Construction of Private Acts.

ante, § 38.

Tit. 32. c. 6.

$ 13.

leaving Charles, afterwards Earl of Egremont, her eldest son, who died, leaving George Earl of Egremont his eldest son.

It was admitted on both sides, that upon the death of the Duke of Somerset, the rectory of Overblowes vested in Lord Egremont; because he was within the general saving of the act.

39. Private acts are construed in the same manner as conveyances that derive their effect from the com mon law; and therefore, when any doubt arises upon the construction of a private act, the Court will consider, what the object and intention of the parties was, in obtaining the act; and will, if possible, give effect to that intention.

40. In the case of the Provost of Eton v. the Bishop of Winton, which has been already stated, the Crown having lost the advowson of Overblowes, to which Lord Egremont became entitled, claimed from the College of Eton the advowson of Worplesdon, and presented to it; upon the principle that the whole transaction became void by the defect of title in the Duke of Somerset to the advowson of Overblowes; whereupon the College of Eton brought a quare impedit. It was contended, on the part of the Crown, that private acts were to be construed like deeds; and that this act should be considered as an exchange, in which there was a mutual warranty; and that the eviction of the advowson of Overblowes, by Lord Egremont, gave the Crown a right to be restored to the advowson of Worplesdon. But it was answered, on the part of the College of Eton, that the act could not be considered as an exchange, because an exchange could only be made between two parties: besides, the act could not be construed to operate as a deed of exchange, the word exchange not being

once mentioned therein: the act made use of no words of conveyance, but vested the several advowsons in the respective parties, under the agreement.

Judgement for the College.

2 Term R.

41. A private act was passed in the year 1777 for Townley v. Gibson, inclosing and dividing the common and waste lands within the manor of Yealands, by which it was enacted, 701. that the commissioners should set out, allot, and assign unto the lady of the manor, twenty statute acres of the common and waste grounds, in lieu of, and as compensation for, her right and interest in and to the soil of the residue of the common; and then that the commissioners should allot and assign the residue of the common unto, for, and amongst the said lady of the manor, for and on account of her messuages, tenements, lands, and hereditaments within the said manor, in respect whereof she was entitled to right of common, and to the several other persons having right of common, and to their heirs and assigns for ever, according and in proportion to their several and respective rights, &c.

A subsequent clause directed that "all and every the allotments, &c. to be made under the act, should be vested in fee simple in the several and respective persons, &c. to whom the same should be set out of allotted, and their heirs, assigns, and successors respectively for ever, absolutely freed and discharged of and from all customary tenures, rents, fines, boons, and services whatsoever; and that the several shares or allotments so to be set out as aforesaid, should be in lieu of and in full compensation and satisfaction for all rights of common, and other former property, privilege, right, &c.; and that all rights of common, together with all former rights, interests, profits, &c. in and upon the same, should, from and immediately VOL. V.

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after that time, cease and be for ever barred and extinguished. Provided always, and it was further enacted, that nothing in that act contained should extend to prejudice, lessen, or defeat the right, title, or interest of the said lady of the said manor, her heirs or assigns, of, in, or to the seigniories incident or belonging to the said manor; but that she and they and every of them should and might at all times thereafter hold and enjoy all rents, fines, services, courts, perquisites and profits of courts, goods and chattels of felons and fugitives, felons of themselves and put in exigent, deodands, waifs, estrays, forfeitures, and all other royalties and manorial jurisdictions whatsoever, in and upon the said common and waste grounds thereby intended to be inclosed as aforesaid, to the said manor, or the lord or the lady thereof for the time being, incident, belonging, or appertaining; and the same in as full, ample, and beneficial a manner to all intents and purposes, as she or they might or could have held or enjoyed the same, in case the act had not been made."

Before the passing of this act, the lady of the manor was entitled to the mines and minerals lying under the soil of the manor, of which they had made several leases, the last to one Tissington in 1757, for 21 years, under which the mines were worked, and continued to be so till the year 1759; but from that period the lessee discontinued the works, though the lease was subsisting at the time when the act was made.

The question was, whether the lady of the manor was entitled to the mines, under the clause of reservation in the act, allotting the inclosures to the several tenants of the manor.

It was contended on behalf of the tenants of the manor, that the act barred the lady of the manor

from claiming any future right to the mines and minerals: for by the first clause it appeared that the commissioners were to set out twenty acres to the lady of the manor, in lieu of and as a compensation for her right and interest in the soil of the residue of the waste; and, on the other hand, that all allotments to the several tenants were to be in fee; which the act declared should be a full compensation for all rights of common, and other former property, privi lege, right, title, interest, claim, and demand whatsoever. That if the act had stopped there, there could have been no doubt but that the lady of the manor would have had no right whatever to the mines in the allotments: but if the clause of reservation entitled her to them, and a right still remained in her of digging in those inclosures, without making any allowance for the injury sustained by the owner of the soil, all the purposes of the act would be defeated. The latter clause only provided that the lady of the manor should suffer no prejudice as to her right to all seigniories incident to the manor; and that she should still enjoy all rents, fines, services, &c. and other royalties and manorial jurisdictions: but there was nothing in that clause which had the least reference to the soil of the manor; and the particular enumeration of the things intended was decisive that mines were not intended to be reserved, otherwise they would have been mentioned. The word seigniories in the former part of the clause was defined and explained by the words which followed, and could only mean things of the same nature as those mentioned.

On the other side it was said, that this being a private act, passed at the requisition of the parties concerned, was to be construed like all other private

agreements; consequently the Court would consider the probable intention of the parties, to be collected from the situation and state of their several rights, at the time when the act passed. The ancestor of the defendant was the lady of the manor, and as such

she would have been entitled, not only to the mines under the wastes, but also under the copyhold inclosures, unless there had been some custom to exclude her: the right of these mines existed in the lady of the manor, separate from the interest in the soil, as appeared from the leases of the mines, during the continuance of the last of which, the act passed. It was admitted that the words in the first clause were large enough to comprehend mines, if such had been the intention of the parties; but that could not have been so intended, for then the subsisting lease would have been affected, and the rents thereby reserved; which certainly could not have been intended, inasmuch as they were reserved expressly by the word rents in the saving clause, there being no other rents to which that word could relate; and there being a reservation of the rents to the lord, the right to the mines themselves, out of which the rent issued, would also be reserved to him. Besides, there were other words in the saving clause which were sufficiently comprehensive to reserve the right of digging for mines; such as seigniories and royalties: if therefore the mines had been intended to have been taken out of the lord, there should have been express words for that purpose.

Lord Kenyon." I agree that private acts of parliament are to be construed according to the intention of the parties; but then that intention must be collected from the words used by the legislature, without doing violence to their natural meaning. The