to admit of more varieties than man has yet conceived, inasmuch as men yet unborn will conceive errors never conceived before.

The same holds good as to Education which holds good of the machine. The general use, the general object of Education is roughly and rightly conceived by all persons to whom the name is familiar; but the great contrariety which exists among mankind as to the particulars which they conceive as entering into and forming a part of this term, and as to their mode of conceiving the same, proves either that all are still wrong as to their particular conceptions of this term, or that hitherto no means have been discovered of producing a general harmony of opinion, or in other words, of approaching to the truth. And here there is no person, or class of persons, who, as in the case of the miller, is or are allowed to be an authority competent to decide between conflicting opinions.

In every society, Education (in what particular manner conceived by any particular society is of no importance to our present inquiry) is, as a general rule, and must necessarily be, subjected to the positive law of the society, and to that assemblage of opinions, customs and habits which is not inappropriately called by some writers the Positive Morality of Society, or the Law of Opinion. This truth, or truism, as some may call it, is the basis of every inquiry into Education. In no country can there exist, as a general rule, an Education, whether it be good or bad, not subordinate to the law as above explained: for if such Education did exist, the form of that society or political system could not co-exist with it. One or the other must be changed, so that on the whole there must at last result a harmony, and not a discord. In every country then there does exist Education, either directed by and subordinate to the Positive Law and Positive Morality of that country, or there is an Education not so directed and subordinate, and consequently inconsistent with the continuance of that political sys-, tem in which it exists. But such an anomaly, if found anywhere, should not be allowed to exist, because it is inconsistent

with the continued existence of the society in which it has established itself; and if such an Education does exist, and can maintain itself in a society, against the will of that society, such a society is not a sovereign and independent society, but is in a state of anarchy. Education then should be in harmony with and subordinate to the political system: it should be part of it; and whether the political system is called by the name good or bad, if that political system is to continue, Education must not be opposed to it, but must be a part of it. From this it follows that the question, What is the best education? involves the question, What is the best political system? and that question again cannot be answered without considering what are the circumstances of the particular nation or society as to which we inquire what is the best political system. Recollecting however that the question of the best education and of the best political system cannot be discussed apart, because, as we have shown, Education is a part of the system, still we can consider several important questions to Education, without determining what is the best political system. One is, the political system being given, what ought the Education to be?

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And, how far is it the business of the state to direct, control, and encourage that Education?

A man (under which term we include woman) has two distinct relations or classes of relations towards the state: one comprehends his duties as a citizen, wherein he is or ought to be wholly subordinate to the state; the other comprehends all his functions as a producer and enjoyer of wealth, wherein he has or ought to have all freedom that is not inconsistent with the proper discharge of his duties as a citizen. It is barely ne cessary to state this proposition in order to perceive that his Education as a citizen should be directed by the state. To suppose any other directing power, any power for instance which may educate him in principles opposed to the polity of which he is to form a part, is to suppose an inconsistency which, in discussing any question involving principles, we always intend to avoid.

His Education then as a citizen, it must be admitted, ought to be under the superintendence of the state: but How ought the state to exercise this superintendence ?

It is not our purpose to attempt to answer this question, which involves the consideration of some of the most difficult questions in legislation. It is our object here to present the questions which it belongs to the civilization of the present and future ages to solve; to show What is to be done, not How it is to be done.

But we may answer the question so far as this: the state having the superintendence of the citizen's Education, must have the superintendence of those who direct that Education; in other words, must direct those who are to carry its purposes into effect. The body of teachers therefore must be formed by, or, at least, must be under the superintendence of the state. Unless this fundamental truth is admitted and acted on, the state cannot effectually direct or superintend the Education of its citizens.

Every branch of this inquiry into Education runs out into other branches almost innumerable, till we find that the solution of this important question involves the solution of the greater part of those questions which occupy or ought to occupy a legislative body. For this reason, as above stated, we cannot attempt to answer in its full extent, How the state must direct the Education of its citizens, because this question involves the consideration of How far the direction and control of the state should be a matter of positive law imperative on all, how far and with respect to what particular matters it should encourage and give facilities only, how far it should act by penalties or punishment, how far it should allow individuals or associations of individuals to teach or direct teaching according to their own will and judgment, or, to express the last question in other words, whether and to what extent the state should allow competition in Education?

