Will. IV. c. 42, § 26, that "if any witness shall be objected to as incompetent, on the ground that the verdict or judgment in the action on which it shall be proposed to examine him would be admissible in evidence for or against him, such witness shall nevertheless be examined; but in that case a verdict or judgment in that action in favour of the party on whose behalf he shall have been examined, shall not be admissible in evidence for him; nor shall a verdict or judgment against the party on whose behalf he shall have been examined be admissible in evidence against him. By the 27th section, it was enacted that the name of every witness objected to as incompetent, on the ground that the ver admitted upon the ground of necessity. Secondly, in actions at the common law, a party to the suit cannot be examined as a witness; but in courts of equity defendants in a cause may be made witnesses upon a special application for that purpose; and in those courts, if a plaintiff consents to be examined as a witness his evidence may be admitted. Thirdly, a person cannot be a witness who has been convicted of treason or felony, or of any offence which involves the crimen falsi (such as perjury or cheating), or which is liable to a punishment which the law considers infamous, as whipping, branding, or the pillory. This principle of exclusion, which is derived from the Roman law (Digest ii., tit. "De Tes-dict or judgment in the cause in which tibus"), is now of little practical importance, as the recent statutes have enacted that a pardon in felons, or the actual endurance of the punishment in felony or misdemeanour, excepting perjury or subornation of perjury, shall have the effect of restoring the competency of the party as a witness. Fourthly, the law of England excludes the evidence of those who have a direct interest in the result of the proceedings in which they are called to testify. The indefinite state of the rule respecting the nature of the disqualifying interest led to much perplexity in its practical application. These rules are, however, now altered by a recent act, which will presently be mentioned. The nature of the interest which disqualified a witness was this: either he must be directly and immediately benefited by a result of the proceeding favourable to the party who called him, by exonerating himself from a liability to costs, er to some process founded upon the decision of the cause in which he was called to testify; or he must be in such a situation as to be able to avail himself of the decision of the cause, by giving it in evidence in support of his own interest in some future litigation. With the view of removing the practical difficulties arising from the rule as to a witness being able to avail himself of the decision of the cause, by giving it in evidence in support of his own interest in some future litigation, it was enacted by the stat. 3 & 4 he is examined would be admissible in that such person offered as a witness may have been previously convicted of any crime or offence: provided that this act shall not render competent any party to any suit, action, or proceeding individually named in the record, or any lessor of the plaintiff, or tenant of premises sought to be recovered in ejectment, or the landlord or other person in whose right any defendant in replevin may make cognizance, or any person in whose immediate and individual behalf any action may be brought or defended, either wholly or in part, or the husband or wife f such persons respectively; provided also, that this act shall not repeal any provision in a certain act passed in the session of parliament holden in the seventh year of the reign of his late majesty and in the first year of the reign of her present majesty, intituled 'An Act for the amendment of the Laws with respect to Wills' provided that in courts of equity any defendant to any cause pending in any such court may be examined as a witness on the behalf of the plaintiff or of any co-defendant in any such cause, saving just exceptions; and that any interest which such defendant so to be examined may have in the matters or any of the matters in question in the cause shall not be deemed a just exception to the testimony of such defendant, but shall only be considered as affecting or tending to affect the credit of such defendant as a witness." This act does not extend to Scotland. affirmative of a proposition must prove it. Thirdly, in proving a fact, the best evidence of it must be given of which the nature of the thing is capable. Thus, a party is not permitted to prove the contents of a deed by a copy, and still less by oral testimony, where the deed itself may be produced; nor to prove the execution of a deed by any other person than a subscribing witness, when he is living and producible. This rule is justified by the presumption which the offer of secondary evidence raises, that the production of the best evidence might have prejudiced the party in whose power it is, had he produced it. This rule is not, however, to be understood as requiring that all the evidence which can be given upon the fact in dispute should be produced; as, for instance, if there are several attesting witnesses to a deed or other contract, it is not necessary that more than one should be called. Fourthly, hearsay testimony, which is a statement on oath of what an absent person has said respecting a fact to be proved, is, in general, excluded both on the ground that the witness to the actual fact does not declare his knowledge upon oath, and also because he is absent from the cross-examination of the party who is to be affected by what he states. To this rule, however, there are the following exceptions:-1. The declarations of persons who are in imminent danger and under the apprehension of immediate death, and who are therefore considered to be speaking under as powerful a reliII. The principal general rules by which gious sanction as the obligation of an the reception of oral evidence is regulated. oath; 2. The declarations of deceased: -The first general rule (which applies persons, and made against their interest; equally to written as to oral testimony) as, for instance, charging themselves with is that all evidence produced must be the receipt of money on account of third relevant to the point at issue between the persons, or acknowledging the payment parties. The object of special pleading of money due to themselves; 3. The deby the common law is to reduce contro-claration of deceased persons respecting versics between parties to particular issues, or propositions of fact affirmed by one and denied by the other, which are to be decided by the jury; and the rule of evidence, that the proofs in the cause must be strictly