This last was merely a consequence of tenure by knight's service, and was abolished by stat. 12 Charles II. c. 24; and the 3rd and 4th having long become obsolete, were finally abolished by the abovementioned statute of Wm. IV. By the old law, the right called dower extended to all the lands of which the husband was seised at any time during the marriage, and which a child of the husband and wife might by possibility inherit; and they remained liable to dower in the hands of a purchaser, though various ingenious modes of conveyance were contrived, which in some cases prevented the attaching of dower; but this liability was productive of great inconvenience, and frequently of injustice. The law, too, was inconsistent, for the wife was not dowable out of her husband's equitable estates, although the husband had his courtesy in those to which the wife was equitably entitled. To remedy these inconveniences the statute above mentioned was passed, and its objects may be stated to be-1, to make equitable estates in possession liable to dower; 2, to take away the right to dower out of lands disposed of by the husband absolutely in his life or by will; 3, to enable the husband, by a simple declaration in a deed or will, to bar the right to dower. 66 was The law of dower," say the Real Property Commissioners, in their Second Report, upon which this statute founded, though well adapted to the state of freehold property which existed at the time when it was established, and during a long time afterwards, had, in consequence of the frequent alienation of property which takes place in modern times, become exceedingly inconvenient." In short, dower was considered and treated as an incumbrance, and was never, except in cases of inadvertency, suffered to arise. The increase of personal property, and the almost universal custom of securing a provision by settlement, afforded more effectual and convenient means of providing for the wife. Dower at the common law is the only species of dower which affects lands in England generally; dower by custom is only of local application, as dower by the custom of gavelkind and Borough Enlish; and freebench applies exclusively to copy hold lands. The former is treated of in Robinson's History of Gavelkind,' the latter in Watkins on 'Copyholds.' As to dower at common law, every married woman who has attained the age of nine years is entitled to dower by common law, except aliens, and Jewesses, so long as they continue in their religion. From the disability arising from alienage, a queen, and also an alien licensed by the king, are exempt. The wife is entitled to be endowed, that is, to have an estate for life in the third part of the lands and tenements of which the husband was solely seised either in deed or in law, or in which he had a right of entry, at any time during the marriage, of a legal or equitable estate of inheritance in possession, to which the issue of the husband and wife (if any) might by possibility inherit. By Magna Charta it is provided, that the widow shall not pay a fine to the lord for her dower, and that she shall remain in the chief house of her husband for forty days after his death, during which time her dower shall be assigned. The particular lands and hereditaments to be held in dower must be assigned by the heir of the husband, or his guardian, by metes and bounds if divisible, otherwise specially, as of the third presentation to a benefice, &c. If the heir or his guardian do not assign, or assign unfairly, the widow has her remedy at law, and the sheriff is appointed to assign her dower; or the widow may enforce her rights by bill in equity, which is now the usual remedy. A woman is barred of her dower by the attainder of her husband for treason, by her own attainder for treason, or felony, by divorce à vinculo matrimonii, by elopement from her husband and living with her adulterer, by detaining the title-deeds from the heir at law, until she restores them, by alienation of the lands assigned her for a greater estate than she has in them; and she might also be barred of her dower by levying a fine, or suffering a recovery during her marriage, while those assurances existed. But the most usual means of barring cost. dower are by jointures, made under the drawback is allowed by the government. provisions of the 27 Hen. VIII. c. 10; Payments of this nature are in principle and by the act of the husband. Before essentially different from bounties, which the stat. 