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defendants' servants through the gross negligence of the defendants. Butt v. The Great Western Railway Co., 443.

6. Surplusage.] Held, also, that the allegation of gross negligence and felony in the declaration was surplusage, and that a replication of felony only without an allegation of gross negligence would have been bad. Ib.

7. Liability for Damage to Goods-Contract restricting Liability—Live Stock.] The plaintiff, who had some cattle conveyed by a railway company, received for them a ticket, which he signed, containing the terms on which the railway company carried the cattle. At the foot of the ticket there was a clause: "N. B.-This ticket is issued subject to the owner undertaking all risks of conveyance whatever, as the company will not be liable for any injury or damage howsoever caused, and occurring to live stock of any description travelling upon the L. and Y. Railway, or in their vehicles." The plaintiff saw the cattle put into the truck. During the journey some of the cattle got alarmed and broke out of the truck and were injured. The truck was so defectively constructed as to be unfit and unsafe for the conveyance of cattle:

Held, that there was no implied stipulation that the truck should be fit for the conveyance of cattle; and that the company were protected by the terms of the ticket from liability to the plaintiff for the damage to the cattle. Chippendale v. Lancashire Railway Co. 395.

COMPANY.

1. Action against.] An action for work and labor does not lie against a company completely registered for work done for the company provisionally registered. Hutchinson v. The Surrey Consumers' Gas Light &c., Association, 474.

2. Liability of] A company completely registered is not liable on any contract made by the promoters before provisional registration. Ib.

3. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, s. 23-Provisional and complete Registration.] Quære, whether a company is liable, after complete registration, to be sued in its collective name upon contracts previously made by the provisionally registered company, when such contracts are within section 23, of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110. Ib.

Common Law, Admiralty, &c.

COPYRIGHT.

Equitable Assignment of.] The defendant by an instrument in writing, not sealed or attested so as to pass a legal copyright, agreed to assign the copyright in "Monsieur Violet," to R. B. for 300l., with a stipulation that a deed of assignment of the copyright should be executed. The 3007. was duly paid by R. B.:

Held, that the effect of this was to vest the equitable copyright in R. B., who would be entitled to a decree for a specific performance of the contract, and that the plaintiff' was consequently entitled to succeed upon issues denying the defendant's title to grant the copyright, and alleging that R. B. was equitably the proprietor thereof, and had the sole right to grant permission to publish. Simms v. Marryat, 330.

See INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. COUNTY COURT.

COUNTY COURT.

1. Appeal Costs, Judgment below reversed.] In appeal from the county courts into the court of exchequer, the appellant will have costs, if the decision below be reversed. Hunt v. Wray, 598.

2. Summoning Defendant before Order of Commitment for non-payment of Sum recovered.] If a defendant in the sheriff's court of London be ordered by the judge to pay the amount recovered against him at a certain time, and he makes default, the judge cannot order him to be committed to prison for non-payment, unless he be first summoned to show cause why the order of commitment should not be made. Buchanan v. Kinning, 455.

3. Certiorari.] In order to prevent the removal of a plaint from the county court by certiorari, on the ground of want of jurisdiction in the superior court to entertain the action after removal, the plaint ought to be so framed as to disclose a cause of action over which the superior court has no jurisdiction. Rees v. Williams, 567. 4. Partnership Demand.] Where a plaint was removed from the county court by certiorari on the affidavit of the defendant's attorney, that difficult questions of law would arise, the court refused to quash the certiorari, though the affidavit of the plaintiff's attorney averred that no such difficult questions of law would arise. 1b. 5. Concurrent Jurisdiction - Dwelling of Plaintiff-Costs.] Where the plaintiff in an action in a superior court resided at Inverness, more than twenty miles from the defendant, but had been in the habit for some years of coming to London and residing for some months in Golden Square, for the purposes of his business, within the iurisdiction of a county court, and less than twenty miles from the defendant, and was residing there during the whole time of the action : —

Held, that the plaintiff did not "dwell" in Golden Square within the meaning of the 128th section of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, but at Inverness; and that, therefore, the superior court had concurrent jurisdiction with the county court under that section. Macdougal v. Paterson, 510.

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6. Semble, that if the plaintiff dwells at two places, one of them less and the other more than twenty miles from the defendant, the superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Ib.

