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carrying coal from a mine: Iveson v. Moore, supra; Wood v. Stourbridge Ry. Co., 16 C. B. (N.S.) 222; the injury is an actionable one, and matter for compensation under the Act. Similarly, an individual, whose property is injured by the high road being diverted so as to leave it in a cul de sac, closed at one end by an embankment, is entitled to receive compensation Chamberlain v. W. End of London etc. Ry. Co., 2 B. & S. 605; but not so a person whose trade is affected by the interruption of the highway, whether permanent: Rex v. London Docks Co., supra; or temporary: Rickett v. Metr. Ry. Co., L. R. 2 H. L. 175; where the interruption is not "personal to himself, either immediately or by immediate consequence:" S.C. See also Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Walker's Trustees, 7 App. Cas., per Lord Selborne, L. C., at pp. 283 and 284. Again, where a railway crosses a road by a level crossing closed by gates, involving delay and possible danger to the persons using the road, if the latter be a public road an individual cannot maintain an action, and consequently cannot obtain compensation: Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Ogilvy, 2 Macq. Sc. App. 229; but if the road be a private one, the depreciation caused by the erection of the gates, and by the liability to danger from passing trains, are both matters for compensation: Glover v. N. Staffordshire Ry. Co., 16 Q. B. 812.

In the case of a level crossing where the access is not prevented, except when trains are passing, the temporary obstruction is an incident not of the construction but of the use of the line, and consequently is not subject for compensation: Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Ogilvy, 2 Macq. 229; Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Walker's Trustees, 7 App. Cas. 259, 277. The contrary is the case where the access is taken away or obstructed once and for all by the construction of the works: S.C., at p. 280. It is not necessary, in order to found a claim, that the obstruction to access should be "immediately ex adverso of the property," provided that such obstruction be "direct and proximate," and not "indirect or remote": S.C. at p. 285. Cf. In re the Potteries S. & N. W. Ry. Co., 25 Ch. D. 251.

The interruption of the free access to and free user of the public highway is an injury contemplated by the words "injuriously affected," for which the right of action is taken away by the Act, and supplanted by a right to compensation: Moore v. Gt. S. & W. Ry. of Ireland, 10 Ir. Com. Law Cas. (N.S.) 46. Therefore a person can claim compensation by

reason of the public road in front of his property being lowered: S.C., Reg. v. E. Counties Ry. Co., 2 Q. B. 347; or raised: Reg v. Vestry of St. Luke's, Chelsea, L. R. 6 Q. B. 572, 7 ibid. 148; Reg. v. Wallasey L. Bd. of Health, L. R. 4 Q. B. 351; Tuohey v. Gt. S. & W. Ry. of Ireland, 10 Ir. Com. Law Cas. (N.S.) 98; Wedmore v. Mayor etc. of Bristol, 7 L. T. (N.S.) 459; or inconveniently narrowed: Becket v. Midland Ry. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 241, 3 C. P. 82. See also Bigg v. Corp. of London, L. R. 15 Eq. 376, and compare Fleming v. Newport Ry. Co., 8 App. Cas. 265.

The same principles necessarily apply to the obstruction of the access to a public water way or navigable river: Metr. Bd. of Works v. McCarthy, L. R. 7 H. L. 243; see also Rose v. Miles, 4 M. & S. 101, where the mooring of barges in the river so as to obstruct the entrance to a creek used by the plaintiff was held to be an individual injury, "substantially more injurious to the plaintiff than to the public at large," and consequently actionable. Compare also Lyon v. Fishmongers' Co., 1 App. Cas. 662, especially Lord Cairns' judgment at p. 675; D. of Buccleuch v. Metr. Bd. of Works, L. R. 5 H. L. 518; and Temple Pier Co. v. Metr. Bd. of Works, 11 Jur. (N.S.) 337, where the defendants temporarily diverted the access to the plaintiffs' pier. See also Macey v. Metr. Bd. of Works, 33 L. J. Ch. 377; Bell v. Hull & Selby Ry. Co., 2 Ry. Cas. 279.

