In fine, upon a mature, and deliberate consideration of the whole subject submitted to them, the Committee have unanimously, agreed to recommend to this Legislature, the adoption of the following Resolves.

For the Committee.

GEORGE BLAKE.

RESOLVES.

WHEREAS, the Governor of the State of South Carolina did, by his communication, under date of the fifth day of January last past, transmit to His Excellency the Governor of this Commonwealth, copies of a certain preamble, and resolutions connected therewith, recently passed by both branches of the Legislature of the said first mentioned State, with a request that the same might be laid before the Legislature of this Commonwealth; in which said preamble and resolutions, it is set forth that "serious causes of discontent do exist among the States of this Union, from the exercise, by Congress, of powers not conferred or contemplated by the sovereign parties to the compact; and resolving, therefore, that it is expedient that a Convention of the States be called, as early as practicable, to consider and determine such questions of disputed power as have arisen between the States of this Confederacy and the General Government."

AND WHEREAS, His Excellency the Governor of this Commonwealth hath, in pursuance of the said request, submitted to the consideration of this Legislature, the preamble and resolutions aforesaid: Therefore

1. Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in General Court assembled, That the Legislature of this Commonwealth do not recognize the existence, at this time, of any serious causes of discontent, among the States generally, of this Union, or in any one of them; much less, can they admit that, if any such discontents do, in fact, exist, they have arisen from the exercise by Congress of powers not conferred or contemplated by the sovereign parties to the compact, as is asserted in the before mentioned communication from the Legislature of South Carolina.

2. Resolved, That there is, already existing, under the Constitution of the United States, a proper and competent tribunal, namely, the Supreme Court of the United States, who are invested with sufficient power and authority; who are eminently

qualified, and to whom it constitutionally belongs, to consider and determine "the questions of disputed power," and all other matters of controversy which are referred to in the said preamble and resolutions: Therefore

3. Resolved, That the Legislature of this Commonwealth do not accede to the proposition of calling a Convention of the States for the purposes therein expressed, or for any other purpose whatsoever.

4. Resolved, That His Excellency the Governor, be requested to transmit a copy of these resolves, together with the report which accompanies them, to the President of the United States, the Governors of all the States, and to each of the Senators and Representatives of this Commonwealth in Congress.

IN SENATE, March 16, 1833.

Read twice and passed. Sent down for concurrence.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 18TH, 1833.

The Joint Select Committee, appointed to consider the Resolutions of the Legislature of Georgia, proposing a Convention of the People of the United States, for the Amendment, in various respects, of the Constitution, and also so much of the Governor's Special Message as relates thereto, have attended to the duty assigned them, and ask leave to submit the following

REPORT:

The Resolutions of the State of Georgia propose to the other States of the Union the call of a Convention of the people, in conformity with the provisions of the fifth article of the Constitution, for the purpose of defining and making certain that instrument in regard to certain questions of disputed power, and for the purpose of altering it in other respects, wherein it needs amendment, in the opinion of the Legislature of Georgia. In the preamble to their resolutions, they premise that "throughout the United States there exist many controversies, growing out of the conflicting interests which have arisen among the people since the adoption of the Federal Constitution,-out of the cases in which Congress claims the right to act under constructive or implied powers,-out of the disposition, shown by Congress, too frequently to act under assumed powers,-and out of the rights of jurisdiction, either claimed or exercised by the Supreme Court,"-all of which controversies, they allege have a tendency to produce discontent and disaffection among the citizens of the United States, and ultimately to bring about a dissolution of the Union; and upon these premises they conclude that experience has "clearly proved" the Constitution to

need amendment in thirteen distinct particulars, which they proceed to set forth specifically, as the basis of their Resolutions. Your Committee propose briefly to remark upon the several portions of the Preamble to the Resolutions, and in so doing they will have explained the grounds of the Resolves, which they offer to the consideration of the Senate and House of Representatives.

Your Committee do not pretend to deny, that "controversies" exist in some parts of the Union, "growing out of the conflicting interests, which have arisen among the people since the adoption of the Federal Constitution." Such controversies, and such sources of controversy, are inseparable from the very existence of political society, and belong to the practical operation of every system of government in every country. They are not such as any modifications of the present Constitution could remove, or any prescribed form of fundamental law prevent. Of course, whatever may be the extent, nature, degree, or tendency of controversies of this description, they do not seem to your Committee to afford any argument in favor of the call of a Con

vention.

And whatever controversies may have arisen out of "the cases, in which Congress claims the right to act under constructive or implied powers," your Committee conceive that still less can such cases be admitted to render the call of a Convention necessary or expedient. Prior to the time when the people of the United States adopted the Constitution, they possessed, either in themselves individually, or in their respective state governments, all the powers of sovereignty. That Constitution consists in part of a specification of powers, whereof the people saw fit to divest themselves or the States, in order to concede them to the government of the United States; and it is manifest that, according to the settled principles of constitutional jurisprudence, the Union cannot rightly claim any powers, other than such as are bestowed upon it by the Constitution. What those powers are, and what their extent, are in themselves essentially questions of construction, that is, of the legal meaning and effect of the terms of the instrument. Whether it shall be construed liberally, or whether it shall be construed strictly,— or whether neither liberally nor strictly, if there be any middle