intereft the spectator in the warmest manner. An accidental misfortune, if not extremely fingular, doth not greatly move our pity. The perfon who fuffers, being inno cent, is freed from the greatest of all torments, viz. the anguish of mind occafioned by remorse ::..

Metaftafio.

2

A criminal, on the other hand, who brings misfortunes upon himself, excites little pity, for a different reafon. His remorfe, it is true, aggravates his distress, and swells the first emotions of pity: but then our hatred to the criminal blending with pi ty, blunts its edge confiderably. Misfor tunes that are not innocent nor highly criminal, partake the advantages of each extreme they are attended with remorse to embitter the diftrefs, which raises our pity to a great height; and the flight indignation we have at a venial fault, detracts not fenFf2

fibly

fibly from our pity. For this reason, the happiest of all fubjects for tragedy, if fuch a one could be invented, would be where a man of integrity falls into a great misfortune by doing an innocent action, but which by fome fingular means he conceives to be criminal. His remorse aggravates his distress; and our compaffion, unrestrained by indignation, rifes to its highest pitch. Pity comes thus to be the ruling paffion of a pathetic tragedy; and by proper representation, may be raised to a height scarce exceeded by any thing felt in real life. A moral tragedy takes in a larger field; for, beside exercising our pity, it raifes another paffion, felfish indeed, but which deferves to be cherished equally with the social affections. When a misfortune is the natu ral confequence of fome wrong bias in the temper, every spectator who is confcious of fome fuch defect in himself, takes the alarm, and confiders that he is liable to the fame misfortune. This confideration raises in him an emotion of fear or terror; and it is by this emotion, frequently reiterated in a variety of moral tragedies, that the

fpectators

fpectators are put upon their guard against the diforders of passion.

The commentators upon Ariftotle and other critics, have been much graveled about the account given of tragedy by this author, “That by means of pity and terror "it refines in us all forts of paffion." But no one who has a clear conception of the end and effects of a good tragedy, can have any difficulty about Ariftotle's meaning. Our pity is engaged for the perfons represented, and our terror is upon our own account. Pity indeed is here made to ftand for all the fympathetic emotions, because of these it is the capital. There can be no doubt, that our fympathetic emotions are refined or improved by daily exercise; and in what manner our other paffions are refined by terror I have juft now faid. One thing is certain, that no other meaning can justly be given to the foregoing doctrine than that now mentioned; and that it was really Ariftotle's meaning, appears from his 13th chapter, where he delivers feveral propofitions agreeable to the doctrine as here explained. Thefe, at the fame time, I the rather chuse

to

to mention; because, fo far as authority can go, they confirm the foregoing reasoning about the proper fubjects for tragedy. His first propofition is, That it being the province of tragedy to excite pity and terror, an innocent perfon falling into adverfity ought never to be the fubject. This propofition is a neceffary consequence of his doctrine as explained a subject of this nature may indeed excite pity and terror; but the former in an inferior degree, and the latter in no degree for moral inftruction. The fecond propofition is, That we must not reprefent a wicked perfon emerging from mifery to good fortune. This excites neither terror nor compaffion, nor is agreeable in any refpect. The third is, That the misfortunes of a wicked perfon ought not to be reprefented. Such reprefentation may be agreeable in fome measure upon a principle of juftice: but it will not move our pity; or any degree of terror, except in those of the fame vicious difpofition with the perfon represented. His last propofition is, That the only character fit for reprefentation

representation lies in the middle, neither eminently good nor eminently bad ; where the misfortune is not the effect of deliberate vice, but of fome involuntary fault, as our author expreffes it *. The only objection I find to Ariftotle's account of tragedy, is, that he confines it within too narrow bounds, by refufing admittance to the pathetic kind. For if terror be effential to tragedy, no representation deferves that name, but where the misfortunes exhibited are caused by a wrong balance of mind, or fome diforder in the internal conftitution. Such misfortunes always fuggeft moral inftruction; and by fuch misfortunes only can terror be excited for our improvement.

Thus Ariftotle's four propofitions above mentioned, relate folely to tragedies of the moral kind. Thofe of the pathetic kind, åre not confined within fo narrow limits, Subjects fitted for the theatre, are not in fuch plenty, as to make us reject innocent

*If one can be amufed with a grave difcourfe which pro mifeth much and performs nothing, he may fee this fubject treated by Brumoy in his Theatre Grec. Preliminary discourse on the origin of tragedy.

misfortunes