Regina v. Stapylton. was then justly and truly indebted to me, the said R. Heslop, in the sum of 3481. 7s. 10d. for goods sold and delivered, rent, and for money lent, as he, the said J. H. M'George, did thereby acknowledge, and I, the said R. Heslop, having demanded payment of the said sum, and the said J. H. M'George, not being able then to pay the same, had agreed to execute the said indenture for the purposes therewith expressed, it is by the said indenture witnessed, that in pursuance of the said agreement, and in consideration of the sum of 3481. 7s. 10d. then due and owing as aforesaid, as he, the said J. H. M'George, doth thereby acknowledge, he the said J. H. M'George did by the said indenture grant, convey, and assign unto me the said R. Heslop, my executors, administrators and assigns, all the household goods and furniture, plate, linen, and china, carts, carriages, horses, casks, fixtures, personal estate and effects whatsoever of him the said J. H. M'George then or at any time thereafter during the continuance of the said security in or about his houses, brewery, and premises at Darlington aforesaid and Fayhill, in the said county of Durham, or elsewhere; to have and to hold all the goods, chattels, and premises thereby conveyed or assigned, or intended so to be, unto me the said R. Heslop, my executors, administrators, and assigns." [The notice further recited that this was subject to the trusts of the deed, and that there was a power of sale on default of payment of the sum of 348l. 7s. 10d., and then proceeded]" I do hereby claim all and singular the said goods and chattels mentioned and intended to be assigned by the said deed, and which were in the possession of the said J. H. M'George upon the execution of the said deed, and which said goods and chattels, or some part thereof, have been seized and taken possession of by you, in virtue of a certain writ of execution, wherein J. S. Helmer is the plaintiff, and the said J. H. M'George is the defendant, or by other process issued out of the said county court of Durham at Barnard Castle, Darlington, or elsewhere, and I do hereby claim the said goods and chattels, or such part thereof as are now in your custody or possession by virtue of the said mortgage deed." [It then averred the principal sum and interest due and owing.] "Dated this 3d day of May, 1851." "R. HESLOP. The interpleader summons came on to be heard before the county court judge on the 14th of May, when an objection was taken by the execution creditor that there ought to have been a schedule or inventory specifying the articles claimed by Heslop and seized by the bailiff. The judge held the notice and particulars insufficient, and refused to adjudicate upon the claim. Atkinson showed cause. The particulars of claim are insufficient. There ought to have been an inventory and schedule to enable the court to know what goods were claimed. The mortgage deed professes to assign not only the goods on the premises, but any that might thereafter be on the premises during the continuance of the security. It is clearly inoperative as to the latter portion of goods. The bailiff is placed in great difficulty. He cannot tell which of the In re Bowen. goods so on the premises belonged to Heslop. The Queen v. Richards, 20 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Q. B. 351; s. c. 3 Eng. Rep. 410, does not govern this case. Lush, in support of the rule, was not called upon. WIGHTMAN, J. The county court judge, if he had thought fit, might have required a particular to have been delivered: that is frequently done. But here he has rejected the claim altogether. This is the ordinary course when a party claims the whole, and is entitled to part. The judge will take care that he does not get too much. The bailiff is in no difficulty; he slips out of the proceeding altogether, because the issue is between the claimant and execution creditor. All that the bailiff has to do is to interplead. The rule must be absolute. Rule absolute. In re BowEN.1 November 4, 1851. Prohibition-Insolvency-5 & 6 Vict. c. 116- Protection from Process-Debts less than 3001.- Jurisdiction. A petitioned the county court for protection from process under 5 and 6 Vict. c. 116, as a trader owing debts amounting in the whole to less than 300l.' It appeared that he had previously presented a similar petition and obtained a final order for protection, and that the debts specified in the schedule to the former petition were still unpaid. The whole amount of the debts stated in both schedules exceeded 300l. The judge decided that he was entitled to protection as a trader owing debts amounting in the whole to less than 300l.; Held, that (assuming the decision to be erroneous) a prohibition could not be granted, as this was a question which the judge had jurisdiction to determine. But Quare-whether the decision was erroneous. TAMERLANE BOWEN, on the 14th of May, 1851, presented a petition to the Dorking County Court of Surry for protection from process under 5 and 6 Vict. c. 116, and therein described himself as a trader owing debts amounting in the whole to less than 3007., and he set forth in the schedule to such petition debts amounting to 2421. Os. 1d. On the day appointed for the first examination, the petitioner was sworn, and in answer to questions put to him, on behalf of a creditor, he admitted that in the year 1843 he had petitioned the Court of Bankruptcy for protection from process as a trader owing debts amounting to less than 300l., upon which petition he had obtained a final order in the same year, and that the debts from which he had then applied to be protected, and stated in his then schedule, amounted 121 Law J. Rep., (N. s.) Q. B. 10; 15 Jur. 1196. In re Bowen. to 2197. 