such State, be considered as utterly void and ineffectual. Furthermore, it is contended that a declaration of the kind above mentioned, is not only binding upon all within the jurisdiction of the disaffected State, but conclusive also, for the time being at least, against all the authorities of the General Government. From this novel and most extravagant doctrine, it results as a consequence, that an act of the highest legislative authority of this nation, whatever may be its scope or object, or however urgent in reference either to the foreign or internal affairs of the whole people, may have been the cause of its adoption, must, when thus brought into question, remain as it were in obeyance, at the commandment of a single State. In other words, that the vast and complicated machinery of the national government shall be made to stand still, until a grand Convention of twenty-four independent contending sovereignties, if so many should be pleased to assemble on the occasion, shall have considered and determined the question of its validity.

Such, in substance, appears to be the theory of reform which has recently been promulgated, and is still maintained by the constituted authorities of South Carolina; and your committee is constrained to believe that it is, with a reference to this system, and to a consummation of the very extraordinary course of procedure therein contemplated, that the proposition for a Convention of the States is now submitted to their Legislature. The committee conceive that it would be a very useless appropriation of time, especially as the whole subject matter involved in the late extraordinary proceedings of South Carolina, is already entirely familiar to the community, were they to proceed any further, on a course of reasoning, in order to demonstrate the utter fallacy and impracticability of the doctrines here adverted to; or to dwell longer in contemplating the consequences in which, should they be sustained, they must naturally and necessarily involve the peace and safety of the Union. Their tendency, it is conceived, is quite too obvious to require, or even to admit of argument or illustration They, manifestly, go to resolve at once our present glorious system of National Government into its original elements, and would leave, not for the present generation, but for posterity, the fearful if not utterly hopeless task, of building some frail and miserable fabric upon its ruins.

In fine, your committee are unanimously of the opinion, that upon any such grounds, or for any such reasons as those which are set forth in the said preamble and resolutions, according to the construction thus given to them, it would be wholly inconsistent with the honor and the dignity of this Commonwealth to accede to the call of a Convention of the States, for the purposes therein specified.

But secondly, in case your committee have been so unfortunate in regard to the before mentioned particulars, as to have misinterpreted the import and intent of the communication from the Legistature of South Carolina; if, contrary to the construction now assumed, its real intention was to invite the co-operation of Mas

sachusetts in the call of a Convention of the States, with a view to some legitimate amendment of the Constitution, in conformity with the existing provisions of the instrument, the committee are nevertheless, entirely agreed in the opinion, that there are in truth and in fact, no such causes existing, as would justify, even for such a purpose, (especially, during the present irritable state of feeling among the people of several States of the Union,) a resort to a measure so unusual and extraordinary. Unless some one or two discontented States in this Union should by reason of their pre-eminence in virtue and patriotism, be considered as justly entitled to the distinguishing appellation of "the States of this Union," the committee cannot assent to the position which is laid down in the sweeping language of the preamble to the resolutions from South Carolina, that there are in fact existing, serious causes, or any just causes whatever, whether serious or trivial, of discontent among "the States of this Union;" much less are the committee prepared to sanction the yet more extravagant assertion, that if discontents of any kind, or to any extent, do in fact exist, "they have arisen from the exercise, by Congress, of powers not conferred or contemplated by the sovereign parties to the Federal Compact."

It is indeed true that within the period of the last two or three years one of the States of this Union has seen fit to proclaim aloud throughout the land, her displeasure on account of certain prominent measures of the General Government.

She has been pleased to assign as the cause of the discontent, that the highest legislative authority of the nation, had assumed to itself the exercise of unwarrantable, and exhorbitant power; and on this ground has at length placed herself in the attitude of open defiance of the Constitution and the laws of the land.

