DOCUMENTS. REPORT Of the special joint committee on the message of the Governor, of Ja nuary 19, transmitting resolutions of South Carolina, proposing a Convention of the people, to revise the Constitution of the Uni ted States, SIR EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, I have the honor to transmit the annexed resolutions, passed by both branches of the Legislature of South Carolina, with a request that the same may be laid before the Legislature of your State. With high consideration, I am, Very respectfully, your ob't. serv't. TO HIS EXCELLENCY, The Governor of Massachusetts. ROB. Y. HAYNE. IN THE SENATE, 13th December, 1832. The committee on Federal relations, to whom was referred that portion of the Governor's message, No. 3, which relates to the call of a Convention of the States, respectfully report the following preamble and resolutions. Whereas, serious causes of discontent do exist among the States of this Union, from the exercise, by Congress, of powers not conferred, or contemplated, by the sovereign parties to the compact, therefore, Resolved, That it is expedient that a Convention of the States be called as early as practicable, to consider and determine such questions of disputed power, as have arisen between the States of this Confederacy and the General Government. Resolved, That the Governor be requested to transmit copies of this preamble and resolutions to the Governors of the several States, with a request that the same be laid before the Legislatures of their respective States, and also to our Senators and Re presentatives in Congress, to be by them laid before Congress for consideration. Resolved, That the Senate do agree. Ordered, To the House of Representatives for concurrence. IN THE SENATE, 19th December, 1832. The House of Representatives returned, with their concurrence, the report of the committee on Federal Relations, on that portion of the Governor's message, No. 3, which relates to the call of a Convention of the States. A true copy from the Journals. JACOB WARLEY, Clerk of the Senate. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. IN SENATE, February, 1833. The special joint committee, to whom was referred, among other things, that portion of His Excellency the Governor's message, relating to the subject of the preamble and resolutions of the Legislature of South Carolina, proposing that a "Convention of the States should be called, as early as practicable, to consider and determine such questions of disputed power as have arisen between the States of this confederacy, and the General Government," have had the same under consideration, and respectfully submit the following REPORT in part. Upon the first presentment of the resolutions in question, taken in connexion with the matter contained in the preamble, with which they are introduced, your committee were considerably at a loss to determine what should be regarded as being their precise scope and object. The question occurred to them, whether it was the intention of the Legislature of South Carolina to invite a Convention of the States, with a view to certain specific amendments of the Constitution of the General Government, in conformity with the provisions in the fifth article of that instrument, or to assume the novel and extraordinary ground that such a convention was necessary, or expedient for the purpose, merely, of considering, and determining, in their sovereign capacity, certain questions of disputed power, which are supposed to exist between that State, more particularly, and the Government of the Union. With reference to this point, the committee were naturally led, in the first place, to a consideration of the very unusual manner, (in case an amendment of the Constitution, in conformity with the article alluded to, were alone contemplated,) in which the proposition is submitted to the Legislature of Massachusetts. Since the first organization of the Federal Government, it has, as the committee believe, been the uniform practice of the Legislature of a State, whenever it has proposed to bring about any amendment or change in the constitution of that government by a convention of the States, to specify, in their application to other States for co-operation and support in such a measure, the precise points wherein the existing provisions of the system were supposed to be doubtful or insufficient, and the nature and extent of the correction proposed to be applied. This form of application, which, whether prescribed or not by the terms of the article before referred to, would seem to be such as the nature of the case requires, appears, nevertheless, to have been not inadvertently, but studiously, avoided by the Legislature of South Carolina on the present occasion. In another particular, the novelty of the proposition now submitted to this Legislature, not as respects its form only, but its matter and substance is not less conspicuous. It is not proposed that a convention should be called, with a view to any particular amendment, or even, in general terms, to a revision of the Constitution of the General Government, but that it should take upon itself, when assembled, in a manner wholly unknown in any existing provision of the federal compact, the office of umpire, and sit in judgment on certain disputes which