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 105, a fine enable the exporter to sell his goods at or recovery by the husband and wife was less than they cost; but a drawback does the only mode by which a right to dower not interfere with the natural which had already attached could be [BOUNTY.] Previous to the establishing barred, though, by means of a simple of the warehousing system in this country form of conveyance, a husband might in 1803, and when the payment of duties prevent the right to dower from arising on all foreign and colonial merchandise, at all upon lands purchased by him. with the exception of tobacco and East By the above-mentioned statute, it is pro- India goods, was required on the first vided that no woman shall be entitled to importation, drawbacks were in all cases dower out of any lands absolutely dis- allowed upon re-exportation. This course posed of by her husband either in his was injurious to trade, because of the life or by will, and that his debts and larger capital which was necessarily emengagements shall be valid and effectual ployed, and it was prejudicial to the as against the right of the widow to revenue because it gave rise to numerous dower. And further, any declaration and ingenious fraudulent expedients, by by the husband, either by deed or will, means of which greater sums were rethat the dower of his wife shall be sub-ceived for drawback than had been orijected to any restrictions, or that she shall not have any dower, shall be effectual. It is also provided that a simple devise of real estate to the wife by the husband shall, unless a contrary intention be expressed, operate in bar of her dower. This statute, however, affects only marriages contracted, and only deeds, &c., subsequent to the 1st of January, 1834. Most of these alterations, as indeed may be said of many others which have recently been made in the English_real property law, have for some years been established in the United States of America. An account of the various enactments and provisions in force in the different States respecting dower may be found in 4 Kent's Commentaries, p. 34-72. (Blackstone, Comm.; Park On Dower.) DRAMATIC LITERARY PRÓPERTY. [COPYRIGHT.] DRAWBACK is a term used to signify the sum paid back on the re-exportation of goods, upon the importation of which an equal sum has already been paid as duty. A drawback is also allowed on the exportation of articles which are subject to excise duties. The object of this repayment is to enable the exporter to sell his goods in foreign markets unburthened with duties; and it is clear that if duties are required to be paid on the first importation, no transit trade can possibly be carried on unless ginally paid by the importers; besides which, the machinery required for the collection and repayment of duties was more complicated and expensive than would otherwise have been necessary. The amount of customs' duty collected in Great Britain before the passing of the Warehousing Act in 1803 was usually from twice to three times as great as the sum paid into the exchequer, the greater part of the receipts being absorbed by drawbacks, bounties, and charges of management. The only articles upon which drawback. was paid at our Custom-houses, and the amount of repayment in 1844, were as follows: : process, and drawback on wine is only paid when exported in bottles, for transferring it to which from the cask it was, until lately, necessary to pay the duty. In 1830 the sum paid for various drawbacks amounted to 3,300,000l.; and in 1836 to 781,154/. The reduction has been obtained by totally repealing many duties, and by affording greater opportunity of exportation from the warehouses. DRAWER. [EXCHANGE, BILL OF.] DROITS OF ADMIRALTY are the perquisites attached to the office of Admiral of England (or Lord High Admiral). Prince George of Denmark, the husband of Queen Anne and Lord High Admiral, resigned the right to these droits to the Crown for a salary, as Lord High Admiral, of 7000l. a year. When the office was vacant they belonged of right to the Crown. Of these perquisites the most valuable is the right to the property of an enemy seized on the breaking out of hostilities. Large sums were obtained by the Crown on various occasions in the course of the last war from the seizure of the enemy's property, most of which however was eventually given up to the public service. In the arrangement of the Civil List, during the last two reigns, it was settled that whatever Droits of Admiralty accrued were to be paid into the Exchequer for the use of the public. The Lord High Admiral's right to the tenth part of the property captured on the seas has been relinquished in favour of the captors. battle was introduced into England by William the Conqueror, and established in three cases; viz., in the court-martial or court of chivalry, in appeals of felony, and in civil cases upon issue joined in a writ of right. Once established as a mode of trial, the duel was retained after the superstition which had given rise to it had died away, and was resorted to for the purpose of wreaking vengeance, or gaining reputation by the display of courage. Then came the age of chivalry, with its worship of punctilio and personal prowess, its tilts and tournaments, and the duel, originally a mode of trial established by law, became in time (what it now is) a practice dependent on fashion or certain conventional rules of honour. It is an instance of the length of time for which abused and improper obsolete laws are often allowed to encumber the English statute-book, that the trial by battle in appeals of felony and writs of right was only abolished in 1818. An appeal of felony had been brought in the previous year, in a case of murder, and the appellee had resorted to his right of demanding wager of battle (Ashford v. Thornton, 1 