It is not less true however, that whatever of sympathy or com miseration may have been expressed or felt by any for the errors and delusion of a much beloved, but wayward associate in the political family, not a single other State in this Union is united with her in sentiment, either as to the legal grounds of her complaint, or the propriety of the measures to which she has seen fit to resort for redress. On the contrary, in relation to both the one and the other, the voice of nearly the whole people in their primary assemblages, in their halls of legislation, and everywhere throughout the land, has been heard in a tone not of expostulation only, but of severe censure and reproof, to pronounce its decision against her.

In the opinion of your committee, a convention of the States cannot now be necessary to consider the validity of that decision, or to add any new provisions to those already existing in the Federal Compact, with the view of preventing a recurrence of similar discontents among the States in future.

It is now nearly half a century since the present admirable system of Goverment first came from the hands of the illustrious statesmen and patriots by whom it was framed. Its theory, conceived as it would now seeem to have been, almost by the power of superhuman intelligence, has been found in experiment in its wonder

ful adaptation to all the various and complicated concerns of this great and growing nation not only to have equalled, but greatly transcended the most sanguine hopes and expectations of the country.

In peace and in war; throughout all the trials and vicissitudes to which the nations, as well as individuals, in this imperfect state of being are necessarily subjected, its original principles, as they were at first established and understood by the people, have, to this day, remained without essential change or variation-unpolluted, undisturbed. Indeed, the members of the committee are solemnly impressed with the conviction, that next to the superintending agency of a wise and beneficent Providence, which seems from the first to have watched over the destinies of this much favored people, it is to this same system of civil government, and to the mild, but firm and undeviating manner in which its principles have, for the most part, been maintained and administered, that we are chiefly indebted for the general, nay, almost universal prosperity which is now seen and felt in every part of this wide spread nation. It is this, as they verily believe, which, under the smiles of Heaven, has been the means of elevating these States from their once confused and imbecile condition, to that distinguished station which they now occupy among the proudest and most powerful nations of the world.

In the Constitution of a government framed with such wisdom, which has been thus tried and proved, and found to have been attended with such happy results, it surely would not be the part of prudence or good policy to attempt on any light occasion, or indeed in any case but one of the most imperious and urgent necessity, a fundamental change of any kind. It is the opinion of your committee, that in the complaints lately put forth by the State of South Caorlina, there is nothing, when their real causes are fairly and fully investigated, that can be supposed to amount to the presentment of an exigency of this latter description.

Nor do the committee believe that a revision of the Federal Constitution, by a Convention of the States, would at this time be useful, much less that it can be necessary, as has of late been sometimes alleged, or pretended, with a view to some more clear and exact definition than is to be found in the existing provisions of that instrument, in relation either to the legitimate boundaries of jurisdiction between the General and the State Governments, or to any of the powers or immunities which these high parties respectively have hitherto been accustomed to claim or enjoy.

It was not unforeseen by the illustrious framers of the federal compact, nor by the intelligent people who adopted it, that, in the very nature of things, such "questions of disputed power," (to use the language of the South Carolina resolutions,) would be likely to arise in the course of its operation. They were doubtless well aware also, that it was not in the power of any human wisdom or forecast, or indeed of any thing less than the intelligence which belongs alone to the Omniscient, to devise a system of government for a nation like this, that should be forever exempt from such [Assem. No. 291.]

2

.

doubts and exceptions as the ingenuity or ambition of men might suggest, especially in times of party zeal or excitement. Differences of this kind in political opinion, and the collisions which sometimes spring from them, should be regarded as the natural, perhaps necessary incidents of all free institutions; as constituting in fact, that portion of alloy, which, by the ordination of Providence, seems to have been mingled with all our best comforts and blessings, and without which we could not have been permitted to enjoy the blessings of civil liberty, which is more precious in our estimation than all others.