To these questions, and more especially to the last, the answer is in general terms, that the general interest, considered in all its bearings, must determine what and

how much the state must do. This answer may be said to determine nothing. It is true it determines no particular thing, but it determines the principle by which all particular measures must be tested; and it would not be difficult to select instances from our own legislation, where enactments relating to places of education have been made with a view to particular interests only, without a reference to all the bearings of the question, and which, consequently, if tried by the test above given, would be found to be mischievous. As to the last question, the answer more particularly is, that individual competition must not be destroyed. It is possible to reconcile the two principles of state direction and control and individual competition. The state may allow no person to teach without being examined and registered: such register will show if he has been trained under the superintendence of the state or not. This fact being established, it may be left to individuals or associations of individuals to employ what teachers they please. In all the schools founded by the state, in all schools under the superintendence of the state (to which latter class belong nearly all charitable foundations; and all such foundations which are not under the superintendence of the state ought, consistently with the general principles already laid down, to be brought under that superintendence), it follows as a matter of course that none but teachers trained under the superintendence of the state should be appointed. The selection of the teachers, out of the whole authorized body, for any particular school of the class just described, may be safely left to the local authorities who have the immediate superintendence of these schools.

If the principle that a state ought to exercise a superintendence over the Edu cation of its citizens as citizens be admit ted, it may be asked, how far and to what branches of knowledge does this extend? To this we reply that a precise answer can only be given by the legislature of each country, and the question cannot be answered without many years of labour and perhaps without many experiments. But it follows from the principles

side with the grossest ignorance and the darkest superstition; thousands in the enjoyment of wealth for which they never laboured, and tens of thousands, depending for their daily bread upon the labour of their hands and the sensitive vibrations of the scale of commerce; political power in appearance widely diffused, in effect confined to the hands of a few; ignorance of the simplest elements of society in many of the rich and those who have power; ignorance not greater in those who are poor and have none-such a society, if it exists, is a society in which every reflecting man must at moments have misgivings as to its future condition and as to the happiness of those in whom he is most nearly interested. But if such a society contains a class, properly and truly denominated a middle class, a class neither enervated by excessive wealth and indolence nor depressed by poverty; a class that is characterized by industry and activity unexampled; a class that considers labour as the true source of happiness, and free inquiry on all subjects as the best privilege of a free mansuch a society may exist and continue to be indefinitely in a state of progressive improvement. Such a society, with its monstrous anomalies and defects, offers to a statesman of enlarged mind and vigorous understanding the strongest motive, while it supplies him with all the means, to give to the political system an impulse that shall carry it beyond the region of unstable equilibrium and place it at once in a state of security.

In such a society the simple enunciation by one possessed of power, that Education is a part of the business of the state, would be considered as the forerunner of some measure which should lay the foundation of that unity without which the temporary prosperity of the nation can never become permanent and its real happiness can never be secured.

The particular questions that the philosophic legislator has then to solve with respect to the education of the citizens, are-1. How are teachers to be taught, and what are they to be taught? 2. How is the body of teachers to be directed, superintended, rewarded, and punished? 3. What schools and what kinds of schools

are to be established and encouraged for the Education of the people? 4. What are the teachers to teach in those schools? 5. Where is the immediate government of such schools to be placed? 6. And where the ultimate and supreme direction and control of such schools? The word Schools is here used as comprehending all places of Education.

It remains to consider those other relations of a man to the state in which we view him as a producer of wealth for his own enjoyment. Here the general principle is, that the pursuit and enjoyment of wealth must be left as free as the public interest requires; and this amount of freedom will not depend in any great degree on the form of government. To this head, that of the production of wealth, belong all the divisions of labour by which a man, to use a homely but expressive phrase, gets his living, or what in other words are called the professions, trades, and arts of a country. The only way in which the state can with any advantage direct or control the exercise of any profession, trade, or art, is by requir ing the person who undertakes to exercise it to have been trained or educated for the purpose. Whether this should be done in all cases, or in some and what cases, and to what extent, and how, are questions for a legislature guided by a philosopher to answer.