But a mere right, not appurtenant to the land, but enjoyed in common with the rest of the public, to bring barges to a draw-dock is not matter for compensation: Reg. v. Metr. Bd. of Works, L. R. 4 Q. B. 358.

Nuisance. A nuisance causing an injury to lands of which no part is taken is generally not matter for compensation, although if lands of the parties have been taken, a claim for compensation in respect of such injury may successfully be made (see Lord Chelmsford's judgment in D. of Buccleuch v. Metr. Bd. of Works, L. R. 5 H. L. 518). Noise of trains and smoke: City of Glasgow Ry. Co. v. Hunter, L. R. 2, Sc. App. 78; vibration: Hammersmith etc. Ry. Co. v. Brand, L. R. 4 H. L. 171; Penny v. S. E. Ry. Co., 7 E. & B. 660; or the frightening of horses by passing trains: Rex v. Pease, 4 B. & Ad. 30; or danger of fire from sparks sent out by locomotives: Vaughan v. Taff Vale Ry. Co., 5 H. & N. 679; James v. Festiniog Ry. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 733; are not injuries for which compensation is to be made. The reasons for this rule are, that the damage is not special, but

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common to all the public, and such as would not have been actionable: Penny v. S. E. Ry. Co., supra; and that the Legislature must be presumed to have foreseen and licensed a nuisance arising from acts which it has sanctioned: Rex v. Pease, supra; Hammersmith Ry. Co. v. Brand, supra; cf. Metr. Asy. D. v. Hill, 6 App. Cas. 193; Truman v. L. B. & S. C. Ry. Co., 25 Ch. D. 423. Moreover, the words "execution of the works" do not confer a right to recover for damages which arise (if at all) not from the works of the railway, but from their use after their execution: City of Glasgow U. Ry. Co. v. Hunter, supra.

Flooding. Where a company with compulsory powers constructed a canal, and afterwards to save the canal from bursting, in consequence of an extraordinary rainfall, opened a sluice and allowed the surplus water to flow into a stream which overflowed and inundated adjoining mines, the company were held to be not liable to make compensation: Thomas v. Birmingham Canal Co., 49 L. J. Q. B. 851; cf. Cracknell v. Mayor etc. of Thetford, L. R. 4 C. P. 629; and Geddis v. Pr. of Bann Reservoir, 3 App. Cas. 430. An occasional flooding of lands caused by a proper execution of parliamentary powers is "injuriously affecting" lands within this section: Ware v. Regent's Canal Co., 3 De G. & J. 212 (but see, contra, Keates v. Holywell Ry. Co., 28 L. T., N.S. 183).

Easement.-Light.-A diminution of light to premises, rendering them less convenient and suitable for the purposes and requirements of the trade carried on therein, is clearly an injury in respect of which compensation can be claimed, even though the saleable value of the premises is not diminished: Eagle v. Charing Cross Ry. Co., L. R. 2 C. P. 638; Turner v. Sheffield & Rotherham Ry. Co., 10 M. & W. 425. A person entitled to an easement over lands purchased by a company cannot maintain trespass for acts done upon those lands: Thicknesse v. Lancaster Canal Co., 4 M. & W. 472; nor compel the promoters to purchase the land: Clark v. School Board for London, L. R. 9 Ch. 120; nor restrain them from interfering with his easement: D. of Bedford v. Dawson, L. R. 20 Eq. 353. He must wait until the injury is done, and then claim compensation: S. C. See also Badham v. Marris, 45 L. T. 579; and cf. Bonner v. G. W. Ry. Co., 32 W. R. 190.