But it is believed that the testimony of all history will demonstrate that such difficulties have been of less frequent occurrence, and attended with much less serious consequences in this, than in any other government partaking in any degree of the republican form, which has existed on the face of the earth. It was, at any rate, precisely with a reference to these natural and necessary consequences of the freedom of all our political institutions, that the grand conservative principle, which is found in the judiciary department, was deeply implanted in the system; that a high tribunal was appointed to stand, as it were, by the very tenure of its office, as well as by the peculiarity of its attributes in other respects, separate and distinct from all other departments of the government. That to this tribunal was confided the great business of interpreting the Constitution and the laws, and of performing the high office of arbiter, in the last resort, of all questions "of disputed power," that might arise in the course of their administration. It is, in the opinion of the committee, no more than a tribute justly due to the character and conduct of this distinguished tribunal, as well as to the wisdom and forecast of the illustrious statesmen who provided for its organization, to pronounce that it has hitherto fulfilled most faithfully and effectually, the great purposes of its appointment.

It must be admitted, indeed, that, in the course of a series of years, during which the system has been in operation, a few isolated instances of insubordination, not only among considerable masses of citizens, but extending even to the constituted authori ties of whole States, have been known to exist, which seemed, at first, too mighty to be controlled by the mild and peaceable operation of the principle alluded to; but, happily for the peace and honor of the country, the Constitution and the laws have hitherto, in all such cases, eventually triumphed. The committee here feel a degree of pride as well as pleasure, from having an opportunity to unite their humble voice with that of a late distinguished commentator, who had, perhaps, as much to do, as any other mortal, now living or dead, in the original formation and subsequent administration of our present system of government, in the declaration, that, "with few exceptions, the course of the judiciary has, hitherto, been sanctioned by the predominant sense of the nation."

If, in relation to this particular branch of the subject any thing further were wanting in confirmation of the opinions which are entertained by every member of the committee, they would beg leave

to invoke to their aid, and indeed, to adopt as their own, the senti ments that were once expressed by the authorities of another leading State of this Union, in a case corresponding essentially in its character, and, in fact, almost entirely analogous in its circumstances, to that which is now presented for consideration.

The committee here allude to the proceedings of the Legislature of Virginia, some thirty years ago, when a proposition was submitted to them by the Government of a neighboring State, then the largest and most influential member of the confederacy, for an amendment of the Constitution of the United States, by provi ding for "the appointment of an impartial tribunal to decide disputes between the State and Federal Judiciary;" in other words, a tribunal, in relation to which, the one now established by the Constitution should become a mere subordinate and dependent. It would be foreign from the purpose of the present inquiry, and serve only to revive the remembrance of scenes, which, for the honor of the country, should rather be permitted to pass silently to oblivion, and, if possible, be obliterated from the history of this government, were the committee to attempt a detail of the reasons, or rather, pretexts, which were urged as the grounds of this extraordinary, and at that time, wholly unprecedented proposal, on the part of the great State that has been alluded to.

It is sufficient for us to know, that it was a case in which the highest authorities of one of the States of this Union were seen in hostile array, on the very verge of open insurrection, against the judicial power of the nation; and which, but for a returning consciousness of error and delusion on the one side, and a firm, undeviating perseverance in the execution of its high duties, on the other, must inevitably have involved the country in all the complicated horrors of civil war.

But, happily for the nation, the pretensions and the project of the disaffected State received no countenance from the State of Virginia. Her response on the occasion was precisely such as might reasonably have been anticipated, from the intelligence and pure patriotism of such men as are known to have presided, at that day, in the councils of that much distinguished Commonwealth.

"It was, among other things, unanimously resolved by both branches of their Legislature, that, in their opinion, there was a tribunal already provided by the Constitution of the United States; to wit, the Supreme Court, more eminently qualified, from their habits and duties, from the mode of their selection, and from the tenure of their office, to decide the disputes aforesaid, in an enlightened and impartial manner, than any other tribunal which could be erected."

Such, to the very letter, was the magnanimous declaration of Virginia, when, by reason of an unpopular judicial decision, (in the celebrated Olmstead case of Pennsylvania) she was invited to eo-operate in an attempt to break up the existing foundations of the judiciary department of our Government. The example thus presented to us is worthy of all praise, and of imitation; and it