CHAP. III. ments of a campaign. No greater expense 1779. would have been incurred, nor would the constraint on individuals have been greater, while the public service would have been infinitely promoted by it, if timely and correspondent measures had been taken by all the states, to raise their respective quotas by a specified time in the depth of winter. This arrangement would at the same time, have afforded to the recruits the advantage of being trained a few months before they were brought into actual service, and have given the general a certain uninterrupted force for each campaign. This course of proceeding had been continually recommended, and the recommendation had been as continually neglected.

Letter from

general

to congress.

"In the more early stages of the contest," Washington said the commander in chief to congress in a letter of the 18th of November, "when men might have been enlisted for the war, no man, as my whole conduct and the uniform tenor of my letters will evince, was ever more opposed to short enlistments than I was; and while there remained a prospect of obtaining recruits upon a permanent footing in the first instance, as far as duty and a regard to my station would permit, I urged my sentiments in favour of it. But the prospect of keeping up an army by voluntary enlistments being changed, or at least standing on too precarious and uncertain a footing to depend on, for

the exigency of our affairs, I took the liberty CHAP. III. in February 1778, in a particular manner, to 1779. lay before the committee of arrangement then with the army at Valley Forge, a plan for an annual draught as the surest and most certain, if not the only means left us, of maintaining the army on a proper and respectable ground. And more and more confirmed in the propriety of this opinion, by the intervention of a variety of circumstances unnecessary to detail, I again took the freedom of urging the plan to the committee of conference in January last, and having reviewed it in every point of light, and found it right, or at least the best that has occurred to me, I hope I shall be excused by congress, in offering it to them, and in time for carrying it into execution for the next year; if they should conceive it necessary for the states to complete their quotas of troops.

"The plan I would propose is that each state be informed by congress annually, of the real deficiency of its troops, and called upon to make it up, or such less specific number as congress may think proper, by a draught. That the men draughted join the army by the first of January, and serve until the first of January in the succeeding year. That from the time the draughts join the army, the officers of the states from which they come, be authorized and directed to use their endeavours to enlist

CHAP. III. them for the war, under the bounties granted 1779. to the officers themselves, and the recruits by

the act of the 23d of January last; viz. ten dollars to the officer for each recruit, and two hundred to the recruits themselves. That all state, county, and town bounties to draughts, if practicable be entirely abolished, on account of the uneasiness and disorders they create among the soldiery, the desertions they produce, and for other reasons which will readily occur. That on or before the first of October annually, an abstract or return similar to the present one be transmitted to congress to enable them to make their requisitions to each state with certainty and precision. This I would propose as a general plan to be pursued; and I am persuaded that this, or one nearly similar to it, will be found the best now in our power, as it will be attended with the least expense to the public, will place the service on the footing of order and certainty, and will be the only one that can advance the general interest to any great extent."

These remonstrances on the part of the commander in chief were not attended with more success than those which had before been made. Although the best dispositions existed, the proceedings of congress were unavoidably slow, and the difficulty of bringing about a harmony and concert of measures among thirteen sove

reign states, was too great to be surmounted. CHAP. III. The resolutions respecting the military estab- 1779. lishment were not agreed to until the ninth of February, (1780) and did not require that the men should be furnished before the first of April. In consequence of these incurable defects in the system itself, the contributions of men made by the states continued to be irregular, uncertain, and out of season: and the army could never acquire that consistency and stability which would have resulted from an exact observance of the plan so often recommended.

On receiving information of the disaster experienced by the allied arms before Savannah, and the consequent resolution to abandon the siege of that place, sir Henry Clinton, who by the arrival of the re-enforcement from Europe, and the evacuation of Rhode Island, was in great force in New York, resumed his plan of active operations against the southern states. A large embarkation took place soon after that event had been announced to him; but as it would have been imprudent to hazard the voyage until certain information should be received that D'Estaing was no longer on the American coast, the armament did not leave the hook until near the end of December. The detachment destined for the south was led by sir Henry Clinton in person, and the fleet by which it was escorted, was conducted by admiral Arbuthnot. The defence of New York

CHAP. III, and its dependencies devolved on the German 1779. general Knyphausen.

The first preparations made in New York for some distant enterprise, were communicated by his faithful intelligencers to general Washington, who conjectured that the expedition contemplated must be particularly against Charleston in South Carolina, and generally against the southern states. His utmost endeavours, therefore, were used to hasten the march of the troops of North Carolina, of the new levies of Virginia, and the rear division of Bland's and Baylor's regiments of cavalry which were designed to re-enforce general Lincoln. On finding the situation of the southern army to be more unfavourable than had been supposed, he also obtained permission from congress to detach the Virginia line to its aid.

The season for active operations in a northern climate being over, the attention of the general was turned to the distribution of his troops in winter quarters. Habit had familiar. ized the American army to the use of huts constructed by themselves, and both officers and men were content to pass the winter season in a hutted camp. In disposing of the troops, therefore, until the time for action should again arrive, villages in which they might be comfortably accommodated were not sought for. But wood and water; a healthy situation; convenience for supplies of provisions; stations