Ferry. Where a right of ferry is a private right attached to land, and the land is seriously affected by the injury to the ferry, such injury is matter for compensation :

Reg. v. G. N. Ry. Co., 14 Q. B. 25. The owner of a ferry has only a grant of an exclusive right to carry passengers and goods across the stream by means of a ferry, and has only a right of action for the violation of such right by means of boats. Therefore the construction of a railway bridge and foot-bridge in the vicinity of the ferry, though it injures the ferry, is not actionable or matter for compensation: Hopkins v. G. N. Ry. Co., 2 Q. B. D. 224. Such injury is caused by the user of the railway after its construction. But if damage is caused to a franchise by the construction of the works, e.g. if the approach to the ferry is blocked up by a railway embankment, compensation would be given: S.C. at p. 237, overruling Reg. v. Cambrian Ry. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 422. Mines and Minerals.—If the owner of land is restricted in the exercise of his right of working minerals by a provision that he shall not work them to the danger of a canal constructed over them, this is an injury to his interest in the land for which he can claim compensation: Cromford Canal Co. v. Cutts, 5 Ry. Cas. 452; similarly it was held that compensation could be claimed by the owner of mines which had become workable within forty yards of a tunnel, and the company had required the whole forty yards to be left unworked for their security: Fenton v. Trent & Mersey Navigation Co., 2 Ry. Cas. 837. The measure of compensation is the profit to be derived from the minerals when gotten, after deducting the expense of getting them: Barnsley Canal Co. v. Twibell, 7 Beav. 19. But inasmuch as the clauses of the L. C. C. Act, 1845, apply only where it is intrinsically the execution of the works which injuriously affects the land, injury caused by negligence in the use of the works (e.g. by removing the clay surface soil and thereby admitting the percolation of water into the mines) is actionable, and is not within this Act: Bagnall v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 7 H. & N. 421. Compensation in respect of loss sustained by reason of its being impossible to work the mine without doing damage to the undertaking must be claimed (if at all) at the time of the original agreement or assessment, and cannot be claimed subsequently: Rex v. Leeds & Selby Ry. Co., 3 A. & E. 683 (decided under a Special Act before the L. C. C. Act, 1845). See also Smith v. G. W. Ry. Co., 3 App. Cas. 165, 2 Ch. D. 235, as to the mode of ascertaining and apportioning damage to mining rights.

In the Railways C. C. Act, 1845, and the Waterworks C. C.

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Act, 1847, special provisions are included for dealing with mines. These provisions are almost identical in both the above Acts, and will be found along with the decisions relating to them, post, pp. 316-322, 437, and 690.

Water Rights. In order to make out a claim for compensation in respect of injury to the right of using water, or to the right of free flow of water, some special damage must be shown over and above that common to all the public. Therefore where a river was dammed back by the execution of the works, and the water was thereby made less pure, brewers who had been in the habit of using the water were refused compensation because the injury was not special to them: Rex v. Bristol Dock Co., 12 East 428. Similarly, where the execution of the works prevented access to the river for the purpose of drawing water: Reg. v. Metr. Bd. of Works, L. R. 4 Q. B. 358. But compensation was allowed where the works had, by completely damming up one branch of a stream, interrupted the flow of water to a tanyard: Mortimer v. S. Wales Ry. Co., 1 E. & E. 375; and where the value of a water-mill was greatly diminished by the erection of a weir which prevented the free flow of water to it: Rex v. Nottingham Old Waterworks Co., 6 A. & E. 355; and where the construction of a reservoir authorized by Act of Parliament had the effect of fouling the stream so as to render the water unfit for the purposes of dye-works: Clowes v. Staffordshire Potteries Waterworks Co., L. R. 8 Ch. 125.

In cases of this nature, although the works are restricted to a particular line, damage occasioned by executing the prescribed works to property not within the line is within the proviso for compensation: Rex v. Nottingham Old Waterworks Co., supra. See also D. of Buccleuch v. Metr. Bd. of Works, L. R. 5 H. L. 410.

The riparian owners have the same right against promoters of an undertaking that anybody would have against a trespasser for diverting water above: Bush v. Trowbridge Waterworks Co., L. R. 10 Ca. 459; but the authorized interference with the flow of water, though matter for compensation, cannot be restrained by injunction: Stainton v. Woolrych, 23 Beav. 235.

Sporting Rights.-A party who, under an agreement not under seal with the owner, has merely a right of shooting over land, has not an interest in such land to entitle him to compensation under this section in respect of the shooting