confined to these issues, is founded upon obvious reasons of justice as well as convenience. Secondly, the affirmative of every issue is to be proved; that is, the party who asserts the rights of a public nature, such as the boundaries or general customs of a manor or district; 4. The declarations of deceased persons on questions of pedigree, or family occurrences of ancient date before the memory of living witnesses, such as births, deaths, or marriages. With respect to the two last exceptions, however, evidence of declarations of this kind is inadmissible, if they have been made post litem motam, that is, after the matter to which they relate has become the subject of litigation. other reason incompetent to give evidence, the execution of the deed may be proved by proof of the hand-writing of the party. The proof of hand-writing, by the law of England, is peculiar. The testimony of persons skilled in hand-writing is wholly excluded, comparison of hands being inadmissible for the purpose. The course is, that a witness acquainted with the writing of the individual in question, and who has seen him write, or who has had a written correspondence with him, shall testify to his belief that the document to be proved is in his handwriting. III. Written evidence consists of records, documents under seal, as charters and deeds, and writings not under seal.—Acts of parliament are records of the highest nature, being the memorials of the legislature; but a distinction is made with respect to evidence between public and private statutes. A public statute requires no express proof in courts of justice, every one being presumed to know the law which he is bound to observe; as to them, therefore, the citation of the statute itself is in all cases sufficient. But private acts of parliament are considered as documents relating to individuals, and must therefore be proved by copies compared with the original roll of parliament. A second and inferior species of records is the proceedings of courts of justice, which are proved by exemplifications, sworn copies, and office copies. Exemplifications are transcripts of the records of different courts, accredited by having the seals of such courts attached to them. Sworn copies are transcripts made by individuals who authenticate them upon oath, when they are produced in evidence. Office copies are copies certified to be true and accurate by an officer expressly intrusted for that purpose by an officer of the court to which the records belong. Charters and deeds are proved by the production of the instrument and proof of the execution by the party to be charged with it; but where the document is more than thirty years old, the execution need not be proved. The general rule is that the original deed must be produced, on the principle already alluded to of its being the best evidence; but this is subject to the following exceptions-1. Where it has been lost or destroyed by accident; 2. Where it is in the possession of a party to a suit against whom it is sought to be produced, and The most plausible reason for the exwho refuses to produce it: in either of clusiveness of the English law of evidence which cases the contents of the document is derived from the nature of the trial by may be proved by a copy, or, if no copy jury, with reference to which it is conexists, by oral testimony. Deeds attested tended to be safer to withdraw doubtful must, in general, be proved by one at least evidence altogether from their consideraof the subscribing witnesses; but if the at- tion, than to leave it to persons who are testing witnesses be dead, or are not to be often uninstructed, and incapable of drawfound after a diligent search, or for anying correct distinctions upon the subject From the above summary of the principal rules of evidence existing in the English law, it will be observed that the system is extremely exclusive. Upon the subject of interested witnesses, the law has lately been altered in the way already explained. With respect to the reception of secondary and hearsay evidence, it sanetions no degree or kind of testimony at second-hand (except in the cases above enumerated), but excludes it under all varieties of circumstances. It is true that we ought not to attach so much weight to hearsay evidence as to direct testimony, because it is beyond all doubt that the certainty of obtaining the truth is diminished, and that the means and causes of error are multiplied, in proportion as you remove from the actual observer and add links to the chain of testimony. But it may still be questioned whether the absolute and unconditional rejection of hearsay evidence is useful. Also with respect to the mode of proving hand-writing, it might be unsafe wholly to rely upon the evidence of comparison of hands by persons of experience in that occupation, but there seems no good reason why such proof should not be admissible in aid of the present vague and unsatisfactory mode of proof by the general belief of a witness. of testimony, to form a proper estimate of its credibility. But this reason is founded upon an assumption not justified by the fact, namely, that the means of proof actually legalized are infallible guides to truth; whereas the truth is, that many of them are quite as liable to lead to a false conclusion as those which are excluded. In this state of things, therefore, there seems no good reason why all practicable means of attaining to truth, however various in their degrees of effectiveness, should not be committed to juries. This seems indeed to be the growing impression in the profession; the inclination of the courts of late years being to let in as much light to a cause as possible, and to regard objections to evidence rather as matters of credibility upon which juries may exercise their judgment, than of competency to be wholly withdrawn from their consideration. Witnesses in proceedings in Equity are examined upon written interrogatories, as explained in the article EQUITY. The interrogatories are drawn by counsel, according to the instructions which he receives as to the facts which a witness is considered able to prove; but it frequently happens that the instructions are very defective, and the counsel is obliged to frame his interrogatories as well as he can, in order to elicit the proof of facts favourable to the party for whom he is employed. Though each several interrogatory, when well drawn, is framed for the purpose of establishing some single and distinct fact, or connected facts, written interrogatories cannot from their nature be otherwise than long and somewhat difficult to comprehend. In the oral examination of a witness, it necessarily happens that several questions must be asked consecutively for the