sideration. Such was the case of Collins v. Blantern (a), which was the case of a prosecution for perjury. It is strange that such a doubt should ever have been raised. A contrary decision would have placed it in the power of a private individual to make a profit to himself by doing a great public injury. It is difficult to comprehend the case of Johnson v. Ogilby (b) as stated in Peere Williams's Reports. There a prosecution for a fraud was suppressed, and that suppression made the consideration for an agreement to pay money. The distinction between felony and misdemeanour seems to have been the foundation of the decision, if it was made, by Lord Talbot, a distinction overruled in Collins v. Blantern (a), which was decided at a later period. It is not, indeed, at all clear that the indictment for the fraud was compromised, as a part of the agreement, or that the fraud was an indictable one: and perhaps the case may be so explained. If not, it cannot, we conceive, be sustained as law. In Drage v. Ibberson (c), however, Lord Kenyon adverted to, and stated that he should adhere to, the class of cases which held that the consideration for an agreement, being the settling of a misdemeanour, might be good in law. Thus a settlement of an indictment for a nuisance, preferred by public authority, was held (d) a lawful consideration for a bond binding the defendant to remove the nuisance; we presume, on the ground, which however is not very satisfactory, that the main object of the prosecution, the removal of the nuisance, was thereby effected. But the Court seem to have (a) 2 Wils. 341. 347. (c) 2 Esp. N. P. C. 643. (d) Fallowes v. Taylor, 7 T. R. 475. (b) 3 P. Wms. 277. 279. Queen's Bench. 1846. KEIR V. LEEMAN. Volume 1X. 1846. KEIR V. LEEMAN. overlooked the consideration that a defendant who had Bousfield (c) be reconciled with it. nor can Pool v. There an agreedefendant, that he ment to stifle a motion against the But there is a class of cases, such as Beeley v. Wingfield (d) and Baker v. Townsend (e), which do not at all break in upon sound principles. These are cases where the private rights of the injured party are made the subject of agreement, and where, by the previous conviction of the defendant, the rights of the public are also preserved inviolate. As Gibbs C. J., in the latter case, well observes, "the parties have referred nothing but what they have a right to refer. They have referred the several assaults" (by which we understand him to mean their several rights to damages for those assaults); "these may be referred. They have referred the right of possession; that may be referred. The reference of all matters in dispute refers all other their civil rights;" which words shew our previous interpretation to be correct. The case of Beeley v. Wingfield (d) was after conviction; and the promissory note seems merely (a) 5 East, 294. · (c) 1 Camp. 55. (b) 7 T. R. 475. (d) 11 East, 46. (e) 7 Taun. 422. 1846. to have been given for the expences of the prosecution, Queen's Bench. and was obviously a part of the punishment inflicted by the Court after conviction of the offence. Indeed it is very remarkable what very little authority there is to be found, rather consisting of dicta than decisions, for the principle, that any compromise of a misdemeanour, or indeed of any public offence, can be otherwise than illegal, and any promise founded on such a consideration otherwise than void. If the matter were res integra, we should have no doubt on this point. We have no doubt that, in all offences which involve damages to an injured party for which he may maintain an action, it is competent for him, notwithstanding they are also of a public nature, to compromise or settle his private damage in any way he may think fit. It is said, indeed, that in the case of an assault he may also undertake not to prosecute on behalf of the public. It may be so: but we are not disposed to extend this any further. In the case before us, the offence is an assault coupled with riot and the obstruction of a public officer. No case has said that it is lawful to compromise such an offence. Nor do we think that the assent of the Judge was material. We entirely agree in the observations of the Court of Queen's Bench as to this part of the case: and we think the judgment of the Queen's Bench must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. KEIR LEEMAN. Volume IX. 1846. Declaration alleged that plaintiff was IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. (Error from the Queen's Bench.) PARTRIDGE against The Governor and Company of the Bank of ENGLAND. CASE. The 1st count of the declaration stated that plaintiff was proprietor of and entitled to a certain proprietor of a share in the 3 reduced annuities, in the management of defendants (Governor &c. of The Bank of England) for certain reward &c., and was entitled to receive certain dividends, his share standing in the books for the purpose of their paying him, on request, the accruing dividends, when sufficient money had been received by them: whereupon defendants became liable, and it was their duty, to pay plaintiff on request, when sufficient money had been received by them, all dividends due to him that, while plaintiff was possessed of the share, a dividend became due to him, and sufficient money had been received by defendants &c., and they were requested by plaintiff to pay him his dividend, and a reasonable time had elapsed: but they had not paid. share or interest, to wit 30837. 