17s. 10d., the whole of which were still unpaid; that he had continued to be a trader ever since that period, and that the debts in the schedule to the petition presented to the Dorking county court, independent of those stated in the schedule to the petition of 1843, amounted to 2421. Os. 1d. Upon this, the attorney for the opposing creditor submitted that the judge of the county court had no jurisdiction to grant the protection prayed, as the debts under the two insol vencies together amounted to 4617. 17s. 11d., the whole of which was still unpaid, and requested the judge to abstain from further proceedings. The judge, however, decided upon granting the interim order, and fixed the 18th of July, 1851, for granting the final order. Before that time a summons for a writ of prohibition had been issued at chambers, and the matter had been referred by Patteson, J., to the full court, the county court judge being requested to renew the interim order in the mean time. Upon affidavits stating these facts, Keane now moved for a rule calling upon the judge of the county court, and on Bowen, to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue to restrain the judge from further proceeding upon the said petition. Under the 5 and 6 Vict. c. 116, s. 1, the power to grant protection from process exists, in the case of a trader, only where he owes "debts amounting in the whole to less than 300l." According to the literal meaning of those words, this trader owes debts exceeding 3007., because although under the former order the petitioner is protected from being taken or detained by any process in respect of the then existing debts, those debts still remain owing by him. The remedy is barred, but the debts are not extinguished. 7 and 8 Vict. c. 96, s. 22. The final order is a protection only to the petitioner himself; it does not operate in favor of his heirs, executors, or administrators, as a discharge does under the 1 and 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 91. The discharge by the Insolvent Court of a person against whom a judgment has been obtained in the county court does not satisfy the judgment. Abley v. Dale, 20 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) C. P. 33; s. c. 1 Eng. Rep. 359. [LORD CAMPBELL, C. J. Is he not somewhat in the position of an uncertificated bankrupt?] The whole estate, present and future, is vested in the assignees under the first order. 5 and 6 Vict. c. 116, ss. 7, 9. What he now has is therefore equally liable for the old as for the new debts, and any order to be made upon the present petition must (if operative at all) operate on the old as well as on the new debts. But the second petition is altogether void. [WIGHTMAN, J. If so, there is no need to have a prohibition.] The creditor may suffer great hardship if this protection is granted, and he ought not to be compelled to run the risk of issuing execution against the insolvent. [LORD CAMPBELL, C. J. Supposing a judge erroneously decides that a debt is barred by the Statute of Limitations, could you apply for a prohibition?] If an inferior judge decides that he has jurisdiction, a prohibition In re Bowen. will lie if in truth he has no jurisdiction. Thompson v. Ingham, 19 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Q. B. 189. Here he has erroneously decided that the trader does not owe the former debts within the meaning of the 5 and 6 Vict. c. 110; and prohibition will lie where an inferior court puts a wrong construction upon an act of parliament. [LORD CAMPBELL, C. J. In that case the county court was expressly forbidden to try a question of title, and the judge's decision could not alter the fact of title coming in question. Here he has jurisdiction to inquire whether the trader owes debts less than 300%] LORD CAMPBELL, C. J. I give no opinion whether these former debts are or are not to be reckoned as part of that in respect of which the trader seeks to be protected. It seems to me that upon this motion we are called upon to decide that question, because the county court judge had jurisdiction to inquire whether the debts owing by the trader were below or above 3007. in the whole, and he had a right to decide whether what remained due under the former insolvency was to be taken into