purpose of completing the investigation into and the establishment of every important fact to which the examination is directed. Written interrogatories must be framed on the same principle, and therefore every subsequent part of an interrogatory must be framed on the supposition of every previous part being answered in some way; and, consequently, it is hardly possible in written interrogatories to avoid what is called making them leading, and at the same time verbose and cumbrous. These long interrogatories, it is proved by experience, are often imperfectly comprehended by the witnesses, and consequently their evidence is in some respects either incomplete or inaccurate, or both. The interrogatories which either party proposes to his witnesses are not known to the adverse party until the examination of all the witnesses on both sides is concluded, when publication is passed, as it is termed, and copies of all the depositions are delivered to the litigating parties under an order of the court. Witnesses in courts of law are pro duced before the court, and examined by counsel; after which they may be crossexamined by the counsel for the other side. In the equity system there is of course no cross-examination, in the proper sense of the term; for one party does not know what the witnesses examined by the opposite party have deposed, and cannot therefore effectually examine them, as in a court of common law, where the crossexamination of a witness follows, and is founded upon what the witness has stated in his examination in chief. If a party to a suit in chancery will cross-examine a witness who is produced by his adversary for examination, he must examine him on written interrogatories, without knowing what interrogatories have been proposed to him by the opposite party, and without knowing what he has said in his depositions in chief. Such a crossexamination must be in general altogether useless, and often dangerous to the interest of the party making it; unless the witness is one whom he would himself have examined in chief. Under the 32nd order of the 21st of December, 1833, the last interrogatory before that date commonly in use is in future to be allowed as follows: "Do you know or can you set forth any other matter or thing which may be of benefit or advantage to the parties at issue in this cause, or either of them," &c. A party, however, is not bound to insert this interrogatory; and, indeed, no great harm will result if it is never used. Owing to various causes, such as disinclination on the part of a witness to give himself further trouble, particular affection to one of the litigating parties, or forgetfulness, it might have been anticipated that this general interrogatory would fail in its object; and so far as it has been used, such is said to be the case. This mode of ascertaining facts in suits in equity is evidently very defective, and has been the subject of considerable complaint and of lengthened inquiry; but hitherto nothing has been done to amend the system. (See Minutes of Evidence taken before the Chancery Commissioners, annexed to their Report of 1826; and a pamphlet (1837), by W. A. Garratt, entitled Suggestions for Reform in Proceedings in Chancery.) Those who may be inclined to follow this subject further will find it discussed at great length in Bentham's Rationale of Judicial Evidence, a work which has certainly contributed to the formation of more correct opinions on evidence; but it has neither exhausted the subject, nor is it free from great defects. The rules of the English law of evidence are contained in the treatises of Mr. Phillipps and Mr. Starkie. that the Greeks and Romans were acquainted with some modes of remitting money and paying debts, similar to those effected by a bill of exchange. Instruments of this kind were current among the commercial states of Italy in the early part of the fourteenth century, and it is probable they were not unknown at the close of the same century in England. It is certain that bills of exchange were originally employed solely as media of remittance, and the circumstances which brought them into use may be explained as follows:- A., at Hamburg, consigned goods to B., in London, either in execution of an order, or as his factor for sale. B, thereupon, being debtor to A. for the invoice amount, or the proceeds of the sale, as the case might be, was desirous of remitting to A. accordingly. The remittance could only be made in money or in goods; but A. might not want a return cargo of English commodities, and the sending out of specie would be inconve nient and hazardous. Now suppose that some third person, C., were about to go from Hamburg to London, mutual accommodation would suggest the following ar [DIVISION OF EM-rangement:-A. would deliver to C. an EXCHANGE. EXCHANGE, BILL OF, may be described as a written order or request addressed by one person to another, directing him to pay on account of the writer to some third person or his order, or to the order of the person addressing the request, a certain sum of money at a time therein specified. The person who gives the direction is called the drawer of the bill, he to whom it is addressed the drawee, and he in whose favour it is given the payee, or, occasionally, the remitter. Bills of exchange are ordinarily divided into two classes, foreign and inland; foreign bills comprehend such as are drawn or are payable abroad; inland, those which are drawn and payable in England. Thus, a bill drawn in France, or even in Scotland or Ireland, upon a party in England, or conversely, is a foreign bill; and this is a distinction that has important legal consequences. The origin of bills of exchange is unknown. It is probable or almost certain open letter addressed to B., requesting him to pay to C. the amount intended to be remitted: and C. on receiving the letter would pay to A. the value of it in money current at Hamburg, and having carried it over to London would there receive from B. the sum specified. Thus much of the expense, and all the risk and trouble of remittance would be saved to B. or A.; and C., besides having a more convenient sign of wealth, would probably receive some advantage for the accommodation. It is obvious, however, that to bring this exchange into operation several things would be wanting: first, the knowledge by the two parties of the mutual want; secondly, confidence on the part of C. that the money would be paid by B. on presentment of the letter of request, or that in default of payment by him he would be repaid by A.; and, thirdly, the determining how much C. ought to give A. in ready money of Hamburg for the sum specified in the letter, to be paid at a future day in money of England. Now the adjustment of the |