4s. 3d., in a certain public : Plea that by usage and custom of bankers and merchants in London, for divers, to wit sixty, years past, the drafts of defendants upon their cashiers, called dividend warrants, are transferable and assignable by delivery only, and a bonâ fide holder thereof is entitled to payment by defendants on demand that W. had received from defendants such warrant for payment of the dividend in question, under a power of attorney from plaintiff, authorizing W. to receive and give receipts for dividend, and had delivered the warrant to L. for good consideration then moving from L. to W., and that L., while lawful holder of the warrant, had demanded payment from defendants and required them to hold the money for his use. Held, by the Court of Q. B., on a replication traversing the above allegations, except the execution of the power and delivery to W.; 1. That the allegation of usage was satisfied by proof that dividend warrants, with the receipt subscribed, are passed from hand to hand like bank notes, and are paid by the Bank cashiers to any one who presents them after a certain day : 2. That the alleged consideration was proved by shewing that, before the dividend was due, L., a banker, had discounted a promissory note of and for W., his customer, payable on a day subsequent to the delivery of the warrant by W. to L., and that the warrant was delivered to secure payment to L. of the note when due; although at the time of delivery the cash balance at L's bank was in favour of W., and the note was not due till after the day for payment on the warrant. But, Held, by the Court of Exchequer Chamber, that the plaintiff was entitled to judg ment on the record: because, 1. The power, as pleaded, did not authorize receiving payment by a warrant and it did not appear, by plea or by any statute, that it was a usual mode of paying dividends to give a warrant. 2. It did not appear that defendants had become liable to pay L, the warrant not being negotiable by the general law, and the supposed custom not appearing to be an immemorial custom in the particular place, nor an usage of trade of which plaintiff was cognisant. 3. L. was not averred to be a bonâ fide holder, but only to have taken for value; and the averment, as above, of his being lawful holder, did not supply the defect. stock called the 37. 10s. per cent. reduced annuities &c., transferable at defendants' bank, and in their care and management for certain reward &c. and that plaintiff was entitled to receive in respect thereof interest or dividends on 5th April and 10th October in each year. That, at the time of the grievances &c., the said share &c. of plaintiff was standing in defendants' books in his name, and in their care and management for the purpose of paying to him on request, when sufficient money had been issued by Her Majesty and received by defendants for that purpose, all dividends and interest from time to time due to plaintiff in respect of his share in the said stock, whilst such share was not transferred by plaintiff's authority; by reason whereof defendants became liable, and it was their duty, to pay plaintiff on request, when sufficient money had been issued and received by them &c., all dividends &c. from time to time due to plaintiff. The count then averred the accruing, to wit 5th April 1841, of the half-yearly dividend of (to wit) 53l. 19s. 1d. due to plaintiff; the issuing, and receipt by defendants, of sufficient money &c.; request by plaintiff to pay, and refusal by defendants, although a reasonable time had elapsed &c. The 2d count was for nonpayment of a dividend due on other stock of the plaintiff. The 3d count, in trover, for two pieces of paper with print and writing thereon, called dividend warrants, purporting to be orders &c., addressed to the cashiers of defendants' bank, to pay plaintiff the sums of &c. Pleas. 1. Not guilty. 2. To the last count, Not possessed. 3. To the first count, that, whilst plaintiff was entitled to the said share or interest &c., and to receive the interest &c. thereon, and before the said half yearly interest or dividends became due to plaintiff, to wit on |