8 Vict. c. 18, 8. 23. of the sation. the sheriff to summon a jury in respect of such lands "The L. C. C. Act contemplates that after the company have given the claimant notice to treat, and when the amount of compensation cannot be agreed the claimant may, if the claim is above 50l., go to arbitration. The claimant therefore has the choice whether there shall be an arbitration or not:" Fitzhardinge v. Gloucester and Berkeley Canal Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 776. Section 23 is part of the scheme of arbitration, and its provisions apply as well to the settlement of the amount of compensation under sec. 68, post, p. 112, for land already taken or injuriously affected as to the settlement of the amount of compensation for land sought to be taken: Evans v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co., 1 E. & B. 754, 764. "Notice in Writing."-The notice of desire to have the compensation settled by arbitration must state : - 1. "The nature of the interest" in respect of which the compensation is claimed, and 2. The amount of the compensation claimed. "Nature of the Interest."-An attempt was made in Cameron v. Charing Cross Ry. Co., 16 C. B. (N. S.) 430, to draw a distinction between notices under this section and those under section 68, post, p. 112, but the later case of Healey v. Thames Valley Ry. Co., 34 L. J. Q. B. 52, disposed of any such dis E 8 Vict. o. 18, 8. 23. tinction between the two kinds of notices, and put them on the same footing. Where the claim was for compensation in respect of the "fee-simple in possession," and the award was in respect of such interest, the latter was held to be good even though it might have been based upon the assumption that the claimant was in possession, when in fact the land was let to tenants: Bradshaw's Arbitration, 12 Q. B. 562, 573. But a claim for "an estate or interest" is bad: In re N. Staffordshire Ry. Co. and Landor, 17 L. J. Ex. 350. It is the duty of the claimant to give the company such information as will enable them to form a judgment as to the fairness and propriety of the claim, but inasmuch as it is impossible that these notices can be so framed as to enable the company to obtain an accurate or even approximate estimate from a surveyor, the notice need not be so precise and particular as to preclude all necessity for inquiry: Cameron v. Charing Cross Ry. Co., 16 C. B. (N.S.) 430. The words "nature of the interest' are synonymous with the words particulars of estate and interest " used in sec. 18, ante, p. 43. The notice must give the company sufficient information to enable them to form some judgment as to the nature of the interest for which they are required to pay or tender compensation: Healey v. Thames Valley Ry. Co., supra. See further the notes to sec. 18, ante, p. 43, and to sec. 68, post, p. 130. 66 Amount of Compensation Claimed.-The party taking the initiative is required to state in the notice that he gives how much he claims. The object of this "must be that the promoters may have an opportunity of considering whether they will pay him the amount he claims without arbitration, or whether they will offer him a smaller sum": per Blackburn, J., in Fitzhardinge v. Gloucester and Berkeley Canal Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 776. The notice should comprise every head of damage which can be ascertained at the time, as the compensation for all damage that can be foreseen must be assessed once and for all: Croft v. L. and N. W. Ry. Co., 3 B. & S. 436; Bagnall v. L. and N. W. Ry. Co., 7 H. & N. 423; Lawrence v. G. N. Ry. Co., 15 Q. B. 643; Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co. v. Evans, 15 Beav. 322; unless the special Act <therwise provides, as in the Metr. and Distr. Rys. Act, 1879. The notice should be served in the manner prescribed by section 134, post, p. 255, i.e. it must be either left at the prin cipal office of the promoters, or transmitted through the post directed to such office, or given or transmitted by post directed to the secretary or, in case there be no secretary, to the solicitor of the promoters. Compare also sec. 135 of the C. C. C. Act, 1845 (8 Vict. c. 16), in the case of joint stock companies, and sec. 138 of the R. C. C. Act, 1845 (8 Vict. c. 20), post, p. 323, in the case of railway companies. "The Amount of Compensation shall be so settled." -"By the 23rd section the only matter referred to arbitration is the compensation to be paid for the lands required to be taken for the purposes of the undertaking. They are in truth valuers, not arbitrators, and all they have to do is to ascertain the amount that ought to be so paid ": Gould v. Staffordshire Potteries Waterworks Co., 6 Ry. Cas. 568; per Parke, B., at p. 575. See also Pearsall v. Brierley Hill L. Bd., 52 L. J. Q. B. 529, and the notes to section 21, ante, p. 45, post, p. 93, and to section 35, post, p. 75, and for the principles of compensation see the notes to sec. 68, post, p. 113 et seq. "Shall for three months have failed to make their or his award, or if no final award shall be made."The 15th section of the C. L. P. Act, 