which he is now suffering is hereditary in his family, and that a brother of his committed suicide not long since while in a state of mental aberration.

It is not improbable that Obrigon was laboring under the incipient stages of a malady so terrible, at the time of the marriage, yet it must have been so slight as not to be perceptible to the bride, her friends, or the very respectable pastor who solemnized the marriage.

This is the fourth petition for a divorce presented at this session of the Legislature, and the committee deem it proper on this occasion to state briefly to the House the reasons which compel them to come to a conclusion adverse to the prayer of the petitioner at more length, in order that the laws upon so important a branch of our domestic relations may be more generally diffused.

The practice of the Legislature upon this subject has been, with one exception, uniform. The first and only law that has ever passed, was that annulling the marriage of Eunice Chapman, in 1818. Our legislation has been so uniform, that neither during the colonial government, or under the Constitution of 1777, or the present Constitution, is there to be found any other cases of legislative divorce, and that case had no precedent, and has not been followed in practice.

The first law permitting divorces for any cause, was passed in 1787, and by which the court of chancery was authorised in one particular class of cases to dissolve the marriage contract. The Revised Statutes have extended the jurisdiction of that court to the following additional cases:

Where the parties, or one of them, had not at the time of the marriage, attained the age of legal consent.

Where the former husband or wife of one of the parties was living, and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force.

That one of the parties was an idiot or lunatic. In this latter case, the divorce can be obtained only on the complaint of the friends of the idiot or lunatic.

When the consent of one of the parties was obtained by fraud or force.

When one of the parties was physically incapable of entering into the marriage state.

Could the petitioner establish the allegation that her marriage was procured by fraud, then she can be relieved in the court of chancery, and legislative interference would be impolitic and un

necessary.

The committee are of opinion that neither party ought to be permitted to set up the insanity or idiocy of the other, at the time of the marriage or subsequent thereto, and have the contract dissolved for that cause. The only reason why the court of chancery

is authorised to interfere on behalf of the idiot or lunatic, is for their protection on the ground that they were incapable of contracting, and when possessed of property, they ought to be protected from the wicked and heartless profligacy of those who would, by the matrimonial contract, attempt to gain possession of the person of a lunatic or idiot, to deprive them of their wealth.

The rule therefore ought to be inflexible, that the marriage will not be dissolved except upon the suggestions of the friends of those who are deprived of their reason. What but the most sordid avarice or depraved appetite could induce a person claiming to be rational to make such a contract? And if made, upon what principle of justice can they ask relief at our hands?

"An absolute and unconditional dissolution of the marriage contract by statute authority, without any previous judicial investigation, or trial by jury, as to the truth of the facts on which the divorce is asked," would, in the opinion of your committee, be unwise, operate unjustly, and be fraught with danger to society.

It is the opinion of the committee, that the statutes have provided for all the causes for which divorces should be granted; and to extend them to the present case would set an example, which if followed, would be found productive of great evils. This case may be one of great hardship to the petitioner, but we feel it our duty to oppose any innovation upon the well settled practice and policy of our government.

In several of the States the practice prevails of granting legislative divorces, but we indulge the hope that it may never prevail here. We clearly believe "that the stronger authority and the

better policy are in favor of the stability of the marriage union." "That like all other great benefits, matrimony, in its universal application, produces many partial evils, and much individual suffering; but the sum of individual happiness, as well as the peace and order of society, requires that the nuptial tie should be indissoluble, except for the cases now provided for by law."

"That while the partial evils of indissoluble matrimony are sometimes witnessed and deplored, we ought to be consoled by the reflection that the peace and character of many thousands of families are preserved by the mutual forbearance and concession between husband and wife, which are induced by the ever impressive consideration that the voluntary tie which bound them can never be dissolved."

"History and experience unite to confirm the belief that the measure of purity or of profigacy in public morals, in all countries and under every form of government, is essentially graduated according to the degree of sanctity and stability of the marriage contract."

In adopting these opinions of the Counsel of Revision, in the case of Eunice Chapman, we feel conscious that they will be received as the result of long judicial experience, and as emanating from a body entitled to high consideration for their wisdom.

It has been urged upon the committee that a law might be passed in this case confirming jurisdiction upon the chancellor to grant relief in this instance. The committee, however, believe this would be still more objectionable than a general law, providing for divorces in all cases of idiotcy or insanity. Sound legislation requires laws to be general, for if we should start with sanctioning the principle to legislate for each case of individual hardship, our laws would be too multifarious and complex ever to be understood, and it would require a continued session to hear and determine complaints.

The committee commisserate the sufferings and misfortunes of the petitioner, but their duty requires them to offer for the consideration of the House the following resolution:

Resolved, That the prayer of the petitioner ought not to be granted.

IN ASSEMBLY,

April 29, 1833.

REPORT

Of the committee on colleges, academies and common schools, on the resolution from the Senate relative to the introduction of Washington Irving's abridged Life of Columbus into the common schools of this State.

Mr. McKeon, from the committee on colleges, academies and common schools, to whom was referred the resolutions from the Honorable the Senate, relative to the introduction of Washington Irving's abridged Life of Columbus into the common schools of this State,

REPORTED:

That your committee are persuaded that the passage of the resolutions in question will have a direct tendency to raise the standard of education in the common schools of the State, and will at the same time be applauded throughout the Union as a most ape propriate tribute on the part of this State to the eminent genius and meritorious labors of one of our, native citizens. Your committee therefore have no hesitation in advising that this House concur with the Senate.

It is unnecessary that your committee should dwell on the superior merits, as a literary production, of Washington Irving's Life and Voyages of Columbus; it has already received the stamp of public approbation, not only in this country, but in every part of the civilized world, where English and American literature is known and valued. Some years of the life of the author were devoted to the preparation of the work; and by a most assiduous study of original and unpublished documents, which, by his personal re[Assem. No. 333.]

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searches he discovered iu the libraries of Spain, he has been enabled to corect the errors and supply the defects of preceding writers. The production is worthy of the time and labor that it cost. In the accuracy and fullness of its narrative, the beauty of its varied illustrations and the purity and vigor of its style, it is universally admitted to surpass all other works on the same subject; and your committee are assured that they but repeat the opinion of all competent judges in pronouncing it the most valuable contribution that has yet been made to the rising literature of our country.

The abridgment of this masterly work by the author, preserves in a great measure the excellencies of the original; the style is equally animated, correct and flowing, and while the substance of the narrative is retained, the interest is rather enhanced than weakened by the compressed form in which the facts are given. Its peculiar adaptation to the use of common schools will not be denied by any who have perused the work, and are competent to appreciate its extraordinary merits.

Your committee are unable to perceive on what grounds it has been supposed that in recommending a book of such acknowledged excellence to be read in the common schools, the Legislature will transcend the limits of their official duty.

The common school system is the creation of the Legislature, and is subject in all its departments to legislative control. The right of the Legislature to adopt such regulations as they may deem proper as to the organization of the schools, the qualifications of the teachers, and the course of instruction has never been doubted. It would seen a waste of time to refute an objection which assumes, that the same body which has the power to command and prescribe will exceed its authority by limiting itself to recommendation and advice.

Your committee are aware that the Legislature on several occasions have refused to compel by law the use of any particular work as a standard book in the common schools, and they are well satisfied that it would be unwise to interfere in this manner. The principle of the objection is, (to use the language of the late Secretary of State.) that "the adoption by law of any particular book, is a prohibition to future improvements." But it is obvious that this principle does not apply to a mere recommendation.