are alleged to exist between a State or States and the nation. It is believed by your committee, that, with the exception of one solitary case of analogous description, to which they may hereafter have occasion to advert, for another purpose, but which, considering the time of its occurrence, and the fate that awaited it, they can hardly suppose would be relied upon as affording the authority of a precedent, the proposition now submitted is entirely unexampled in the history of this Government. It is, at any rate, most manifest, that if assented to by the States, it would necessarily be attended with the most fatal consequences to the Union. If the principle be sanctioned, that whenever a single member of this confederacy, conceiving itself aggrieved by any, even a questionable measure of the General Government, shall be permitted, first, to resist the measure, and then to summon a convention of the whole, in order to consider and determine the matter in dispute, it is easy to foresee what utter degradation of all the regular authorities of the government, what scenes of anarchy and disorder throughout the land must inevitably and speedily ensue. But it appears to your committee, that the proposition, in itself, is not more extraordinary than is the sweeping assertion with which it is prefaced, and which seems indeed to constitute the only grounds upon which it is predicated. In the preamble to the resolutions in question, it is declared “that serious causes of discontent do exist among the States of this Union, from the exercise by Congress, of powers not conferred or contemplated by the sovereign parties to the compact." The committee will not trust themselves to express, in terms such as their feelings might prompt them to employ on the occasion, the surprise, as well as the regret they have experienced at meeting with a solemn, deliberate announcement like this, from the legislative body of a respectable member of this Union. Nor will they stop to consider how far, under almost any imaginable circumstances, it is consistent with that courtesy and comity, to say nothing of respect and confidence, which the constituted authorities of the different States have hitherto been accustomed to manifest in their intercourse with one another, and with the several departments of the General Government. In the view of your committee, the position here assumed, for it is unaccompanied by any reserve or qualification whatsoever, amounts in fact to nothing less than this: that both branches of the legislative department of this nation, including of course the chief executive, who must have sanctioned their proceedings, have manifestly been guilty of a dereliction of duty, a palpable abuse of power, while in the pretended exercise of their official functions. An imputation of so grave and serious a nature is not indeed in so many words pronounced against them, but as much as this is clearly implied by the whole tenor of the document alluded to. If, according to the naked assertion of the preamble, which is wholly unaccompanied by any allowance for a possible error of judgment, the Congress of the United States have, on any occasion, been found to have exercised "powers not conferred nor even contemplated by the parties to the federal compact," the inference would seem to follow, of course, for all acts of a legislative body must be supposed to have been the result of deliberation, that the outrage was perpetrated knowingly, intentionally. Indeed, the committee have been reluctantly led to the conclusion, especially when taking into view the present communication from the Legislature of South Carolina, in connection with the extraordinary measures antecedently adopted, and still maintained by a majority of the people of that State, in their Convention, and in their halls of legislation, that it was, in reality, their deliberate intention to pronounce a sentence not less serious and severe, than that before supposed, against the legislative authorities of the General Government. It is, as your committee, from a due consideration of all the circumstances of the case, are constrained to believe, principally, with a view to the confirmation or the reversal of this sentence, that the invitation is now given to Massachusetts, to unite in summoning a Convention of the States. In this connection, it may be useful to notice, very briefly, the grounds on which, not the leading politicians only, but the high functionaries in the government of South Carolina, have attempted to justify the extraordinary proceedings that have been adverted to. It has been promulgated as one of the first and fundamental principles in their new theory of the Federal Government, that not one jot or tittle of the sovereignty of any State was surrendered or compromised in any manner, at the formation of the Union. That a State has a right of course, to be its own interpreter of the laws of the General Government, and to be the judge in the last resort, of their validity. That, whenever a State, in its sovereign capacity, shall be pleased to pronounce that the Congress of the United States have, in regard to any other of their enactments, transcended the authority delegated to them by the Constitution, all such acts must thenceforth, so far at least as concerns the citizens of |