Barn. and Ald. 405). The appeal was not proceeded with, so that the barbarous encounter did not take place. [APPEAL.] The law of England makes no distinction between the killing of a man in a duel and other species of murder: and the seconds of both parties are also guilty of murder. But the practice of duelling is maintained by fashion against laws human and divine; and it may be well to enter a little into the reasons of this practice, without reference to its illegality, or to its variance, which no one will dispute, with Christianity. DUCHIES OF CORNWALL AND LANCASTER. [CIVIL LIST, p. 515.] DUELLING. The rise of the practice of duelling is to be referred to the trial by battle which obtained in early ages, jointly with the single combat or tournament of the age of chivalry, which The professed object of a duel is satisagain most probably owed its own exist-faction. The affronter professes to have ence to the early trial by battle. The trial by battle, or duel (as it was also called), was resorted to, in accordance with the superstitious notions of the time, as a sure means of determining the guilt or innocence of a person charged with a erime, or of adjudicating a disputed right. It was thought that God took care to see that, in every case, innocence was vindicated and justice observed. The trial by satisfied the man whom he has affronted, and the challenger professes to have been satisfied by the man whom he has challenged, after they have fired, or have had an opportunity of firing, pistols at one another. That this satisfaction is of the nature of reparation, is of course out of the question. Satisfaction in this its most obvious sense, or reparation for an injury, cannot be effected by the injured man return. firing at his injurer, and being ared at in | practice of duelling is generally said to consist in its tendency to increase courtesy and refinement of manners; as it will be a reason for a man to abstain from giving an affront, that he will be subjected in consequence to the fire of a pistol. The satisfaction furnished by a duel is of a different sort, and of a sort which, were it distinctly comprehended, would at once show the absurdity of the practice; it is a satisfaction occasioned by the knowledge that, by standing fire, the challenger has shown his courage, and that the world cannot call him coward. Now it is clear that there would be no reason for dissatisfaction on this point, previous to the fighting of the duel, and therefore no reason for seeking satisfaction of this sort, were it not that the practice of duelling existed. Were men not in the habit of fighting duels, and therefore not expected to expose themselves to fire after having received an affront, there would be no ground for calling their courage into question, and therefore no necessity for satisfying themselves that the world thinks them courageous. The practice of duelling thus causes the evil which it is called in to remedy,-the injury for which it is required to administer satisfaction. And every one who saw this would immediately see the absurdity of the practice. But the word satisfaction is conveniently ambiguous. When one speaks of it, or hears it spoken of, one thinks of that satisfaction which means reparation for an injury, and which is not the satisfaction furnished by the duel. Thus are men the dupes of words. The real object then of the duel is, in most cases, to satisfy the person who provokes it, or who sends the challenge, that the world does not suspect him of a want of courage; and it will be useful to observe, in passing, that the duel furnishes this sort of satisfaction as well to the man who gave the affront, as to him who was affronted. Its object also, in certain cases, is doubtless to gratify the vengeance of the man who has received an affront. But in all cases the object which is professed, or generally understood to be professed, of satisfaction in the sense of reparation for the affront, is no more than a pretence. But though the practice of duelling cannot effect the good of repairing an injury, it may very possibly effect other sorts of good. The advantage of the Now it is clear, in the first place, that all the affronts which are constituted reasons or grounds of duels by fashion, or the law of honour or public opinion, are so constituted because they are judged by public opinion deserving of disapprobation. If then the practice of duelling did not exist, public opinion, which now constitutes these affronts grounds of a duel, as being deserving of disapprobation, would still condemn them, and, condemning them, provide men with a reason to abstain from them. Thus there would still exist a reason to abstain, in all cases in which the practice of duelling now provides a reason. But, in the second place, the practice of duelling itself depends on public opinion alone. A man fights because public opinion judges that he who in certain cases refuses to challenge or to accept a challenge is deserving of disapprobation: he fights from fear of public opinion. If he abstain from giving an affront on account of the existence of the practice of duelling, it is because the fear of public