Arundel, 16. A fine was acknowledged before Roger Man- Arundel v、 wood, Esq. one of the Justices of the Court of Cro. Eliz. Common Pleas; and afterwards a writ of dedimus 677. potestatem was directed to Sir Roger Manwood, he having been knighted after the fine was acknowledged, who returned it with his name and title. It was held that it could not be assigned for error that the dedimus potestatem was directed to Sir R. M. Knt. where there was no such person at the time, he being but an Esquire; because it contradicted the record, by which it appeared that the writ was directed to Sir R. M., who by virtue thereof took the acknowledgement. 17. By the statute 23 Eliz. c. 3. § 2. it is enacted, "That no fine shall be reversed for false or incongruous Latin, rasure, interlining, misentering, or not returning of the sheriff, or want of form in words, and not in substance." demurs for Infancy. 18. Although it is a rule that in actions for the The Parol recovery of dower, the parol shall not demur on account of the infancy of the heir; yet if a man and his wife levy a fine, and after the husband's death the wife brings a writ of error to reverse it, in order to recover her dower; the heir may plead his infancy, and the parol will demur. 19. In error to reverse a fine levied by the plaintiff Herbert v. Binion, and her husband, the heir being summoned as terreCro. Ja. 392. tenant, appeared and pleaded that he was within age, and prayed that the parol might demur. The plaintiff counterpleaded the age, showing that she was entitled to have dower before the fine levied; and was now barred of dower by the fine, which was erroneous; and set forth the errors. Upon demurrer and solemn argument it was adjudged, that the parol should demur; and that the plaintiff should not have the advantage to take from Manner of Fazakerly 1 Salk. 341. 1 Rep. 76 b. 1 Roll. R.11. 3 Lev. 36. Zouch v. the defendant his age, having by the fine, so long as it stood in force, barred herself of her dower. And therefore the law would rather favour the infant, whose privilege was immediate, than the plaintiff's, which was only mediate, after the fine was reversed. 20. The manner of reversing fines differs from that which is observed in reversing other judgments; for in those cases the record itself is removed into the court in which the writ of error is brought; because in adversary suits errors cannot be assigned on a transcript of a record only: but in cases of fines, nothing more than the transcript is removed, on which the errors are assigned: and if the fine is erroneous, the Court of King's Bench may send for the record itself, and reverse it; or else send a writ to the treasurer or chamberlain of the Court of Common Pleas, to take it off the file. 21. It is said by Lord Coke and others, that if there be tenant for life, remainder in fee to an infant, and they both join in levying a fine, which is afterwards reversed by the person in remainder, on account of his infancy; yet that the cognizee shall have the lands during the life of the tenant for life. But in a sub1 Ld. Raym. sequent case it was adjudged, that though a fine might be reversed, as to part of the lands, and remain good as to the residue; yet that a fine could not be reversed in toto as to one person, and remain good in toto as to another. Thompson, 179. Must be brought within 20 years, 22. By the statute 10 & 11 Will. III. c. 4. reciting that fines, recoveries, and judgments were reversible at any time, without restraint or limitation, for any error or defect which happened therein, by the ignorance or carelessness of clerks, and sometimes by unavoidable accidents; it is enacted, § 1, “ That no fine or common recovery, &c. shall be reversed or avoided for any error or defect therein, unless the writ of error or suit for the reversing of such fine, always, that if any person who shall be entitled to 23. In consequence of this statute, a writ of error to reverse a fine must be brought within twenty years after the fine has been levied, and not within twenty years after a title has accrued; for the time when the fine was levied is the period from which the twenty years are to be reckoned. Vide Lloyd v. Vaughan, Tit. 36.c.11. be barred. 24. A person may bar himself from bringing a How it may writ of error in several ways. Thus if a person releases all his right in, or makes a feoffment of the 788. land, whereof a fine has been levied, he will be thereby barred from bringing a writ of error; because, by his release and feoffment, he has for ever excluded himself from the land; and no person can have a writ of error, who is not entitled to the land. 10 Vin. Ab. 25. But it was unanimously held in the case of ante, $15. Wright v. Wickham, that if a person releases his 15. Hart's Case, Carrington's 1 Roll. Ab. 788. Cro. Eliz. 151. Molton's Case. Cockman v. Farrer, T. Raym. 461. T. Jones, 181. Vide Tit. 36. c. 8. Writ of false Writ of ante, c. 4. right in, or makes a feoffment of part of the land, hẹ may still reverse the fine, as to the remainder. 26. If an infant brings a writ of error to reverse a fine, levied by him during his infancy; and on inspection, his non-age is recorded by the Court; but before the fine is reversed, he levies another fine, the second fine will prevent him from reversing the first; because the second fine, having entirely barred him of all right to the lands, must also deprive him of all remedies to recover them. 27. If a tenant in tail levies an erroneous fine, and afterwards levies another erroneous fine, and dies, and the issue in tail brings a writ of error upon the first fine, and the defendant pleads in bar the second fine, and after the issue brings a writ of error upon the second fine, and the defendant pleads in bar the first fine, by which the right is bound; the plaintiff, may reply upon the first writ, that the second fine is erroneous; and upon the second writ, that the first fine is erroneous; and so shall be helped. 28. In a writ of error to reverse a fine, the defendant cannot plead in bar the same fine which is attempted to be reversed; and five years nonclaim. Quia non valet exceptio istius rei, cujus petitur dissolutio. 29. A common recovery will bar the issue in tail from bringing a writ of error to reverse a fine. 30. A writ of error can only be brought to reverse a judgment in a court of record; for to amend errors in a base court, which is not of record, a writ of false judgment lies, returnable in the Court of Common Pleas. 31. Where a fine is levied in the Court of Common Pleas, of lands held in ancient demesne, the lord 99. 2 Inst. may reverse it by writ of deceit and such writ may be brought by the lord against the parties to the fine, 216. 2 Wils. R. 17. and the cestui que use; by means of which he will Rex v. Mead, obtain judgment, not only for damages, which are usually remitted, but also to recover his court and jurisdiction over the lands, and to annul the former proceedings. 290. 32. If a fine be levied of lands, whereof part is Anon.1 Leon. held in ancient demesne, and part frank fee, and the lord in ancient demesne brings his writ of deceit, the Court of K. B., upon a view of the transcript of the record, and proof that part of the lands is ancient demesne, will reverse the fine as to that part. They will not, however, order the fine to be taken off the file, as in cases where the whole fine is reversed, because it will remain good as to the lands which are frank fee; but will order a mark to be made on the fine, to show that it is cancelled, as to the lands held in ancient demesne. 32. The lord of a manor of ancient demesne is not barred of his writ of deceit by the death of any of the parties to the fine. 33. A writ of deceit was brought by the lord of Zouch v. a manor of ancient demesne, to avoid a fine levied of Thompson, 1 Ld. Raym. lands held of him in ancient demesne, as of the said 177. manor. It was argued for the defendant, that the cognizor and cognizee being both dead, the lord could not now maintain an action of deceit, because it was only a personal action, and therefore died with the person. But it was resolved, that a writ of deceit did lie in such a case, against the heir of the cognizor or cognizee, because it was a real deceit, and did not resemble the personal deceit of non-summons and if the law were otherwise, the lord of a manor of ancient demesne would be for ever barred of his right of in |