collect taxes, establish a judiciary? I presume not; but if you could derive the power by mere implication, could you vest it with any other authority than to enforce the collection of the revenue? A bank is made for the ostensible purpose of aiding in the collection of the revenue, and whilst it is engaged in this, the most inferior and subordinate of all its functions, it is made to diffuse itself throughout society, and to influence all the great operations of credit, circulation, and commerce. Like the Virginia justice, you tell the man whose turkey had been stolen, that your books of precedent furnish no form for his case, but that you will grant him a precept to search for a cow, and when looking for that he may possibly find his turkey! You say to this corporation, we cannot authorize you to discount, to emit paper, to regulate commerce, &c. No! Our book has no precedents of that kind. But then we can authorize you to collect the revenue, and, whilst occupied with that, you may do whatever else you please!

What is a corporation, such as the bill contemplates? It is a splendid association of favored individuals, taken from the mass of society, and invested with exemptions and surrounded by immunities and privileges. The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lloyd) has said, that the original law, establishing the bank, was justly liable to the objection of vesting in that institution an exclusive privilege, the faith of the government being pledged, that no other bank should be authorized during its existence. This objection, he supposes, is obviated by the bill under consideration;

but all corporations enjoy exclusive privileges; that is, the corporators have privileges which no others possess; if you create fifty corporations instead of one, you have only fifty privileged bodies instead of one. I contend, that the states have the exclusive power to regulate contracts, to declare the capacities and incapacities to contract, and to provide as to the extent of responsibility of debtors to their creditors. If congress have the power to erect an artificial body, and say it shall be endowed with the attributes of an individual; if you can bestow on this object of your own creation the ability to contract, may you not, in contravention of state rights, confer upon slaves, infants, and femes covert the ability to contract? And if you have the power to say, that an association of individuals shall be responsible for their debts only in a certain limited degree, what is to prevent an extension of a similar exemption to individuals? Where is the limitation upon this power to set up corporations. You establish one in the heart of a state, the basis of whose capital is money. You may erect others whose capital shall consist of land, slaves, and personal estates, and thus the whole property within the jurisdiction of a state might be absorbed by these political bodies. The existing bank contends that it is beyond the power of a state to tax it, and if this pretension be well founded, it is in the power of congress, by chartering companies, to dry up all the sources of state revenue. Georgia has undertaken, it is true, to levy a tax on the branch within her jurisdiction, but this law, now under a course of litigation, is considered as invalid. The United States own a great deal of land in the state of Ohio; can this government, for the purpose of creating an ability to purchase it, charter a company? Aliens are forbidden, I believe, in that state, to hold real estate; could you, in order to multiply purchasers, confer upon them the capacity to hold land, in derogation of the local law? I imagine this will be hardly insisted upon; and yet there exists a more obvious connection between the undoubted power, which is possessed by this government, to sell its land, and the means of executing that power by increasing the demand in the market, than there is between this bank and the collection of a tax. This government has the power to levy taxes, to raise armies, provide a navy, make war, regulate commerce, coin money, &c. &c. It would not be difficult to show as intimate a connection between a corporation, established for any purpose whatever, and some one or other of those great powers, as there is between the revenue and the bank of the United States.

Let us inquire into the actual participation of this bank in the collection of the revenue. Prior to the passage of the act of 1800, requiring the collectors of those ports of entry, at which the principal bank, or any of its offices, are situated, to deposit with them the custom-house bonds, it had not the smallest agency in the collection of the duties. During almost one moiety of the