opinion would oblige him to fight; he abstains then from fear of public opinion. Now we have seen that there would be the fear of public opinion to deter him from the affronts which now lead to duels, if the practice of duelling did not exist. Thus the practice of duelling does not in any case provide a reason to abstain, which public opinion would not provide without its aid. As a means then of increasing courtesy and refinement of manners, the practice of duelling is unnecessary; and inasmuch as its tendency to polish manners is the only advantage which can, with any show of probability, be ascribed to it, there will be no good effects whatever to set against the evil effects which we now proceed to enumerate. There will be no difficulty in striking the balance between good and evil. First, the practice of duelling is disadvantageous, inasmuch as it often diminishes the motives to abstain from an af front. We have seen that the existence of this practice leads public opinion to employ itself concerning the courage of the two persons, who (the one having affronted and the other having been affronted) are in a situation in which, according to custom or fashion, a duel takes place. Public opinion then is diverted by the practice of duelling from the affront to the extraneous consideration of the courage of the two parties. It censures the man who has given the affront only if he shrinks from a duel; and even goes so far as to censure the man who has received the affront for the same reason. Thus in a case where a man, reckless of exposing his life, is disposed to give affronts, he is certain that he can avert censure for an affront by being ready to fight a duel; and in a case where a bold or reckless man is disposed to affront one who is timid, or a man expert with the pistol one who is a bad shot, he can reckon on the man whom he affronts refusing to fight, and on censure being thus diverted from himself who has given an affront to him who has shown want of courage. It is well observed in a very ingenious article on this subject in the Westminster Review:-" It is difficult to conceive how the character of a bully, in all its shades and degrees, would be an object of ambition to any one, in a country where the law is too strong to suffer actual assaults to be committed with impunity, where public opinion is powerful, and duelling not permitted; but where duelling is in full vigour, it is very easy to understand that the bully may not only enjoy the delight of vulgar applause, but the advantages of real power" (vol. iv. p. 28). Secondly, the practice of duelling is disadvantageous, as increasing the amount of injury which one man can do to another by an affront. Thirdly, the practice of duelling affords means for the gratification of vengeance; and thus tends to hurt the characters of individuals, by the encouragement both of that feeling, and of hypocrisy in those who, thirsting for vengeance, and daring not to own it, profess (in the common ambiguous phrase) to be seeking for satisfaction. Fourthly (which is the most important consideration), there are the evils entailed by the deaths which the practice of duelling brings about-evils entailed both on the persons dying, and on their surviving relatives and friends. It is an evil that a man should be cut off from life, "unhouseled, unappointed, unaneled." It is an evil that he should be taken from relatives and friends to whom his life is, in different ways and degrees, a source of happiness; from parents who have centred in him their hopes, and to whom, in their declining years, he might be a comfort, or from a wife and children who look to him for support. Such are the evil effects of the practice of duelling; and there being no list of good effects to set against them, it follows immediately that the tendency of the practice is, on the whole, evil. There arises, then, the question, how is it to be got rid of? A mild and judicious legislation-one which takes into account, and does not set itself violently against, public opinion, may do much. The punishment assigned to the crime of duelling should be popular. It should be a punishment which does not tend to excite sympathy for the criminal, and thus defeat its own object; for where an opinion prevails that a punishment is too severe, witnesses, jurors, judges are provided by the punishment itself with motives to shield the criminal. It is clear that the punishment of death, which the law of England now assigns, is not popular; and it is clear further that, in consequence of this, it is almost entirely nugatory. Public opinion, which favours duelling, sets itself against the punishment of death, and renders legislation vain. Were a man who had killed his antagonist in a duel compelled by the law to support, or assist in supporting, some of his surviving relatives, this, so far as it would go, would be a punishment popular and efficacious. Public opinion would then infallibly be against the man who, having incurred the penalty, should endeavour to avoid it. And such a punishment as this would furthermore be superior to the punishment of death, as being susceptible of graduation-as furnishing |