1854, applies to submissions to arbitration under this Act, and enables the Court to enlarge the time for making the award: In re Dare Valley Ry. Co., L. R. 4 Ch. 554. See also Lord v. Lee, L. R. 3 Q. B. 404. However, under the Public Health Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 63), secs. 124 & 125, the Court had no such power: Kellett v. L. Bd. of Health of Tranmere, 34 L. J. Q. B. 87. See now the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), sec. 180, subs. 10. The limit of time here fixed applies equally to arbitrations under section 68: Evans v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co., 1 E. & B. 754, 764. In this case the claimant had in default of the company appointing an arbitrator appointed his arbitrator to act for both parties, but such arbitrator did not make his award within three months, and his award was held to be out of time: S. C. "The powers given for arbitration continue for three months after the arbitrators are appointed, and are determined then only by sec. 23, enacting that the question shall be settled by a jury, if when the matter shall have been referred to arbitration, the arbitrators or their umpire shall for three months have failed to make their or his award, or 8 Vict. c. 18, s. 23. 8 Viot. 0. 18, s. 23. 8. 24. Method of proceeding for settling disputes as to compensation by justices. if no final award shall be made": Bradshaw's Arbitration, 12 Q. B. 562, 574. The umpire has three months to make his award from the time when his duties commence. See notes to sec. 27, post, p. 61. Skerratt v. N. Staffordshire Ry. Co., 17 L. J. Ch. 16; In re Hewitt and Portsmouth Waterworks Co., 10 W. R. 780; In re Pullen and Mayor, etc., of Liverpool, 51 L. J. Q. B. 285. 66 The limitation of time by the Act does not prohibit the parties from enlarging the time for making the award: Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Lockhart, 3 Macq. 808; and in the event of the time being so enlarged the Court will not set aside the award on the ground that the parties had no power to dispense with the provisions of the statute: Palmer v. Metr. Ry. Co., 31 L. J. Q. B. 259. The provision is merely a power given for the advantage of both parties enabling either party to obtain a settlement of the compensation by a jury in case of improper delay in the arbitration, and this advantage the parties may renounce": Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Lockhart, supra. Nor is it necessary that there should be a written consent for enlarging the time if the parties have acted upon the submission as still subsisting: Tyerman v. Smith, 6 E. & B. 719. Where the claimant had given notice of his desire to have his claim settled by arbitration, and the arbitrators appointed were unable to agree in the appointment of an umpire, and the Board of Trade refused to appoint one under sec. 28, post, p. 63, because the three months had expired, it was held that the claimant was not bound to proceed under section 68, post, p. 112, but was entitled to a mandamus to compel the promoters to issue their warrant for summoning a jury: In re S. Yorkshire, etc., Ry. Co. ex p. Senior, 14 Jur. 1093. XXIV. It shall be lawful for any justice, upon the application of either party with respect to any question of disputed compensation (a) by this or the Special Act, or any Act incorporated therewith, authorized to be settled by two justices (b), to summon the other party to appear before two justices, at a time and (a) Sec. 21. (b) Secs. 22 and 121. See also R. C. C. Act, 1845, sec. 30 et seq. place to be named in the summons (c), and upon the (c) Form 9. The justices have under this Act jurisdiction in the following cases : 1. Settlement of compensation for lands taken or required, or injuriously affected, where the claim does not exceed 501. [sec. 22]. 2. Settlement of compensation in respect of lands, of which any person having no greater interest than as tenant for a year, or from year to year, is required to give up possession before the expiration of his term or interest [sec. 121]. 3. Apportionment of customary or other rents between copyhold or customary lands required to be taken, and the residue not required [sec. 98]. 4. Apportionment of any rent-service, rent-charge, chief, or other rent payment or encumbrance under similar circumstances [sec. 116]. 5. Apportionment of rents between lands required to he taken, and the residue not required, where such lands are comprised in a lease for a term of years unexpired [sec. 119]. 6. Settlement of compensation where a claim, which if made in the ordinary course, would have been settled by justices, is made in respect of lands or any estate, right, or interest in or charge affecting lands which the promoters have through mistake or inadvertence omitted to purchase or to pay compensation for [sec. 124.] The above section applies only to "any question of disputed compensation," and not to the jurisdiction of Justices generally under this Act. In section 142 of the R. C. C. Act, 1845 (8 Vict. c. 20), which is otherwise almost verbatim 8 Viot. c. 18, 8. 24. |