In all countries called civilized this has been done to a certain extent. The legislation of our own country offers instances of great errors committed by legislating where no legislation was wanted, or by legislating badly. Perhaps instances may also be noted in all countries where evil has arisen for want of legislation on the subject. W may explain by example.

Perhaps it is unnecessary for a state to require that a shoemaker, or a tailor, or a painter, or a sculptor, should be required to go through a certain course of training before he exercises his art. The best shoemaker and best tailor will be sure to find employment, and individual shoemakers and tailors have as ample means of giving instruction in their craft as can be desired. It may be true or not true, that the best painters and sculptors will meet with most employment: but is

it unnecessary or is it necessary for a state to offer facilities and encouragement to those who design to educate themselves as painters and sculptors? Most civilized nations have decided this question by doing so, and there are many reasons in favour of such a policy.

Ought the state to require the professor of law, of medicine, or of religious teaching, to undergo some kind of preliminary Education, and to obtain a certificate thereof? Nearly all civilized countries have required the lawyer and physician to go through some course of Education. There are strong reasons in some countries, our own for instance, both for and against such a requisition; but on the whole, the reasons seem to preponderate in favour of requiring such Education from him who designs to practise law, and still more from him who designs to practise the art of healing. Most civilized countries, perhaps all, except two (so far as we know), require all persons who profess the teaching of Religion to have received some Education, to be ascertained by some evidence. But in both the nations excepted, any person, however ignorant, may preach on subjects which the mass of the community believe or affect to believe to be of greater importance both for their present and future welfare than any other subjects. Professing to maintain, as we hope they always will do, the principle of religious freedom, these two nations have fallen into the greatest inconsistencies. They have checked the free expression of individual opinion by word of mouth, and fettered it in the written form, in the one country by the severe penalties of posit ve law, and the no less severe penalties of positive morality; and in the other by the penalties of positive morality carried to an excess which is destructive to the interests of the society itself. (See Attorney General v. Pearson, 3 Merrivale, 353.) But both nations allow any person, if he professes to be a teacher of religion, however ignorant he may be, to become the weekly, the daily instructor of thousands, including children, who derive and have derived no instruction of any kind except from this source. Such a teaching or preaching, if it only as

sumes the name and form of religious teaching, is permitted to inculcate principles which may be subversive of the political system; and it may and often does inculcate principles the tendency of which is to undermine the foundations of all social order; for it should never be forgotten that all religious teaching must include moral teaching, though moral teaching is quite distinct from religious teaching. And though it must be admitted that no teacher of religion recommends a bad thing as bad, he may recommend a bad thing as good, solely because he knows no better. We have endeavoured to point out an anomaly which exists in certain political institutions, and which can only be allowed to exist so long as it protects itself under a specious and an honoured but misunderstood name. For though it be admitted that such anomaly exist, it may be said that it cannot be remedied without interfering with the important principle of religious freedom. But what is religious or any other freedom? Is it the individual power of doing or saying what a man likes? Certainly not. It means no more than a freedom not inconsistent with the public welfare. Still it may be urged that this is precisely the kind of freedom with which no state, where the principle of religious freedom is admitted, can safely interfere. But this is only bringing us round again to the question, What is religious freedom? To say that it cannot be interfered with is to assume an answer to the question. Does what is called religious freedom, as the same is now understood, admitting it to produce much good, produce also any evil? If it does, can the evil be remedied? Is the free practice of any art or profession, medicine or law, for instance, or the art of instructing children in general knowledge, or perfect freedom in teaching and expounding religious doctrines, inconsistent with the condition of qualification? How the qualification is to be ascertained, and what it is to be, is the question; and it is a question which may be answered.

It may be asked: If a man should not be a teacher of Religion without complying with some previous conditions, why should he be allowed to write on Religion