7. Discretion of Judge -9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 128-13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, s. 13.] The 13th section of the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, which provides that if the plaintiff, in an action in a superior court, in which less than 20l. is recovered, shall make it appear to the satisfaction of the court, or of a judge at chambers, upon summons that the action was brought for a cause in which concurrent jurisdiction is given to the superior courts by the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 128, the court or judge may direct that the plaintiff shall recover his costs, does not give the court or judge any discretion, but only confers upon them an authority to make such an order, which they are bound to exercise if it appears by affidavits that the case falls within section 128. [Overruling Jones v. Harrison, 20 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Exch. 166; s. c. 3 Eng. Rep. 579, and Palmer v. Richards, 20 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Exch. 323; s. c. 5 Eng. Rep. 535.] Ib. 8. Plaintiff's Right to be nonsuited.] In an action in a county court the plaintiff retains the common law privilege of electing to be nonsuited, at any time before the judge gives his verdict. Robinson v. Lawrence, 597.

9. Costs of Appeal.] In appeals from county courts brought in the court of exchequer, the successful party in the appeal will, as a general rule, have costs. Ib.

10. Order.] An order by the judge of a county court, on a judgment summons on a defendant to pay a sum on a future day or to be imprisoned for thirty days, is bad. Dews v. Ryley, 469.

11. Evidence of Judge.] Minutes of proceedings in the county court made under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 111, or a copy of them, cannot be contradicted by the evidence of the judge. 1b.

12. Evidence under Plea of not Guilty.] The clerk of a county court, against whom an action of trespass is brought, may give special matter in evidence under a plea of "not guilty by statute," by virtue of the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, s. 19. Ib.

event

13. Appeal Security for Costs and Judgment - Appellant bound to pay costs in any Abandoning Notice of Appeal and giving fresh Notice-Jurisdiction of Court of Appeal.] The defendant, against whom judgment had been recovered in a county court on the 17th of January, gave the plaintiff notice of appeal on the 22d of January, and the next day entered into a bond with a surety conditioned to pay the costs of the appeal, whatever the event might be, and the amount of the judgment in case the appeal were dismissed. On the following day, the defendant withdrew the notice of appeal, and gave the plaintiff another notice of appeal, which included additional grounds of appeal. It was objected, that as the first notice had been withdrawn, the bond was no security for the costs of the second appeal on the amount of the judgment, and that consequently the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal:

The court held, that they had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and after argument directed judgment to be entered for the appellant with costs, notwithstanding the terms of the bond by which the appellant had bound himself to pay the costs of the appeal whatever the event might be. Daniels v. Charsley, 524.

See MANDAMUS. PERJURY.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.

Jurisdiction.] Where the case transmitted to the Court of Common Pleas contains no signature of the revising barrister at the end of it, the Court of Common Pleas cannot entertain the appeal. But the court allowed an appeal to be argued, the respondent consenting to have the signature inserted. Burton v. Brooks, 483.

COVENANT.

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

1. On Bond.] Debt on bond, dated the 5th of December, 1812: the condition of which recited that J. B. had agreed to advance T. W. the produce of the sale of 8771. 4s. 1d. 5 per cent. stock, without any advantage other than he would have been entitled to if the stock continued in his own name in the books of the Bank of England; that J. B. sold the stock and paid the produce, 7291. 4s., to T. W., and that it had been agreed between them that the same, or a like sum of 8771. 4s. 1d. 5 per cent. stock should be replaced and transferred to J. B. The condition then stated that if T. W., before the 5th of June then next ensuing, purchased the said amount of stock, and transferred the same to J. B., and paid to J. B. in lieu of the dividends thereof, such sum as J. B. would have been entitled to receive for the dividends of the same, in case the same had continued in his name, at such time and times, in such shares and proportions, and in such manner as the same dividends would have been payable to him if the same had not been sold, then the bond was to be void; otherwise, to remain in force. Breach-first, that J. W. did not, before the said 5th of June, nor at any time since, purchase the said amount of stock and transfer the same to J. B., or the plaintiff, as administrator. Secondly, that the dividends of the said stock, if the same had continued standing in the name of J. B., would have been payable half-yearly after the date of the said bond, and the first and only one of such dividends before the said 5th of June would have been payable on the 5th of January, 1813; that J. B., on the 11th of September, 1824, died; and that if the said stock had continued standing in J. B.'s name, or the plaintiff as, administrator, a sum, to wit, &c., would have been payable half-yearly as dividends, and the money payable in lieu of such dividends, and becoming due after J. B.'s death, amounted to a large sum, to wit, &c. And although the said stock had not been transferred into the name of J. B. or the plaintiff, yet the said T. W. and the defendants had wholly failed to pay the sums which became due in lieu of the said several dividends.