account or not; and we cannot review his decision, even if it were erroneous. If it were not so, wherever a county court judge made a mistake in summing up what was due from a petitioner, we should be asked to review his decision. If he were to say a debt is barred by the statute when it is not barred, the party against whom he decides might then come to this court; and so in almost every case of a decision which the party considers wrong. If the present applicant wishes to dispute the validity of this order, he may do so in another mode. If the judge had no authority - to make it, it is a mere nullity, and can do no harm. We are not, therefore, called upon to interfere. PATTESON, J. I am afraid that this point must be raised in some other way. If there is, in fact, more than 300l. owing from the trader, the protection would be unavailing, and if an action were brought and the protection pleaded, the question might be raised upon the record. But I do not think we can grant a prohibition. This is not exactly like Gould v. Gapper, 5 East, 345, where it was held that prohibition lies where a spiritual court puts a wrong construction upon a statute. The county court is different from a court of peculiar jurisdiction. It is a temporal court, which proceeds upon the same rules as we do ourselves; and therefore we cannot interfere when it has decided upon the construction of a statute in a matter over which it clearly has jurisdiction to inquire. WIGHTMAN, J. The county court judge has authority to grant a protection from process to any trader who owes debts amounting in the whole to less than 300l. He must, therefore, have jurisdiction to inquire into the amount of the debts, and to form his judgment upon the fact. In arriving at this decision many points of law may arise, -for example, whether a debt is barred by the Statute of Limitations or not; and we cannot review his judgment if he decides wrongly on any such point of law. Thompson v. Ingham is different Chippendale v. The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company. from the present case. There a question of title came directly in issue, which the county court is by the statute expressly forbidden to try, and the only remedy there was by a prohibition. Here, if the protection is erroneously granted it is a mere nullity, and there would be little use in our prohibiting the proceedings. Rule refused. COUNTY COURT APPEAL. CHIPPENDALE V. THE LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY COMPANY.1 November 26, 1851. Carrier― Liability for Damage to Goods-Contract restricting Liability-Live Stock-Railway Company. The plaintiff, who had some cattle conveyed by a railway company, received for them a ticket, which he signed, containing the terms on which the railway company carried the cattle. At the foot of the ticket there was a clause: "N. B.-This ticket is issued subject to the owner undertaking all risks of conveyance whatever, as the company will not be liable for any injury or damage howsoever caused, and occurring to live stock of any description travelling upon the L. and Y. Railway, or in their vehicles." The plaintiff saw the cattle put into the truck. During the journey some of the cattle got alarmed and broke out of the truck and were injured. The truck was so defectively constructed as to be unfit and unsafe for the conveyance of cattle : Held, that there was no implied stipulation that the truck should be fit for the conveyance of cattle; and that the company were protected by the terms of the ticket from liability to the plaintiff for the damage to the cattle. THE following case was stated, by the judge of the County Court of Lancashire holden at Wigan, on an appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench. This is an action brought in the County Court of Lancashire, holden at Wigan, to recover the sum of 221. 4s. the amount of da mages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of the negligence and carelessness of the defendant's servants at Wigan, whereby the plaintiff suffered the loss of three heifers, which were alleged to have been intrusted to the defendants as carriers for hire, and also for incidental expenses incurred in and about the same. On the trial of the cause, in the said court, before William Adam Hulton, Esq. the judge of the same court, and a jury duly summoned to try the same, on Tuesday the 22d of July last, the following facts appeared in evidence:- The plaintiff is a dealer in cattle, and the defendants are common carriers by railway for hire, from, among other places, Wigan aforesaid to Bury, in the said county of Lancashire. On the 28th of May last the plaintiff's drover brought twelve head of cattle to the Wigan station of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, for the purpose of being conveyed upon their railway to Bury aforesaid, a distance of sixteen miles, and they were 121 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Q. B. 22; 15 Jur. 1106. Coram COLERIDGE, J. and ERLE, J. |