rotten carcass before that of the most odori ferous flower: nor jarring difcords before the most exquisite harmony.

But we must not ftop here. If the pleafures of external fenfe be exempted from criticism, why not every one of our plea fures, from whatever fource derived ? If tafte in the proper sense of the word cannot be difputed, there is as little room for dif puting it in its figurative sense. The proverb accordingly comprehends both; and in that large sense may be refolved into the following general propofition, That with respect to the fenfitive part of our nature, by which some objects are agreeable some disagreeable, there is not such a thing as a good or bad, a right or wrong; that every man's taste is to himself an ultimate standard without appeal; and confequently that there is no ground of cenfure against any one, if fuch a one there be, who prefers Blackmore before Homer, felfifhnefs before benevolence, or cowardice before magnanimity.

The proverb in the foregoing inftances, is indeed carried very far. It feems difficult,

however,

ap

however, to fap its foundation, or with fuc cefs to attack it from any quarter. For in comparing the various tastes of individuals, it is not obvious what ftandard must be pealed to. Is not every man equally a judge of what is agreeable or difagreeable to himself? Doth it not seem odd, and perhaps abfurd, that a man ought not to be pleased when he is, or that he ought to be pleased when he is not?

This reafoning may perplex, but, in contradiction to fenfe and feeling, will never afford conviction. A man of taste must neceffarily feel the reasoning to be falfe, however unqualified to detect the fallacy. At the fame time, though no man of taste will fubfcribe to the proverb as holding true in every cafe, no man will venture to affirm that it holds true in no cafe. Subjects there are undoubtedly, that we may like or dif like indifferently, without any imputation upon our taste.. Were a philofopher to make a scale for human pleasures with many divifions, in order that the value of each pleasure may be denoted by the place it occupies, he would not think of making di

VOL. III.

ХУ

vifions

vifions without end, but would rank toge ther many pleasures arifing perhaps from different objects, either as being equally va→ luable, or differing fo imperceptibly as i to make a separation unneceffary.sol Nature hath taken this courfe, fo far as appears to the generality of mankind. There may be fubdivifions without end; but we are only fenfible of the groffer divifions, comprehend ing each of them many pleasures of various kinds. To thefe the proverb is applicable in the ftricteft fenfe; for with respect to pleasures of the fame rank, what ground can there be for preferring one before another? If a preference in fact be given by any individual, it cannot be tafte, but cuftom, imitation, or fome peculiarity of mind.

Nature in her fcale of pleafures, has been fparing of divifions: fhe hath wifely and benevolently filled divifion with many every pleasures; in order that individuals may be contented with their own lot, without envying the happiness of others: many hands must be employ❜d to procure us the conveniencies of life; and it is neceffary that the different

different branches of bufinefs, whether more or lefs agreeable, be filled with hands. A tafte too nice and delicate, would obftruct this plan for it would crowd fome employments, leaving others, not lefs useful, totally ineglected. In our prefent condition, happy it is, that the plurality are not delicate in their choice. They fall in readily with the occupations, pleafures, food, and company, that fortune throws in their way; and if at first there be any displeasing circumstance, custom foon makes it easy.

The proverb will be admitted fo far as it regards the particulars now explained. But when apply'd in general to every subject of tafte, the difficulties to be encountered are infuperable. What fhall we fay, in particular, as to the difficulty that arifes from human nature itfelf? Do we not talk of a good and a bad tafte? of a right and a wrong tafte? and upon that fuppofition, do we not, with great confidence, cenfure writers, painters, architects, and every one who deals in the fine arts? Are fuch criticisms abfurd and void of foundation? Have the foregoing expreffions, familiar in all lanY y 2 guages

guages and among all people, no forth of meaning? This can hardlybes: what vis univerfal must have a foundation in natúre. If we can reach this foundation, the ftandard of taste will no longer be a fecret. Ment CoAll living creatures are by natures diftri buted into claffes; the individuals of reach, however diverfified by flighter differences, having a wonderful uniformity in their ca pital parts internal and external. Each clafs is diftinguishable from others by an external form; and not lefs diftinguishable by an internal conftitution, manifefted by certain powers, feelings, defires, and actions, peculiar to the individuals of each class. Thus each clafs may be conceived to have a common nature, which, in framing the individuals belonging to the clafs, is taken for a model or standard. 29 611

Independent altogether of experience, men have a fenfe or conviction of a common nature or standard, not only in their own species, but in every species of animals. And hence it is a matter of wonder, to find any individual deviating from the common nature of the fpecies, whether in its inter

nal