Plea, that the causes of action did not accrue at any time within twenty years next before the commencement of the suit.

Replication, so far as related to the first breach, that whilst the stock remained untransferred, and a certain sum, to wit, &c., was due, in lieu of the dividends which J. B. would have been entitled to receive, to wit, on the 10th of September, 1824, T. W. made an acknowledgment that the said stock remained untransferred, contrary to the said condition, and was due thereon by T. W. making to J. B. satisfaction on account of part of the said sum of money, to wit, of 10l., and that the action was brought within twenty years next after such acknowledgment; and so far as related to the other causes of action in the declaration mentioned, that the said causes of action did accrue within twenty years next before the commencement of the suit.

Rejoinder as to the first part of the replication, a traverse of the bringing of the action within twenty years, modo et formâ.

An agreement between J. B. and T. W. was proved by which J. B. was to be boarded and lodged by T. W. for half a guinea a week, and that this weekly sum should go and be accepted in part satisfaction of the dividends of the stock due from T. W., and that they were to have a settlement every six months. This agreement appeared to have been acted upon until J. B.'s death, on the 11th of September, 1824, down to which time he boarded and lodged with T. W., but no settlement had taken place between them, although repeatedly asked for by J. B.:Held, first, that supposing the issue raised by the rejoinder cast upon the plaintiff the

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burden of proving an acknowledgment within twenty years next before the commencement of the action, the above was sufficient evidence to entitle the plaintiff to the verdict on that issue, as also on the second issue raised by the replication. Blair v. Ormond, 318.

2. Secondly, that the bond in addition was not within the 5th section of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, that the replication, therefore, as to the first breach, set up no answer in law to the plea, and the plaintiff, consequently, was not entitled to any damages on that breach; but as to the second breach. Ib.

3. Thirdly, that the part of the condition which stipulated for the payment, from time to time, of such sums as would have been payable by way of dividends, if the stock had continued standing in J. B.'s name, a cause of action still existed, and, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment; the damages to be confined to those claimed in the second breach. Ib.

4. Release by Deed - Account Stated.] Debt for dividends sold and assigned and on an account stated. Pleas, payment into court of parcel, &c., and as to the residue, never indebted. At the trial, it appeared the plaintiff had agreed to sell to the defendant certain dividends for 175l., but after the bargain was made it was found that an order of the Court of Chancery was necessary before the dividends could be received by the defendant, and a dispute having arisen as to which party was to pay the costs of obtaining this order, it was agreed that the deed of transfer should be executed, and the question of costs referred to two solicitors. The deed was accordingly executed, and 125l. paid to the plaintiff, and a paper signed by both parties in which credit was given for that sum, and 501. stated to be the balance remaining. The deed, however, stated that the whole purchase-money was paid, and contained a release in the usual way:

Held, first, that the plaintiff could not recover the remainder of the purchase-money under the first count as the debt only accrued upon the execution of the deed, and at the same time the debt was released. Baker v. Heard, 531.

5. Secondly, that there was no evidence of an account stated, as at the time the memorandum was signed, the plaintiff's claim to the 50%. was contingent upon the result of the reference. Ib.

For Calls.]

Meaning of]

See CALLS.

See PLEADING. SERVICE OF WRIT.

DECEIT.

1. Fraud-Evidence.] If a man tells an untruth, knowing it to be such, in order to induce another to alter his condition, who does accordingly alter it, and thereby sustains damage, the party making the false statement is liable in an action for deceit, although in making the false representation no fraud or injury was intended by him. Watson v. Poulson, 585.

2. Postdated Check.] A postdated check on a bank is not absolutely void; if paid without knowledge of the false date the payment is good; and though not admissible in evidence to prove a contract, may be used to show fraud. Ib.

DECLARATION.

In an Action for Malicious Prosecution.]

See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

DEED.

Construction of]

See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE,